Board nationality diversity: its measurement, determinants, and impacts on firm value and accounting conservatism by Metwally, Tarek Mahmoud Mosaad
Metwally, Tarek Mahmoud Mosaad (2021) BOARD 
NATIONALITY DIVERSITY: ITS MEASUREMENT, 
DETERMINANTS, AND IMPACTS ON FIRM VALUE 
AND ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM. PhD thesis, 
University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/65562/1/Thesis%20Metwally.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
This article is made available under the University of Nottingham End User licence and may 
be reused according to the conditions of the licence.  For more details see: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf






BOARD NATIONALITY DIVERSITY: ITS MEASUREMENT, DETERMINANTS, AND IMPACTS 
ON FIRM VALUE AND ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM FOR THE DEGREE OF 




TAREK MAHMOUD MOSAAD METWALLY 
NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSITY BUSINESS SCHOOL 




The composition of corporate boards has been under intense scrutiny by regulators 
since the collapse of Enron in 2002. An aspect of board composition is board diversity, 
which has gained the attention of regulators since 2003. Yet, empirical evidence on the 
outcomes of board diversity is inconclusive. One potential reason for the inconclusive 
results on board nationality diversity is that it has upside and downside aspects that 
should be accounted for simultaneously. In particular, I propose that any outcome of 
this diversity is the sum of the effects of two opposing forces: the level of diversity and 
the strength of cultural separation. Drawing on theories of resource dependence and 
groupthink, the level of dissimilarity in directors’ nationalities expands the pool of 
resources at the board’s disposal and mitigates the harmful behaviour of groupthink. 
However, nationality diversity among board members is accompanied by differences 
in their cultural backgrounds, which may serve as bases for cultural separation. This 
separation may cause poor communication, internal conflicts, and lack of trust 
between board members. 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of how the 
above contrasting aspects of board nationality diversity may shape its outcomes. To 
this end, I distinguish between the upside and downside aspects of diversity in the 
first essay of this thesis. In this essay, I review the theoretical and empirical constructs 
of board diversity. I then introduce dissimilarity of director nationalities as a multi-
categorical measure that accounts for the composition of foreign board members, to 
capture the level of board nationality diversity. The second essay investigates the 
determinants and the performance outcome of board nationality diversity, after 
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accounting for its upside and downside aspects. Firm value is chosen to be the first 
outcome variable in this thesis as it is one of the most widely used proxies for board 
performance. In the third essay, accounting conservatism is chosen to be my second 
outcome variable. This is because diverse boards are found to adopt less risky 
financial policies. Therefore, I expect nationality-diverse boards and audit committees 
to demand greater accounting conservatism. 
The empirical tests in this thesis are based on large samples of UK firms over 
the period from 1999 to 2018. On the determinants of board nationality diversity, I 
find that the level of diversity is driven by the magnitude of foreign activities 
(measured by the proportion of foreign sales), rather than the number of geographical 
regions in which a firm operates. On the outcomes of board nationality diversity, I 
find that the level of diversity is associated with higher firm value. This association is 
not significantly mitigated by the strength of board cultural separation, but it is 
mitigated by the level of operational complexity. In addition, I find that levels of 
nationality diversity on the board and its audit committee positively impact 
accounting conservatism, whereas the strength of board cultural separation is not 
significantly related to accounting conservatism. 
This thesis makes five main contributions to the literature on board diversity, 
firm performance, and accounting conservatism. First, it proposes that the upside of 
diversity in multi-categorical attributes, such as nationality, is captured by the level of 
diversity. This level is maximized when each board member is unique in terms of the 
attribute under investigation. Second, it extends prior work on why foreign nationals 
exist on corporate boards by exploring why firms choose a given level of nationality 
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diversity on their boards. Third, it accounts for both the positive and the negative 
aspects of board nationality diversity simultaneously, to identify its net impacts on 
firm value and accounting conservatism. Fourth, it provides robust evidence that 
board nationality diversity is positively associated with firm value and this association 
is moderated by levels of firm complexity. Fifth, it provides robust evidence that 
nationality diversity on the board and its audit committee positively impact 
accounting conservatism. 
The findings of this thesis have implications for board diversity in both 
research and practice. First, it suggests that both the positive and the negative aspects 
of board diversity should be accounted for simultaneously. Second, it reviews a set of 
theoretical and empirical constructs of diversity that could be applied to diversity 
within other workgroups (e.g., top management teams and audit teams). Third, it 
cautions against the use of empirical proxies that do not map onto the theoretical 
construct under investigation. Fourth, it directs companies’ attention to unique 
boards, in which, each board member is dissimilar to other board members in terms 
of a non-binary diversity attribute. This board structure maximizes (minimizes) the 
positive (negative) aspect of diversity in a non-binary attribute such as nationality.  
Fifth, it shows that board nationality diversity provides net benefits to shareholders 
only under certain circumstances (i.e., when firms are complex). Sixth, it identifies a 
new source of variation in accounting conservatism by providing robust evidence that 
nationality diversity on the board and its audit committee matter for conservatism in 
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1.1. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Board diversity refers to differences in director attributes such as gender, age, 
and nationality (Harrison and Klein, 2007). Board diversity research is an extension of 
group dynamics research, which studies human behaviour within and between social 
groups, with attempts to understand, predict, and improve groups’ processes and 
interactions and, hence, improve groups’ effectiveness. The literature on board 
diversity is rooted in the fact that organizations do not make decisions, but people in 
charge do (Kachelmeier, 2010). It is also based on the premise that differences in 
director attributes capture conscious and subconscious differences in mentality and 
behaviour among board members (Riordan and Wayne, 2008). 
Recommendations for best practice in relation to board structure in the UK are 
contained in the Corporate Governance Codes, which are updated every few years, 
informed at times by reports from business leaders. The Higgs Review of the Role and 
Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors is one such report (Higgs, 2003). Research 
commissioned by the review committee chairman, Derek Higgs, revealed that only 
6% of UK non-executive directors were female, and only 7% were non-British. These 
findings motivated the UK regulator1 to commission the Dean of London Business 
School, Laura Tyson, to prepare a report on ‘The Recruitment and Development of 
Non-Executive Directors’ (Tyson, 2003). In it, Tyson argues that board diversity is an 
important area for improvement on UK boards. She talks about diversity in relation 
 
1 At the time, this was the Department for Trade and Industry, the DTI. 
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to “background, experience, age, gender, ethnicity and nationality”. Both Higgs (2003) and 
Tyson (2003) discuss the benefits of increasing ethnic diversity on boards, an issue 
which is addressed more thoroughly in the Parker Report (Parker, 2017). This report 
acknowledges that board diversity is a multi-dimensional concept, which includes 
many dimensions other than gender such as ethnicity and nationality. The report then 
makes the business case for ethnic diversity, citing positive benefits such as the 
reduction of groupthink, increasing the board’s ability to deal with a more diverse 
range of stakeholders, access to a global talent pool, and improved understanding of 
cultural sensitivities in a global supply chain. The same benefits apply to nationality 
diversity, which is regarded in the report as a potential source for ethnic-diverse 
candidates with valuable expertise. Although the benefits of ethnic diversity and 
nationality diversity may overlap, the two constructs are different. In a second report 
by Sir Parker, firms are encouraged not to use director nationality (among other 
constructs) as a proxy for director ethnicity in their annual reports; rather they are 
recommended to distinguish clearly between these constructs (Parker, 2020). 
These shifts in attitude to the composition of UK boards, and evidence of 
changes in practice, have sparked a stream of literature which attempts to quantify 
the determinants and consequences of board diversity in various ways. Yet, this 
stream of research has yielded inconclusive results on the outcomes of board 
nationality diversity. For example, Estélyi and Nisar (2016) find that foreign nationals 
on UK boards are associated with higher firm performance. Delis, Gaganis, Hasan and 
Pasiouras (2017) argue that differences in genetic origins between board members 
bring creative approaches for solving corporate problems. Using a sample of UK- and 
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North American-listed firms, they find a positive association between board genetic 
diversity and firm performance. In contrast, Frijns, Dodd and Cimerova (2016) find 
that nationality diversity on UK boards brings cultural differences that negatively 
affect firm performance. Hahn and Lasfer (2016) find that UK firms with foreign non-
executive board members have lower board meeting frequency.  The fewer board 
meetings are then associated with lower shareholder returns and higher 
compensation for the CEO and the chairman. Further, Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki 
(2017) use a sample of 62,066 firm-years from eighty countries, including the UK, to 
investigate the impact of foreign independent directors on firm performance. They 
find, on average, no significant differences in firm value between firms with and 
without foreign independent board members. However, the presence of these board 
members is negatively associated with shareholder value when their home countries 
have lower quality legal institutions than those of the firm’s host country. Empirical 
UK-based evidence on the value of board nationality diversity is therefore 
inconclusive. This issue thus merits further investigation. 
One potential reason for the inconclusive results is that board nationality 
diversity has upside and downside aspects that should be accounted for 
simultaneously.  The upside aspect refers to the level of dissimilarity in directors’ 
nationalities, which is maximized when the nationality of each board member is 
unique (i.e., dissimilar to the nationalities of other board members). The downside 
aspect refers to the strength of cultural subgrouping, which is maximized when board 
members are subdivided into two equal-sized subgroups who are at the opposite 
endpoints of a set of cultural dimensions (Harrison and Klein, 2007; Carton and 
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Cummings, 2013). The first essay of this thesis establishes that board diversity has 
different aspects, such as the level of uniqueness in directors’ nationalities and the 
strength of cultural separation on the board. It also demonstrates that each of these 
aspects (constructs) should be measured differently. Therefore, this essay investigates 
two main questions. First, what are the theoretical constructs of board diversity? 
Second, how should each construct be measured? 
In my second and third essays, I draw on theories of resource dependence 
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) and groupthink (Janis, 1972) to argue that nationality-
diverse boards can be more effective than homogeneous (all-domestic) boards. This is 
because unique board members, who do not share the same nationality with any other 
members of the same board, expand the pool of resources at the board’s disposal and 
mitigate the harmful behaviour of groupthink. I also build on the faultline theory (Lau 
and Murnighan, 1998) to suggest that a strong separation between cultural subgroups 
may reduce the overall effectiveness of the board. Accordingly, the level of board 
nationality diversity can be beneficial, but it may be accompanied by strong cultural 
separation that is detrimental to board performance. To capture board cultural 
separation, I follow Frijns et al. (2016) and attach four cultural scores to each board 
member based on their country of nationality. According to Hofstede (2001), the 
scores quantify four dimensions of national culture: (i) the individualism score 
measures the disintegration level of individuals from their families or other groups in 
a society; (ii) the masculinity score captures the degree of social preference for 
achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for success; (iii) the power 
distance score quantifies the degree of social acceptance for an unequal distribution of 
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power among individuals; (iv) the uncertainty avoidance score proxies for the degree 
of intolerance towards risk and ambiguity.  
I then ask three main questions in the second essay. First, what are the 
determinants of the level of board nationality diversity? Second, does this diversity 
add value to shareholders? Third, do board cultural separation and firm complexity 
moderate any relationship between this diversity and firm value?  The third question, 
thus, considers two potential moderators: board cultural separation and firm 
complexity. The former is based on the argument that diversity costs are higher for 
firms with stronger board cultural separation compared to those without (Frijns et al., 
2016). The latter is based on the proposition that diversity benefits are higher for firms 
with higher complexity of operations compared to those without (Anderson, Reeb, 
Upadhyay and Zhao, 2011). 
The third essay extends the debate on whether nationality diversity is beneficial 
or detrimental to the effectiveness of the board and its audit committee in monitoring 
the firm’s financial reports. In particular, I argue that higher nationality diversity on 
the board and its audit committee will reduce risk taking in financial reporting, 
leading to greater conservatism in financial reporting. This is because theories of 
groupthink (Janis, 1972) and resource dependence (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) suggest 
that this diversity improves the independence and the expertise of boards and audit 
committees. Diverse boards are then found to adopt less risky financial policies. For 
example, Bernile, Bhagwat and Yonker (2018) find that higher diversity on boards is 
associated with less reliance on debt financing. Diverse boards are also more likely to 
distribute free cash flow as dividend payouts, thereby mitigating agency costs (Bernile 
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et al., 2018; Chen, Leung and Goergen, 2017). Therefore, the third essay investigates 
the following question: do nationality diversity on the board and the audit committee 
(which is responsible for monitoring the firm’s financial reporting) affect accounting 
conservatism? 
1.2. RESEARCH IMPORTANCE 
Since the collapse of Enron in 2002, there have been considerable concerns 
among investors, academics, practitioners, and regulatory authorities of different 
countries about the appropriate composition of corporate boards which would 
contribute to effective decision making and value creation (Kim, Mauldin and Patro, 
2014; Gul, Hutchinson and Lai, 2013; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2012). An aspect of board 
composition is board diversity, which has recently gained the attention of regulators, 
market participants, and the media (Bernile et al., 2018).2 
One justification for the importance of board diversity is to ensure social justice 
(Dijk, Engen and Paauwe, 2012). Scholars and regulators have also offered some 
economic-based justifications. For example, diversity mitigates ‘groupthink’, which is 
cited in relation to the collapse of Enron (O’Connor, 2003) and the Volkswagen 
emissions scandal (Glebovskiy, 2019). From a resource dependence perspective 
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978), diversity expands the pool of talents, skills and 
knowledge that are available at the board’s disposal. In contrast, the faultline theory 
cautions that diversity may lead to subgroup formation on boards, causing internal 
 
2 Other aspects of board composition include whether the board follows a two-tier or one-tire 
structure and whether the board has any committees. 
16 
 
conflicts between subgroups within the boardroom (e.g., Lau and Murnighan, 1998; 
Van Peteghem, Bruynseels and Gaeremynck, 2018). 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of how these 
contrasting theories may shape the outcomes of board nationality diversity. To this 
end, I distinguish between the different views of this diversity. Proponents of 
diversity emphasise its positive aspect (i.e., the level of diversity). However, this 
diversity is accompanied by some negative aspects (e.g., cultural separation). I 
contribute to this debate by introducing dissimilarity proportion as a proxy for the 
level of diversity in a multi-categorical attribute (e.g., nationality). This measure maps 
onto the way in which diversity is seen from the resource dependence and the 
groupthink perspectives. This is because it accounts for the nationality composition of 
foreign directors rather than considering all of them as a homogeneous set of people. 
At the same time, I account for the faultline view of diversity by employing a measure 
of the strength of cultural faultlines as a proxy for cultural separation on nationality-
diverse boards. Therefore, this thesis offers a more nuanced story on the outcomes of 
board nationality diversity. 
1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis begins, in Essay 1, by distinguishing categorical-scaled attributes 
(e.g., gender and nationality) from continuous-scaled attributes (e.g., age and cultural 
dimensions). Next, it distinguishes between three theoretical constructs of diversity 




Case-based asymmetry refers to favouring or disfavouring certain directors of 
interest (the case directors) over other directors (the base directors). For example, 
female-based asymmetry reaches its maximum when all board members are women. 
This construct is typically measured by using the percentage of female directors on 
the board (e.g., Gul, Srinidhi and Ng, 2011; Lai, Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2017; Levi, Li, 
and Zhang, 2014; Chen et al., 2017; Liu, Wei, and Xie, 2014; Liao, Luo, and Tang, 2015; 
Haque, 2017; McGuinness, Vieito, and Wang, 2017; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Sila, 
Gonzalez and Hagendorff, 2016; Dong, Girardone and Kuo, 2017). 
Harrison and Klein (2007) refer to balanced diversity and unique diversity as 
two forms of diversity as variety, which is defined as qualitative differences that 
reflect dissimilarity in information, knowledge, or experience among board members. 
I argue that balanced diversity and unique diversity are different theoretical 
constructs. Balanced diversity refers to an equal board representation of two or more 
categories of an attribute (e.g., gender balance), whereas unique diversity refers to the 
distinctiveness of board members from each other. Unique diversity reaches its 
maximum when every board member is unique (or dissimilar to all other board 
members) in terms of the attribute under investigation. For example, nationality 
diversity is maximized when the nationality of each board member is unique (or 
distinctive) from the nationalities of other board members, indicating that each 
director is a distinctive resource (Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
For each of the three theoretical constructs, I develop a set of desirable 
properties (or criteria) for an empirical construct that maps onto it. I then review four 
potential proxies for each construct to identify the best current proxy for it. 
18 
 
In addition, the first essay demonstrates that unique diversity applies to 
continuous-scaled attributes (e.g., age). This diversity reaches its theoretical maximum 
when a continuous-scaled attribute is evenly distributed among board members such 
that each point along a continuum is represented (Harrison and Klein, 2007). I then 
introduce a new measure, called Uniqueness index, to capture this type of diversity. I 
also distinguish this type of diversity from other types, including diversity as 
separation, which is introduced by Harrison and Klein (2007). 
I next move on to find a setting where different theoretical constructs (aspects) 
of diversity may have led to inconclusive results in the literature. Board nationality 
diversity in the UK is chosen because: (i) the literature has mainly regarded foreign 
directors as a homogeneous set of actors, thereby masking variations among them; (ii) 
variations in directors’ nationalities are deemed relatively high in the UK compared 
to US samples (Frijns et al., 2016); (iii) empirical UK-based evidence on the outcomes 
of board nationality diversity is inconclusive (e.g., Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Frijns et al., 
2016). I then follow an archival research methodology in my second and third essays, 
employing large samples of UK-domiciled non-financial firms that are listed on the 
London Stock Exchange over twenty years from 1999 to 2018. Board data is mainly 
collected from BoardEx database. I fill in missing age and nationality data for board 
members using FAME database whenever available. Financial data is obtained from 
Worldscope, except for data on foreign and institutional ownership and stock returns 
that are collected from Datastream database. 
In both essays, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are used to obtain the 
baseline results. A major concern with these results is the potential endogenous nature 
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of the relationships of board nationality diversity with firm value and accounting 
conservatism.  In the second (third) essay, the endogeneity problem occurs when 
foreign directors are not randomly distributed among firms, and their representation 
on boards is indirectly related to firm value (accounting conservatism).  To mitigate 
this concern, I allow board nationality diversity (and audit committee nationality 
diversity) to be endogenous and implement instrumental variable tests using two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. The instrumental variables are mainly defined 
as the average values of the endogenous variables for firms headquartered within the 
same postcode area. The instruments are motivated by the role of the location of a 
firm’s headquarters in attracting foreign directors. For example, foreign directors are 
more likely to sit on boards of firms headquartered within 100 km of a large airport 
(Masulis et al., 2012) or within a large metropolitan area (Frijns et al., 2016). 
Accordingly, geographical proximity between firms’ headquarters can drive similar 
levels of nationality diversity on their boards.3 My instruments are thus likely to be 
correlated with a firm’s board nationality diversity level, but unlikely to have a direct 
association with firm value or accounting conservatism. 
1.4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
For categorical-scaled attributes of diversity, I find that case-based asymmetry, 
balanced diversity, and unique diversity are best captured by using the proportion of 
case directors (e.g., female directors and Anglo-American directors), proportional 
 
3 Prior studies have considered similarity in firm size (Faleye, 2015) and firm industry (Van 
Peteghem et al., 2018; Faleye, 2015) to drive similar corporate governance practices.  Likewise, similarity 




balance, and dissimilarity proportion, respectively. These findings suggest that 
different aspects (types) of board diversity should be measured differently. My first 
essay thus responds to calls for refining the measurement of board characteristics 
(Carcello, Hermanson, and Ye, 2011). 
In the second essay, I find that the level of board nationality diversity is driven 
by the magnitude of foreign activities (measured by the proportion of foreign sales), 
rather than the number of geographical regions in which a firm operates. This result 
is robust to a battery of control variables and is based on a two-limit Tobit estimation, 
which accounts for the fact that my measure of board nationality diversity is censored 
as its values range between zero and one. This result indicates that firms choose their 
level of board nationality diversity based on the magnitude of the economic benefits 
that they are likely to drive from it. This suggests that foreign nationals are appointed 
to the board for economic reasons. This is different from female directors, for example, 
who may be appointed to corporate boards to ensure social justice (Dijk et al., 2012).       
Next, I find that higher diversity is associated with higher firm value, after 
controlling for a wide range of board-level, firm-level, industry, and year controls. 
This relationship holds after addressing potential endogeneity by implementing an 
instrumental variable approach using 2SLS regressions. The results also hold after 
controlling for firm value in previous years (i.e., one and two lags of Tobin’s Q). 
Additionally, I find that my measure of the level of board nationality diversity is 
positively and significantly related to firm value after controlling for prior measures 
of diversity, including the proportion of foreign board members, the proportion of 
foreign non-executive board members, genetic diversity (Delis et al., 2017) and cultural 
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diversity (Frijns et al., 2016). Further, I find that the strength of board cultural 
separation does not significantly mitigate the positive impact of diversity on firm 
value. In particular, the coefficients on the interactions of my diversity measure with 
measures of board cultural separation have the expected signs but are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that board cultural separation increases the costs of diversity 
but not to the extent that they outweigh its benefits. Yet, I find that the positive impact 
of diversity on firm value is mitigated by levels of operational complexity, suggesting 
that board nationality diversity provides significant net benefits only for complex 
firms. 
In the third essay, I find that higher nationality diversity on the board and the 
audit committee is associated with greater accounting conservatism. The association 
is stronger for firms with high diversity on both the board and its audit committee. 
The results hold after addressing potential endogeneity by implementing 
instrumental variable tests using 2SLS regressions. The results are also robust to the 
use of fixed-effects models and the inclusion of a battery of board-level, firm-level, 
industry, and year controls. The findings suggest that foreign nationals who qualify 
for audit committee membership negatively impact its appetite for risk-taking in 
financial reporting. This effect is strengthened when nationality diversity on the audit 
committee is supported with a high level of nationality diversity on the board. The 





1.5. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis contributes to the literature on board diversity, board effectiveness 
and accounting conservatism in several ways. 
First, for categorical-scaled attributes, it distinguishes between balanced 
diversity and unique diversity as two different theoretical constructs of diversity, 
thereby extending the work of Harrison and Klein (2007), who regard both constructs 
to be the same. It also adds case-based asymmetry as a third theoretical construct. For 
each of the three constructs, I develop a set of desirable properties (or criteria) for an 
empirical measure that maps onto it. Based on these criteria, this study identifies the 
most appropriate available empirical proxy for each construct. Also, this study 
introduces combinations, as an alternative to categories, that allow for the 
measurement of balanced diversity across multiple categorical-scaled attributes of 
diversity. For example, the combinations in terms of directorship-type and gender are: 
(i) outside female directors; (ii) outside male directors; (iii) inside female directors; (iv) 
inside male directors. Diversity can then be constructed as balance between the four 
combinations. Accordingly, it reaches its maximum when the representation level of 
each combination is equal to that of the others. 
Second, this study demonstrates that unique diversity applies to continuous-
scaled attributes and introduces a new measure to capture it. Also, for continuous-
scaled attributes, this study uncovers the potential of ‘pairwise distances’, which 
captures differences between pairs of board members in an attribute, as a consistent 
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measurement basis to be used in measuring diversity constructs, including unique 
diversity and separation. 
Third, it accounts for the nationality composition of foreign directors by 
introducing a set of new measures to capture the level of nationality diversity, the 
strength of cultural faultlines, and the presence of marginalized foreign minorities on 
corporate boards. This measurement approach thus accounts for both the upside and 
the downside aspects of diversity: the level of diversity and the strength of cultural 
separation. This study also proposes the strength of cultural subgrouping along 
faultlines and the marginalization of foreign minorities as two channels through 
which board cultural separation may reduce the value of diversity to shareholders. 
Identifying these channels complements the work of Frijns et al., (2016), who find 
cultural differences among board members to be detrimental to firm value. 
Fourth, it extends earlier work on why foreign nationals exist on corporate 
boards (e.g., Estélyi and Nisar, 2016) by exploring why firms choose a given 
nationality diversity level on their boards. The findings suggest that the magnitude, 
rather than the number, of foreign activities matters for the level of board nationality 
diversity. Furthermore, this study provides evidence that board nationality diversity 
provides significant net benefits only for complex firms. 
Fifth, it responds to calls for exploring group dynamics on specialized 
committees of the board (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010 and Carcello et al., 
2011) by examining the impact of nationality diversity within the audit committee, 
which is responsible for monitoring the firm’s financial reporting, on accounting 
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conservatism. An area that has not been investigated in the accounting literature to 
date. This study also provides robust evidence that nationality diversity on the board 
and its audit committee positively impact accounting conservatism. 
This thesis has a set of implications for academic research on board diversity. 
First, it suggests that both the positive and the negative aspects of board diversity 
should be accounted for simultaneously. Second, it reviews a set of theoretical and 
empirical constructs of diversity that could be applied to diversity within other 
workgroups (e.g., top management teams and audit teams).  Third, it cautions against 
the use of empirical proxies that do not map onto the theoretical construct under 
investigation. Fourth, it introduces geographical proximity between firms’ 
headquarters as a potential driver for similar corporate governance practices. 
The thesis also has some practical implications. First, it directs companies’ 
attention to unique boards as diverse boards with potentially no faultlines nor 
marginalized members. This could help companies in the design of their optimal 
board diversity structures. Second, the thesis shows that board nationality diversity 
creates value for shareholders only when firms are complex.  This could help investors 
in developing a better understanding of the shareholder-value implications of board 
nationality diversity. Third, it identifies a new source of variation in conditional 
conservatism. This suggests that regulators could advocate higher levels of nationality 
diversity on corporate boards to achieve greater conservatism in financial reporting, 
thereby facilitating efficient contracting between market participants (including 
shareholders, debtholders, and managers). 
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THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSTRUCTS OF BOARD DIVERSITY 
 
ABSTRACT 
There is a debate on whether board diversity is beneficial or detrimental to board 
performance. Drawing on theories of groupthink and resource dependence, board 
diversity may reduce groupthink and enlarge the pool of expertise at the board’s 
disposal. Other theoretical frameworks, such as faultline theory, suggest that board 
diversity may cause separation and conflicts between board members. Therefore, 
board diversity has several theoretical and empirical aspects (constructs). This essay 
reviews these constructs. I distinguish between three constructs of diversity in 
categorical-scaled attributes: case-based asymmetry, balanced diversity, and unique 
diversity. I then develop three sets of criteria to assess how well current empirical 
proxies map onto these constructs. The study provides some guidance for enhancing 
the consistency of measurement in board diversity research. 
 
JEL classification: G30; G38; C10 





Board diversity has a general definition, multiple dimensions, and a set of 
different theoretical constructs (types). It is generally defined as differences in the 
attributes of board members. Its dimensions refer to the diversity attributes such as: 
gender, age, nationality, race, religion, social class, level of education, directorship-
type (outside directors vs. inside directors), tenure, political affiliation, network size 
and even hobbies and social club memberships. The theoretical constructs of board 
diversity refer to the conceptualizations of board diversity.  Harrison and Klein (2007) 
distinguish between three theoretical constructs of group diversity: variety, 
separation, and disparity. Variety refers to qualitative differences among board 
members that reflect dissimilarity in information, knowledge, or experience. This 
construct has been regarded as the upside of diversity as it enlarges board resources 
and reduces groupthink (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978 and Janis, 1972). Under this 
construct, the qualitative differences imply that the measurement scale of the diversity 
attribute must be categorical. In contrast, Harrison and Klein (2007) argue that 
separation and disparity apply only to continuous-scaled attributes. Accordingly, 
separation refers to quantitative differences in the position of board members along a 
continuum of a continuously scaled attribute. It has been regarded as a downside 
aspect of diversity as it may generate conflicts between subgroups of directors on the 
board (Lau and Murnighan, 1998 and Van Peteghem et al., 2018). Finally, disparity 
refers to inequality in the distribution of valued resources, such as pay and status, 
among board members. For example, a CEO pay disparity may reflect her/his 
privilege or power over other board members (Vo and Canil, 2019). 
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Guided by various theories, scholars have adopted different theoretical 
constructs of diversity, leading to inconclusive results on the outcomes of group 
diversity (Harrison and Klein, 2007). Less clear is how current empirical proxies map 
onto the different theoretical constructs of diversity. This essay attempts to fill this gap 
by asking two main questions. First, what are the theoretical constructs of board 
diversity? Second, how should each construct be measured? 
To answer these questions, I begin by distinguishing between nominal-scaled 
categorical attributes (hereafter referred to as categorical attributes) and interval-
scaled and ratio-scaled attributes (hereafter referred to as continuous attributes) of 
diversity. For categorical attributes (e.g., gender), the differences between categories 
of directors (e.g., male directors and female directors) are qualitative. These 
differences are therefore referred to as dissimilarities. For continuous attributes (e.g., 
age), the differences between directors vary in length. These differences are therefore 
referred to as distances. Both dissimilarities and distances have a minimum value of 
zero, which occurs when two directors are identical in any attribute. The maximum 
value for a pairwise dissimilarity between two directors is often assumed to be one, 
however no assumption is generally made about the maximum length of a pairwise 
distance between a pair of directors. A pairwise dissimilarity is therefore a special case 
of pairwise distances because it is assumed to have a fixed-length pairwise distance of 
one. 
Next, I extend the work of Harrison and Klein (2007) by distinguishing between 
three theoretical constructs of diversity in categorical attributes: case-based 
asymmetry, balanced diversity, and unique diversity. First, case-based asymmetry 
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refers to favouring or disfavouring certain directors of interest (the case directors) over 
other directors (the base directors).  This construct is asymmetric because it implies a 
bias for or against the case directors. It reaches its maximum when the board is 
composed entirely of the case directors. For example, female-based asymmetry 
reaches its maximum when all board members are women. Other examples include 
outsider-based asymmetry, Anglo-American-based asymmetry, and the asymmetry 
of outside Anglo-American directors. Under this construct, the interest is in the 
separate effect of the case directors regardless of the composition of the base directors. 
For binary attributes, I refer to this construct as asymmetric homogeneity because it 
reaches its maximum when the board is homogeneous.  From an agency perspective, 
for instance, outside directors are argued to be effective monitors of inside directors 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1998; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). In this 
setting, the existence of inside directors on the board is not especially interesting. The 
interest, however, is in the representation level of outside directors. Accordingly, 
asymmetric homogeneity, rather than diversity, is the theoretical construct. It reflects 
the level of representation (concentration) of outside directors on the board; in other 
words, it is the level of board homogeneity in terms of outside directors. It reaches its 
maximum (minimum) when all board members are outside (inside) directors. This 
homogeneity construct is therefore asymmetric (i.e., biased towards outside 
directors).4 Although asymmetric homogeneity is a special case of case-based 
asymmetry that applies only to binary attributes, the construct of case-based 
asymmetry also applies to multi-categorical attributes, such as nationality, and across 
 
4 Unlike the asymmetric homogeneity construct, a symmetric one will not differentiate between 
two cases of board homogeneity: homogeneity of outside directors and homogeneity of inside directors. 
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multiple categorical-scaled attributes of diversity. For example, the asymmetry of 
outside female directors implies that these directors are the case directors and other 
directors (including, outside male directors, inside female directors, and inside male 
directors) are the base directors. 
Second, balanced diversity refers to an equal board representation of two or 
more categories of an attribute. Under this construct, the interest is in the achievement 
of equality or fairness in the board representation of the categories. For example, 
gender balance on the board is advocated from a social justice perspective (Dijk, Engen 
and Paauwe, 2012). Thus, the notion of equity or fairness underlying balanced 
diversity is different from that underlying the construct of disparity, which is based 
on the notion of equality in the distribution of valued resources, such as pay and 
status, among board members. 
Third, unique diversity refers to the distinctiveness of board members from one 
another. For categorical attributes, it is maximized when every board member is 
distinctive or unique (i.e., dissimilar to all other board members) in terms of the 
attribute under investigation. For example, nationality diversity is maximized when 
the nationality of each board member is unique (or distinctive) from the nationalities 
of other board members, indicating that each director is a distinctive resource 
(Harrison and Klein, 2007). This construct reflects the resource dependence 
perspective on board diversity, where the interest is in the amount of non-overlapping 
skills, networks, and expertise that are available at the board’s disposal (Salancik and 
Pfeffer, 1978).  It is therefore the purest construct of board diversity. 
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Harrison and Klein (2007) refer to balanced diversity and unique diversity as 
two forms of diversity as variety. I argue that balanced diversity and unique diversity 
are different constructs and provide evidence that their empirical proxies rank boards 
differently.5  The definition of diversity as variety is more aligned to unique diversity 
(Harrison and Klein, 2007), whereas balance on the board can be an aspect of 
categorical separation (Carton and Cummings, 2013). This seems to run counter to the 
argument by Harrison and Klein (2007) that separation does not apply to categorical 
attributes. Yet, prior research (e.g., Lau and Murnighan, 1998 and Van Peteghem et al., 
2018) has shown that separation between subgroups of board members depends not 
only on continuous attributes, but also on categorical attributes of diversity. Since 
separation can form along a single diversity attribute (Harrison and Klein, 2007 and 
Lau and Murnighan, 1998), balanced diversity can be a form of categorical separation. 
If such is true, there are four constructs of diversity: asymmetry (i.e., case-based 
asymmetry), uniqueness (i.e., unique diversity), separation (including diversity as 
balance), and disparity. 
This study then moves on to investigate how each diversity construct (type) 
should be measured. For each of the three constructs of diversity that apply to 
categorical attributes, I develop a set of criteria to assess how well current empirical 
proxies map onto it. My assessment finds three guidelines for future research: (i) a 
proportion of case directors (e.g., outside directors) better captures case-based 
asymmetry compared to a dummy indicator or the number of these directors on the 
 
5 This evidence is presented in Table 4. 
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board; (ii) proportional balance excluding null categories6 (Carton and Cummings, 
2013) is preferred to capture balanced diversity rather than minority proportion, 
Blau’s (1977b) index, and Teachman’s (1980) index; (iii) a dissimilarity proportion 
(Simpson, 1949 and Rae and Taylor, 1970) is the best available empirical proxy for 
unique diversity in categorical attributes. 
This essay responds to recent calls to explore group dynamics in the boardroom 
and refine the measurement of board characteristics (Carcello, Hermanson, and Ye, 
2011). The essay makes theoretical and empirical contributions to board diversity 
research. On the theoretical side, it extends the work of Harrison and Klein (2007) by 
distinguishing between balanced diversity and unique diversity. It also adds case-
based asymmetry as a third theoretical construct.  In addition, it demonstrates that the 
construct of unique diversity applies to continuous attributes. For these attributes, 
unique diversity is maximized when a continuous attribute is evenly distributed 
among board members such that each point along a continuum is represented 
(Harrison and Klein, 2007). This means that both unique diversity and separation 
apply to any diversity attribute regardless of its underlying scale of measurement 
(categorical or continuous). 
On the empirical side, it develops a set of criteria that are used to identify the 
most appropriate empirical proxy for each the three theoretical constructs of diversity 
in categorical attributes. Further, it introduces combinations, as an alternative to 
categories, that allow for the measurement of balanced diversity across multiple 
 
6 When none of the board members belong to a category, this category is null. 
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categorical attributes of diversity. For example, the combinations in terms of 
directorship-type and gender are: (i) outside female directors; (ii) outside male 
directors; (iii) inside female directors; (iv) inside male directors. Diversity can then be 
constructed as balance between the four combinations. Accordingly, it reaches its 
maximum when the representation level of each combination is equal to that of the 
others. In terms of continuous attributes, I am aware of no available empirical proxy 
for unique diversity. Therefore, I develop a new measure, called Uniqueness index, to 
fill this gap. Finally, this essay extends the study of Biemann and Kearney (2010) by 
uncovering the links between dissimilarity proportion, mean Euclidean distance 
(MED), and Gini coefficient as proxies for unique diversity, separation, and disparity, 
respectively. Together, MED, Gini coefficient, and Uniqueness index can enhance the 
consistency of measurement across the three constructs of diversity that apply to 
continuous attributes because these proxies employ a consistent measurement basis, 
called pairwise distance.7 
The rest of this essay proceeds as follows.  Section 2.2 provides a review of the 
theoretical and empirical constructs of diversity in accounting, finance, and other 
fields of social science. Section 2.3 develops a set of criteria to assess how well current 
empirical proxies map onto the theoretical constructs of case-based asymmetry, 
balanced diversity, and unique diversity.  Section 2.4 applies the construct of unique 
diversity to continuous attributes and distinguishes it from other constructs of 
diversity in continuous attributes.  Section 2.5 demonstrates how multiple attributes 
of diversity can be combined using the concepts of combinations and faultlines.  
 
7 A pairwise distance captures the difference between a pair of directors in an attribute. 
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Section 2.6 discusses the potential of pairwise distance as a consistent measurement 
basis in board diversity research. Section 2.7 discusses my findings and concludes. 
2.2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The literature on board diversity in accounting and finance has mainly 
investigated the separate effects of certain directors of interest (e.g., female directors) 
on board/firm outcomes (e.g., Gul, Srinidhi and Ng, 2011; Lai, Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 
2017; Levi, Li, and Zhang, 2014; Chen, Leung and Goergen, 2017; Liu, Wei, and Xie, 
2014; Liao, Luo, and Tang, 2015; Haque, 2017; McGuinness, Vieito, and Wang, 2017; 
Sila, Gonzalez and Hagendorff, 2016; Dong, Girardone and Kuo, 2017). The theoretical 
arguments in this literature typically imply a bias against or in favour of board 
members who belong to one or more categories of an attribute (e.g., female directors, 
outside directors, or Anglo-American directors), or one or more combinations of 
categories across two or more attributes (e.g., outside female directors, outside Anglo-
American directors, or outside Anglo-American female directors). I refer to the 
directors of interest as the case directors. Directors other than those of interest are 
referred to as the base directors. In this context, case-based asymmetry is the relevant 
theoretical construct. It reflects the level of representation (concentration) of the case 
directors on the board. It is asymmetric because it favours or disfavours case directors 
over base directors on the board. Examples of this construct include the asymmetry of 
outside directors (Weisbach, 1998), retirement-age directors (Van Peteghem et al., 
2018), and outside Anglo-American directors (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). 
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From an agency perspective, for instance, a majority of outside directors on 
boards of large organizations (such as listed companies) is desired to enhance board 
independence and, hence, board effectiveness (Weisbach, 1998; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998). This is because outside directors usually hold senior positions in 
other large organizations which means: (a) that they possess expertise relevant to their 
monitoring role; and (b) the potential loss to their human capital from failing to 
provide effective scrutiny provides sufficient motivation for them to exercise their 
duty of care (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Another example is provided by Van Peteghem 
et al. (2018), who posit that directors’ career concerns decline as they approach 
retirement, suggesting that retirement-age directors (who are older than 65 years) are 
less effective monitors than their younger counterparts. In both examples, a single 
category is favoured (e.g., outside directors) or disfavoured (retirement-age directors) 
than the other categories of board members. Both are thus examples of asymmetry in 
terms of a single dimension of diversity (directorship-type or age). 
Case-based asymmetry is also applicable across two or more dimensions of 
diversity.  For example, using a sample of firms headquartered in Norway or Sweden, 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) view outsider Anglo-American board membership as a 
signal of a firm’s willingness to expose itself to improved corporate governance 
systems. In this setting, directors are classified based on two dimensions (attributes): 
directorship-type (outside directors vs. inside directors) and nationality (Anglo-
American directors: American, British, and Canadian directors vs. other directors). 




Asymmetric homogeneity is a special form of case-based asymmetry that 
reaches its maximum when the board is homogeneous. This form applies only to 
binary attributes and regards diversity as dissimilarity from a base-case category of 
directors such as inside directors or male directors. It reaches its minimum 
(maximum) when the board is composed entirely of the base (the case) directors. 
Therefore, it is not symmetric in its treatment of the two cases of board homogeneity. 
Case-based asymmetry also applies to multi-categorical attributes and across 
multiple categorical attributes. In this setting, the base directors or the case directors 
may belong to mixed categories of directors, thereby masking variations among them. 
For example, the asymmetry of Anglo-American directors involves classifying 
directors into Anglo-American directors (the case directors) versus other directors (the 
base directors).  In this example, both the case directors and the base directors may 
belong to mixed categories. Another example is the foreigner-based asymmetry that 
involves classifying directors into foreign directors (the case directors) versus 
domestic directors (the base directors).  In the second example, the case directors may 
belong to many mixed categories (i.e., nationalities), but the base directors belong to a 
single homogeneous category (nationality). 
In terms of the empirical constructs of board diversity, the accounting and 
finance research has frequently employed binary-categorization measures such as 
dummy variables, the size of case directors on the board, and the proportion of case 
directors on the board. These measures involve a classification of board members into 
case directors and base directors. 
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In the dummy-variable measurement approach, a board diversity indicator 
takes a value of one if a firm has at least one female director on board and zero 
otherwise (e.g., Gul et al., 2011; Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2011; Gul, Hutchinson and Lai, 
2013; Lai et al., 2017; Abbott, Parker and Presley, 2012); one female outside (non-
executive) director on board and zero otherwise (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Srinidhi et al., 2011; Gul et al., 2013); one female audit committee member on board 
and zero otherwise (e.g., Srinidhi et al., 2011; Gul et al., 2013); a critical mass of three 
female directors on board and zero otherwise (e.g., Liu et al., 2014); a critical mass of 
five female directors on board and zero otherwise (e.g., Gul et al., 2011); one female or 
foreign director on board and zero otherwise (e.g., Haque, 2017); one foreign director 
on board and zero otherwise (e.g., Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Giannetti, Liao and Yu, 
2015); one foreign independent director on board and zero otherwise (e.g., Masulis, 
Wang and Xie, 2012); one outside Anglo-American director, who is a citizen of either 
the US, Canada or the UK, on board and zero otherwise (e.g., Oxelheim and Randøy, 
2003); one director with foreign working experience, foreign education, or both, and 
zero otherwise (Giannetti et al., 2015). 
The size-of-case-directors approach counts the number of case directors on a 
board and uses that number or the natural logarithm of that number plus one as a 
proxy for board diversity. The number of female directors (Gul et al., 2011) and the 
number of directors with either foreign working experience, foreign education or both 




Unlike the size-of-case-directors approach, the proportion-of-case-directors 
approach involves scaling the number of case directors by board size or by a subgroup 
of board members. Under the latter approach, board diversity is typically measured 
by using proportions or percentages such as: female directors as a percent of all 
directors on a board (e.g., Gul et al., 2011; Lai et al., 2017; Levi et al., 2014; Chen et al., 
2017; Liu et al., 2014; Liao et al., 2015; Haque, 2017; McGuinness et al. 2017; Sila et al., 
2016; Dong et al., 2017); female independent directors as a percent of all directors on 
board (e.g., Chen et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2014); female inside (executive) directors as a 
percent of all directors on board (e.g., Chen et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2014); male 
independent directors as a percent of all directors on board (e.g., Chen et al., 2017); 
female outside (non-executive) directors as a percent of outside (non-executive) 
directors on board (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011); female directors 
as a percent of shareholder-elected directors on board (e.g., Bøhren and Staubo, 2014; 
Bøhren and Strøm, 2010); foreign directors as a percent of all directors on board (e.g., 
Giannetti et al., 2015; Dong et al., 2017); foreign non-executive directors as a percent of 
non-executive directors on board (e.g., Hahn and Lasfer, 2016); foreign independent 
directors as a percent of independent directors on board (e.g., Masulis et al., 2012). 
Although case-based asymmetry has been the most frequently used construct 
of diversity in the accounting and finance research, a few studies in this stream of 
research have adopted other theoretical constructs of diversity. For example, Frijns, 
Dodd and Cimerova (2016) conceptualize board nationality diversity as cultural 
separation between board members. To proxy for this construct of diversity, the 
authors introduce a modified version of the mean Euclidean distance (MED) measure 
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of separation. Disparity is another theoretical construct of diversity that has been 
adopted by Vo and Canil (2019) in examining two contrasting hypotheses on CEO pay 
disparity: efficient contracting and managerial power. Both separation and disparity 
have been introduced as theoretical constructs of group diversity by Harrison and 
Klein (2007) in the management literature. Therefore, I will discuss both constructs in 
detail below. 
Harrison and Klein (2007: 1200) develop three different constructs (types) of 
group diversity: variety, separation, and disparity. Variety refers to “differences in kind 
or category, primarily of information, knowledge, or experience among unit members.” This 
construct of diversity applies only to categorical attributes. In contrast, separation and 
disparity apply only to continuous attributes. The former is defined as “differences in 
position or opinion among unit members”, whereas the latter refers to “differences in 
concentration of valued social assets or resources such as pay and status among unit 
members—vertical differences that, at their extreme, privilege a few over many.”  The authors 
also propose two alternative proxies for each of the three constructs. Blau index and 
Teachman index are proxies for variety. Separation can be measured by using the 
standard deviation or MED. Coefficient of variation and Gini coefficient are 
alternative measures of disparity. 
None of the above three constructs has been widely used in the accounting and 
finance research on board diversity. Yet, the constructs of variety and separation have 
been frequently adopted in other disciplines—e.g., the management literature; 
organisational studies; sociology and psychology research (Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
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In their paper, Harrison and Klein (2007) refer to equal group representations 
of two or more categories of an attribute and the distinctiveness of group members 
from each other as two forms of diversity as variety. I extend their work by arguing 
that these two forms are different and providing evidence that the empirical proxies 
for these constructs do rank boards differently. I refer to the former (latter) as balanced 
diversity (unique diversity). Both constructs are discussed below. 
First, theories underpinning balanced diversity are free from any conceptual 
bias for or against certain directors of interest. Under this construct, diversity is 
conceptualized as an equal board representation of two or more categories of an 
attribute, or four or more combinations of categories across two or more attributes. 
Drawing on a social justice perspective, for instance, gender diversity is theoretically 
constructed as an equal representation of both female directors and male directors 
(Dijk et al., 2012). This construct of balance on the board is based on the notion of 
equity or fairness in the board representation of the categories/combinations. This is 
obviously different from the notion of equality, underlying the construct of disparity, 
in the distribution of valued assets or resources among board members.    
Second, the resource dependence theory (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) and 
theories of information/decision making (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998) suggest that 
diversity on the board enlarges its resources in terms of expertise, networks, and so 
forth. Such theories construct diversity as uniqueness, which refers to the 
distinctiveness of board members from each other.  Under this construct, the interest 
is in the amount of non-overlapping skills, networks, and expertise that every director 
brings to the board.  For categorical attributes, this construct should be at a maximum 
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when the number of categories on the board is equal to board size, indicating that each 
director belongs to a distinctive category (Harrison and Klein, 2007). For example, 
when the number of board members’ nationalities equals board size, nationality 
diversity as uniqueness reaches its maximum. 
The definition of diversity as variety is more aligned to unique diversity 
(Harrison and Klein, 2007), whereas balance on the board can be an aspect of 
categorical separation (Carton and Cummings, 2013). This seems to run counter to the 
argument by Harrison and Klein (2007) that separation does not apply to categorical 
attributes. Yet, prior research (e.g., Lau and Murnighan, 1998 and Van Peteghem et al., 
2018) has shown that separation between subgroups of board members depends not 
only on continuous attributes, but also on categorical attributes of diversity. Since 
separation can form along a single diversity attribute (Harrison and Klein, 2007 and 
Lau and Murnighan, 1998), balanced diversity can be a form of categorical separation. 
If such is true, there will be four refined constructs of diversity: asymmetry (i.e., case-
based asymmetry), uniqueness (i.e., unique diversity), separation (including diversity 
as balance), and disparity. The first construct applies only to categorical-scaled 
attributes, whilst the last one applies only to ratio-scaled attributes. Contrary to both 
constructs, separation and uniqueness apply to both categorical and continuous 
attributes. The next section reviews available empirical proxies for the three constructs 





2.3. DIVERSITY CONSTRUCTS FOR CATEGORICAL-SCALED ATTRIBUTES 
2.3.1. CASE-BASED ASYMMETRY 
By definition, case-based asymmetry requires a binary categorization of board 
members into case directors vs. base directors. To capture this construct, only a bi-
categorical measurement approach is applicable. Four empirical measures belong to 
this approach: a single-director dummy indicator, a critical-mass dummy indicator, 
the size of case directors on the board, and the proportion of case directors on the 
board.  To evaluate how well each of these measures captures case-based asymmetry, 
I use five assessment criteria: (i) the measure reaches its maximum only when the 
board is composed entirely of the case directors, i.e., when the number of these 
directors is equal to board size; (ii) it does not assign the same value to several 
distinctive levels of board representation of the case directors; (iii) it accounts for 
variations in board size in a systematic and unbiased way (Biemann and Kearney, 
2010); (iv) it occupies a tidy range of variation from zero to unity (Teachman, 1980; 
Harrison and Klein, 2007); (v) it is simple to understand and interpret (Coulter, 1989). 
The last three properties are general criteria.8 The criteria are not equally important. 
Although a single-director dummy indicator may work well for research on the 
characteristic(s) of an individual leader (e.g., the CEO and the CFO), its use in a group 
setting (such as the board of directors) is sometimes questionable. For case-based 
asymmetry, this measure does not satisfy Criteria (i) to (iii). However, it does meet 
Criterion (iv) as it ranges from zero, which indicates the absence of case directors on 
 
8 General criteria are desired for any empirical proxy of case-based asymmetry, balanced 
diversity, or unique diversity. 
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the board, to one, which is assigned to boards with different representation levels of 
the case directors. Similarly, a critical-mass dummy indicator satisfies Criterion (iv). It 
ranges from zero, which indicates the absence of a certain number (or percentage) of 
the case directors on the board, to one, which is assigned to boards with at least that 
certain number (or percentage) of the case directors on the board. Both dummy 
indicators are simple to understand and interpret, and thus, meet Criterion (v). To 
sum up, these indicators satisfy only two out of the five criteria (see Panel A of Table 
1). 
[Table 1 about here] 
Both the size and the proportion of case directors satisfy Criteria (i) and (ii) 
because they distinguish between all levels of board concentration in terms of the case 
directors. These measures also meet Criterion (v).9 Only the proportion measure, 
however, satisfies Criteria (iii) and (iv). This is due to scaling the size of case directors 
by board size.10 This proportion is hence the most appropriate empirical proxy for 
case-based asymmetry. 
Nevertheless, the use of dummy indicators can be justified in certain settings. 
For example, a single-director dummy indicator may be valid for use under the 
signalling theory, where the presence of at least one director of interest on the board 
is regarded as a signal to stakeholders (e.g., Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). In such 
 
9 Criterion (v) is not met in the case of using the natural logarithm of one plus the size of case 
directors. This is because the mathematical logic underlying the logarithmic formulation in this version 
is harder to understand compared to the simple version of counting the number of case directors 
(Coulter, 1989). 
10 Criterion (iii) is not satisfied in the case of scaling by a subgroup of board members. For 
example, the proportion of foreign directors among independent board members (Masulis et al., 2012). 
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settings, the proportion of case directors may proxy for the strength of the signal. Also, 
a critical-mass dummy indicator can be employed to capture firms’ compliance with 
a board diversity quota that requires boards to have a targeted number (or percentage) 
of certain directors of interest (e.g., female directors). This indicator, however, does 
not capture how much further a board is above or below the quota target (Greene, 
Intintolia and Kahle, 2020). 
2.3.2. BALANCED DIVERSITY 
Balanced diversity requires scaling director attributes as categorical. 
Accordingly, if 𝑝𝑖 is the proportion of directors in the ith category/combination, ∑ 𝑝𝑖 
must equal unity (Simpson, 1949; Teachman, 1980). This theoretical construct of 
diversity reaches its maximum when all 𝑝𝑖s are equal.11 Panel B of Table 1 presents 
nine desirable properties (criteria) for an empirical construct that maps onto balanced 
diversity, as follows. 
(a) It reaches its maximum only when each category (in the case of a single 
attribute) or combination (in the case of two or more attributes) includes an 
equal number of directors, i.e., all 𝑝𝑖s are equal (Blau, 1977a). 
(b) It can summarize variations among multiple categorical proportions of 
directors (𝑝𝑖s), where each 𝑝𝑖 belongs to one category/combination (Teachman, 
1980). 
(c) It is not biased towards one category/combination over another. It then should 
 
11 Blau (1977a) refers to balanced diversity as heterogeneity. He then argues that the more 
evenly divided people are among multiple ethnic groups, the higher the ethnic heterogeneity. 
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take the same value for all boards that have the same 𝑝𝑖s, regardless of which 
𝑝𝑖 belongs to which category/combination. It also should capture all cases of 
board homogeneity, i.e., it reaches its minimum value if any 𝑝𝑖 takes a value of 
one, indicating that all directors fall into the same category/combination 
(Teachman, 1980). 
(d) It does not assign the same value to several distinctive levels of categorical/ 
combinational balance. 
(e) It increases (decreases) by the same value per each director replacement that 
increases (decreases) the balance between two categories/combinations. This 
indicates equal weighting of all directors regardless of whether they belong to 
a unique, minority, or majority category/combination. 
(f) It is flexible to include or exclude null categories/combinations, i.e., those with 
𝑝𝑖 = zero (Coulter, 1989). 
(g) It accounts for variations in board size in a systematic and unbiased way 
(Biemann and Kearney, 2010). 
(h) It occupies a tidy range of variation from zero to unity (Teachman, 1980; 
Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
(i) It is simple to understand and interpret (Coulter, 1989). 
Four empirical measures meet the shape at the maximum property of balanced 
diversity, Criterion (a), and are therefore included in my review. The first one, 
minority proportion, belongs to the bi-categorical measurement approach. Whereas 
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the other three proxies (the Blau index, the Teachman index, and proportional balance; 
Blau, 1977b, Teachman, 1980, and Carton and Cummings, 2013) apply not only to bi-
categorical attributes but also to multi-categorical attributes and across two or more 
attributes. I evaluate each of these measures below. 
Minority proportion is a piecewise linear transformation of the proportion of a 
single category (e.g., female directors) on the board. It is given by the following 
formula: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = { 
𝑝1    | 𝑝1 ≤ 0.5
1 − 𝑝1| 𝑝1 > 0.5
 
(1) 
where: 𝑝1 is the number of directors who belong to a single category of a bi-
categorical attribute, as a proportion of all board members. Minority proportion 
reaches its maximum of 0.5 only when 𝑝1= 𝑝2, where 𝑝2 is the proportion of the other 
category of directors on the board. Minority proportion, therefore, satisfies Criterion 
(a). Yet, it fails to meet Criterion (b) because it is not applicable in cases of a multi-
categorical attribute or two or more attributes. 
Unlike the proportion of case directors, minority proportion is not biased 
towards certain directors in the boardroom.12 The latter proportion also distinguishes 
between all cases of bi-categorical balance on the board. It increases (decreases) by the 
same value per each director replacement, which increases (decreases) that balance. 
 
12 Using the proportion of case directors to capture bi-categorical balance on a board is 
justifiable only if this proportion is less than or equal to 0.5 for all firm-year observations. 
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This value is equal to one divided by board size (Panel A of Table 2 presents an 
example). Minority proportion thus meets Criteria (c) to (e). When a category is null, 
the minority proportion reaches its minimum value of zero. It is therefore not flexible 
to include/exclude the null category (if any), thereby failing to meet Criterion (f). Like 
the proportion of case directors, minority proportion satisfies Criteria (g) and (i). 
However, it does not meet Criterion (h), as it ranges from zero to 0.5. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Multi-categorical measurement approach offers two alternative indices: the 
Blau index (Blau, 1977b) and the Teachman index (Teachman, 1980).13 The former is 
based on a combinatorics model, whilst the latter is based on an entropy model 
(Coulter, 1989). The two indices are given in equations (2) and (3), respectively. 












13 Teachman (1980) points out that his index is originally developed by Shannon (1948) as a 
measure of uncertainty in communication. 
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where: 𝑝𝑖 is the proportion of board members in the ith category (of an 
attribute) or combination (across two or more attributes). K is the number of all 
possible categories/combinations. 
Harrison and Klein (2007) note that the maximum value for each of the two 
indices depends on K. This value is (K − 1)/K and ln(K) for the Blau index and the 
Teachman index, respectively.14 The maximum is reached when each of the K 
categories/combinations has an equal number of board members, satisfying Criterion 
(a). Given this equality, the higher the value of K, the higher the maximum value. 
Table 3 presents examples of the shape of balanced diversity at its maximum using a 
diversity attribute with six categories. As shown in Panel B of Table 3, the maximum 
values of the two indices are constant for any K, regardless of board size. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Contrary to the minority proportion, both indices apply to multi-categorical 
attribute(s), thereby meeting Criterion (b). The indices also satisfy Criteria (c) and (d). 
This is due to their equal treatment of all categories (or combinations) and their ability 
to distinguish between different cases of bi-categorical and multi-categorical balance 
on the board. 
The maximum value for the Blau index is always below one, yet the maximum 
value for the Teachman index exceeds unity in cases of K > 2. None of these indices 
thus satisfy Criterion (h), despite each of them having a minimum value of zero. The 
 
14 Harrison and Klein (2007) state that the maximum limit for the Teachman index is 
−1 × ln (
1
𝐾
), which is the same as ln(𝐾). 
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indices account for variations in board size, but not in a systematic and unbiased way 
(Biemann and Kearney, 2010). Therefore, they do not meet Criterion (g). 
The indices differ in the complexity level of their underlying mathematical 
logic. The Blau index is relatively simple to understand compared to the Teachman 
index. The former index is interpreted as the probability that a randomly and 
independently selected pair of directors will be diverse, i.e., the two directors belong 
to different categories (Simpson, 1949). In contrast, the mathematical logic underlying 
the logarithmic formulation of the latter index makes it harder to understand and 
interpret (Coulter, 1989). Criterion (i) is hence met by the former index, but not the 
latter. 
Although Harrison and Klein (2007) refer to balanced diversity as a form of 
diversity as variety, Carton and Cummings (2013) suggest that balance on board is 
more aligned to separation. Under the latter suggestion, it could be desirable to assign 
the same score to balanced boards, regardless of whether these boards have null 
categories/combinations or not. The Blau and Teachman indices are not flexible to do 
this, as they always exclude null categories, thereby assigning a lower (higher) score 
to balanced boards with (without) null categories/combinations (see Table 3).15 None 
of these indices then satisfy Criterion (f). 
According to Panel A of Table 2, both indices yield a decreasing incremental 
value per each director replacement towards attaining bi-categorical balance. This 
 
15 For the Blau index, this is due to the simple mathematical rule that zero squared equals zero. 
For the Teachman index, this is because the natural logarithm of zero is undefined. 
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suggests that the indices account for the scarcity of the directors, thereby higher 
scarcity results in higher incremental value. This is more aligned to the construct of 
unique diversity rather than balanced diversity. Both indices then do not meet 
Criterion (e). In conclusion, even though these indices reach their maximum when 
there is a balance on the board, they are better described as biased measures of unique 
diversity than as proxies for balanced diversity. 
It is worthwhile noting that the Blau index belongs to a family of three diversity 
indices. Each of them is a different mathematical transformation of a concentration 
index that is first introduced by Simpson (1949) in the ecology literature.16 The 
complement, the inverse, and the negative of this concentration index are used as 
diversity indices by Blau (1977b), Laakso (1977), and Bernile, Bhagwat and Yonker 
(2018), respectively. Unlike the Blau index, the second index ranges from one to K, and 
the third ranges from −1 to −1/K. Apart from that, all share similar characteristics 
and receive the same evaluation in terms of the nine criteria in Panel B of Table 3.  
My last approach to capture balanced diversity is using a proportional balance 
(Carton and Cummings, 2013). Its computational formula is as follows. 










16 The same index and the square root of it have been introduced in economics by Herfindahl 




where: 𝑝𝑖 is the proportion of board members in the ith category (of an 
attribute) or combination (across two or more attributes). K is the number of all 
possible categories/combinations. In equation (4), I apply the standard deviation to 
the proportions, rather than the sizes, of categories/combinations. This ensures a tidy 
range of variation for the values of this measure from −0.5 to zero.17 It also guarantees 
that the same score is given to balanced boards with null categories/combinations (in 
case of including them), regardless of the size of each non-null category/combination. 
Table 3, for example, includes null categories/combinations in computing size-based 
balance and yields −3.30 and −2.83 for Boards (1) and (2), respectively. Yet, 
proportional balance yields the same value of −0.12 for both boards. 
Like the minority proportion, the proportional balance satisfies Criteria (a), (c), 
(d), (e), and (i). The latter measure applies to multi-categorical attribute(s), thereby 
offering a major advantage over the former. Both measures occupy a tidy range of 
variation, yet none of them ranges from zero to one. The proportional balance thus 
meets Criterion (b), but not Criterion (h). 
Criterion (f) is satisfied by proportional balance because the standard deviation 
in (4) is flexible to include or exclude zero-sized (null) categories/combinations. Panel 
B of Table 3 presents some examples for both versions of proportional balance: 
 
17 The maximum value of the standard deviation for a continuous variable, which ranges from 
l to u, is (u − l)/2 (Harrison and Klein, 2007). In equation (4), the categorical proportions range from zero 
to one. The maximum value for the standard deviation of these proportions is then (1 − 0)/2. Since I 
multiply by −1 in (4), the minimum value for proportional balance is −1 × (1 − 0)/2. This value can be 
reached in case of K=2 and any of the two 𝑝𝑖s takes a value of one. Similarly, if the number of non-null 
categories/combinations (k) is unity, it is reasonable to assume the existence of a null category so that 




including null categories (cat.) and excluding them. When these categories are 
included, the measure yields lower (higher) values for balanced boards with (without) 
them. This is similar to Blau and Teachman indices. However, when these categories 
are excluded, the same maximum value of zero is assigned by this measure to all 
boards with equal positive 𝑝𝑖s.18 Only the latter version accounts for variations in 
board size in a systematic and unbiased way, meeting Criterion (g). This is because 
the former version includes null categories that do not contribute to board size (𝑛). 
Overall, my results suggest proportional balance (excluding null categories) to be the 
most appropriate proxy for balanced diversity. 
2.3.3. UNIQUE DIVERSITY 
In Panel C of Table 1, I provide a checklist of nine desirable properties (criteria) 
for an empirical measure of unique diversity in a categorical attribute, as follows. 
(1) It reaches its maximum when each category of an attribute includes only one 
director (i.e., each 𝑝𝑖 =  1/𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒), indicating that each director brings in a 
distinctive source of talent, expertise, networks, and so forth (Teachman, 1980; 
Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
(2) It can summarize variations among multiple categorical proportions of 
directors (𝑝𝑖s), where each 𝑝𝑖 belongs to one category (Teachman, 1980). 
 
18 In the case of excluding null categories/combinations, board balance and the number of non-
null categories/combinations (k) are regarded as two aspects of balanced diversity. A balanced board 
with k = 2 and each k has at least two directors may suffer from stronger separation problems than other 
balanced boards with any other k (Carton and Cummings, 2013). This is because a single diversity 




(3) It is not biased towards one category over another. It then should take the same 
value for all boards that have the same 𝑝𝑖s, regardless of which 𝑝𝑖 belongs to 
which category. It also should capture all cases of board homogeneity, i.e., it 
reaches its minimum value if any 𝑝𝑖 takes a value of one, indicating that all 
directors fall into the same category (Teachman, 1980). 
(4) It does not assign the same value to several distinctive levels of unique 
diversity. 
(5) It systematically accounts for changes in board diversity according to the 
scarcity of the category in which a new director falls, thereby higher scarcity 
results in higher incremental value (Shannon, 1948; Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
This is consistent with the economic law of diminishing returns underlying the 
resource dependence theory (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). 
(6) Commencing from a complete homogeneity case where all directors fall into a 
single category, the measure yields a fixed rate of decrease in the incremental 
value brought by each additional replacement of a director from that single 
category by another director who falls in a given alternative category. 
(7) It accounts for variations in board size in a systematic and unbiased way 
(Biemann and Kearney, 2010). 
(8) It occupies a tidy range of variation from zero to unity (Teachman, 1980; 
Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
(9) It is simple to understand and interpret (Coulter, 1989). 
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I review four potential proxies for unique diversity. The first two proxies are 
the proportion of unique directors and categories ratio, which are defined in equations 
(5) and (6), respectively. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 =  









where: unique directors are board members who do not share the same 
category with any other board member; n is board size; k is the number of non-null 
categories on the board. For example, a board with three Australian directors and one 
British director has 0.25 unique directors and 0.5 categories ratio (i.e., nationalities 
ratio).19  
The proportion of unique directors sums up only 𝑝𝑖s that have a value of 1/𝑛 
each. However, it ignores any 𝑝𝑖 that has a value below or above 1/n. It reaches its 
maximum when each 𝑝𝑖 =  1/𝑛, indicating that each director brings in a distinctive 
source of talent, expertise, networks, and so forth. Therefore, it satisfies Criterion (1). 
Although this proportion applies to multi-categorical attributes, it cannot summarize 
 
19 Nationalities ratio has been used as a control variable by Frijns, Dodd and Cimerova (2016). 
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variations among multiple 𝑝𝑖s (as it excludes some of them). That is why this 
proportion does not meet Criterion (2). 
Similarly, categories ratio does satisfy Criterion (1), but not Criterion (2). This 
ratio accounts for the existence of each category, but not its size, on the board. It then 
reaches its maximum when each category includes only one director, meeting 
Criterion (1). Criterion (2) is not met because of equally weighting all non-null 
categories, regardless of their sizes. 
Both proxies exclude null categories. Therefore, they assign the same maximum 
value of unity to all unique boards,20 regardless of whether these boards have null 
categories or not. Accordingly, a unique board with three unique directors is given 
the same score, of one, as another unique board with four or more unique directors. 
Both proxies involve scaling by board size and are simple and not biased 
towards one category over another.21 Both thus meet Criteria (7), (9), and (3), 
respectively. Each of the two proxies has a maximum value of one, yet both differ in 
their respective minimum values. The minimum limit for the proportion of unique 
directors is zero, whereas 1/n is the minimum limit for categories ratio. Criterion (8) 
is hence satisfied by the former proxy, but not the latter.22 Both proxies, however, fail 
to meet Criteria (4) to (6). 
 
20 A board with each positive 𝑝𝑖 =  1/𝑛 is a unique board. 
21 Criterion (7) is not met in cases of using the number of unique directors or the number of 
categories on the board, because these proxies do not involve scaling by board size. 
22 Criterion (8) is not satisfied in the case of using the number of unique directors on the board, 
because this proxy ranges from zero to n. 
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My next potential proxy for unique diversity is an adjusted version of the 
Teachman index. It has been proposed by Biemann and Kearney (2010) to reduce the 
board-size bias in the original Teachman index. The adjusted index is defined as 
follows. 





where: 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 is the original index as defined in equation (3); n is 
board size. The adjusted index has a maximum limit of ln(K)×(K/(K−1)). This limit is 
reached when K = n, indicating that each category includes only one director. The 
adjusted index thus meets the shape at the maximum property of unique diversity, 
Criterion (1). 
Like the first two proxies, the adjusted Teachman index does exclude null 
categories. Yet, the impact of that exclusion is different, as it restricts unique boards 
with null categories from reaching the maximum limit of the index. The maximum is 
only reached by unique boards without null categories. This could be regarded as an 
advantage under the assumption that diversity on unique boards increases as their 
sizes increases, suggesting that the size of a unique board reflects the set of unique 
resources at its disposal (Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
Nevertheless, this potential advantage is accompanied by a board-size bias 
and, hence, a failure by the adjusted index to meet Criterion (7). Biemann and Kearney 
(2010) acknowledge this in their description of the index as a simple approximation to 
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attenuate, but not eliminate, the bias of the original index. They also note that attempts 
to create a completely unbiased version of the original index are complex. This is 
attributable to the complexity of the logarithmic formulation, which makes entropy-
based indexes harder to understand (Coulter, 1989). The adjusted index, therefore, 
does not satisfy Criterion (9). Also, like the original index, the adjusted index meets 
Criteria (2) and (3), but not Criterion (8). 
The adjusted index captures and distinguishes between different cases of 
unique diversity, satisfying Criterion (4). It systematically accounts for the scarcity of 
board members. Under this index, Panel B of Table 2 shows a decreasing incremental 
value for each replacement of a male director by a female one. That is, the higher the 
scarcity of the category in which a new director falls, the higher the incremental value, 
meeting Criterion (5). However, the rate of decrease is variable. Criterion (6) is hence 
not satisfied by this index. 
My last potential proxy for unique diversity is a dissimilarity proportion 
(Simpson, 1949 and Rae and Taylor, 1970). It is specified as follows. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  1 −  
∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
 
 (8) 
where: 𝑛𝑖 is the number of board members in the ith category; n is board size. 
Like the Blau index, dissimilarity proportion is the complement of a concentration 
index that is originally developed by Simpson (1949). In his paper, Simpson (1949) 
introduces ∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1  ÷  𝑛 (𝑛 − 1) as a bias-corrected version of the concentration 
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index included in equation (2), i.e., ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝐾
𝑖=1 . He illustrates that the corrected version is 




∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝑘
𝑖=1 , by the total number of all possible pairs in the same group, 
1
2
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1). When any 𝑛𝑖 = 𝑛, the unbiased concentration index reaches its maximum 
value of one, indicating that all directors are identical in terms of the attribute(s) under 
investigation. The complement of this index then represents the number of dissimilar 
pairs in a group, 
1
2
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1) −
1
2
∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝑘
𝑖=1 , as a proportion of all possible pairs in 
the same group, 
1
2
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1). Therefore, I refer to that proportion as a dissimilarity 
proportion.23 
Like the first two proxies, the dissimilarity proportion reaches its maximum 
value of unity when each 𝑝𝑖 =  1/𝑛, satisfying Criterion (1). This value is assigned to 
all unique boards, regardless of the presence or absence of null categories. The 
dissimilarity proportion is also unbiased in its accounting for board-size variations 
(Simpson, 1949; Rae and Taylor, 1970; Biemann and Kearney, 2010) and its treatment 
of various categories. It hence meets Criteria (7) and (3), respectively. 
Similar to the proportion of unique directors, the dissimilarity proportion ranges 
from zero to unity, meeting Criterion (8). The latter proportion can be interpreted as 
the proportion of pairwise dissimilarities among board members out of all possible 
pairwise dissimilarities that can exist in that board. This proportion, therefore, satisfies 
 
23 Biemann and Kearney (2010) refer to this proportion as a bias-corrected Blau index, because 
it can be obtained by applying the correction term 𝑛/(𝑛 − 1) to the Blau index. The same term is used 
to adjust the Teachman index in equation (7). Dissimilarity proportion is also known as Rae and 




Like the adjusted Teachman index, the dissimilarity proportion meets Criteria 
(2), (4) and (5). Contrary to the former proxy, the latter yields a fixed rate of decrease 
in the incremental value brought by each additional replacement of a director from 
one category by another director who falls into a given alternative category. Panel B 
of Table 2 presents an example, where the rate of decrease is fixed to 𝐾/(𝑛(𝑛 − 1)/2). 
The latter proxy thus meets Criterion (6). In sum, my evaluation suggests that the 
dissimilarity proportion is the best current proxy for unique diversity in categorical 
attributes. Unique diversity in continuous attributes is discussed separately in Section 
7. 
Table 4 presents evidence that the dissimilarity proportion, as a proxy for 
unique diversity, and the proportional balance (excluding null categories), as a proxy 
for balanced diversity, rank boards differently. In this table, I compare the ranks of 42 
cases which represent all possible categorizations of ten-sized boards. The number of 
non-null categories then rages from one to ten. Finally, Table 5 summarizes my 
evaluation results. 
[Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
2.4. DIVERSITY CONSTRUCTS FOR CONTINUOUS-SCALED ATTRIBUTES 
Harrison and Klein (2007: 1200) have introduced two constructs of diversity for 
continuous attributes: separation and disparity. The former refers to difference in 
position between board members, whereas the latter refers to differences in the 
concentration of resources between them. An example of the former is cultural 
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separation (Frijns et al., 2016), whist CEO pay disparity is an example of the latter (Vo 
and Canil, 2019). I extend their work by introducing uniqueness (unique diversity) as 
a third construct that applies to continuous-scaled attributes. Uniqueness is 
maximized when a continuous attribute is evenly distributed among board members 
such that each point along a continuum is represented (Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
Under the resource dependence perspective, scholars have attempted to proxy 
for diversity in continuous attributes without re-scaling them into nominal categorical 
attributes. For example, Bernile et al. (2018) and Delis, Gaganis, Hasan and Pasiouras 
(2017) employ the standard deviation (STDEV) of age and genetic scores, respectively, 
to capture board diversity under this perspective. Contrary to the arbitrary 
classification of directors into age categories, the former study explicitly favours using 
STDEV of age as “it does not induce mechanical changes in age diversity due to directors 
transitioning from one age bucket to the next.” [p.593] Harrison and Klein (2007), however, 
point out that STDEV of age is a proxy for separation because it reaches its maximum 
when board members are polarized: half very old and half very young. At that shape 
of diversity, mean Euclidean distance (MED) of age also reaches its maximum. None 
of these measures thus captures unique diversity. A proxy for unique diversity in 
continuous attributes is therefore needed. 
Measuring unique diversity in nominal categorical attributes is facilitated by 
the assumption that categories in each attribute are equally weighted. Under this 
assumption, differences between categories are equal. In terms of continuous 
attributes, board members also fall into categories, but differences between these 
categories are not assumed to be equal. For example, a board with four directors of 
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different ages has four different age categories, where each director falls into a 
separate age category. 
Unique diversity reaches its theoretical maximum when a continuous attribute 
is evenly distributed among board members such that each point along a continuum 
is represented (Harrison and Klein, 2007). Since boards are relatively small-sized 
groups, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to reach this maximum shape of diversity 
in the boardroom. Therefore, I operationalize the maximum to be attained when a 
board, in a sample, has a desired pairwise distance of the same length between 
consecutive directors, who are ascendingly ranked along a continuum of an attribute 
(e.g., age). This desired distance depends on sample specification and board size, as 
follows. 





where 𝑟 is the sample age range, and 𝑛 is board size. For instance, if the age 
range in the sample is 30 years, a board with director ages of 40, 50, 60, and 70 years 
is unique in age diversity. This is because pairwise distances between the first, second, 
and third pair of directors (who are ascendingly ranked in age) are equal to the desired 
distance of 10 years. The latter distance is computed as 30/(4 − 1). To proxy for 
unique diversity, I then develop an adjusted version of the standard deviation 
formula. This version captures deviations of the pairwise distances from the desired 
distance, as follows. 
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𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = − √






          ∀ 𝑆𝑗 ≥ 𝑆𝑖 
 (10) 
where: 𝑖 is director rank, in ascending order, in terms of age; 𝑆𝑖 is the age of the 
𝑖th director on the board; 𝑆𝑗 is the age of the closest director next to the director (𝑖); 𝑟 
is sample age range; 𝑛 is board size. Uniqueness index ranges from −𝑟 to zero. The 
minimum is reached when a board has two directors of identical age, indicating a 
homogeneous board.24 
Table 6 presents an example of a sample of six boards. In this table, I compare 
the STDEV of age to my adjusted version in equation (10). The table, therefore, starts 
with a board of polarized directors: half 75 years old and half 30 years old. In this case, 
Board (1), STDEV of age is at its maximum value of 22.50. Uniqueness index assigns a 
value of −14.14 to that board. For Boards (2) to (5), as directors become more spread 
along the age continuum, the value of the latter (former) proxy increases (decreases). 
The latter index then reaches its maximum in the case of Board (5). In Board (6), both 
proxies decrease in value compared to their respective values in Board (5). This is 
because Board (6) has smaller age deviations from mean age and larger pairwise 
deviations from the desired pairwise distance compared to Board (5). 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
24 Uniqueness index, however, yields values greater than –  𝑟 as homogeneous boards expand 
in size over two directors. For these boards, the value of the index should be set to –  𝑟. 
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In Table 6, 𝑟 is defined as maximum age minus minimum age within a sample. 
It is therefore determined by only one or two observations within the sample. This 
increases the potential influence of outliers over the index. To address this concern, 𝑟 
can be defined as the average maximum age minus the average minimum age within 
the sample. The latter definition makes use of all observations within a sample and 
can alleviate concerns about age outliers. Under the latter definition, the minimum 
value of the index is still −𝑟, whereas its maximum value can exceed zero. Despite 
that, I recommend using the latter definition to mitigate the potential influence of age 
outliers. 
2.5. COMBINING MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES OF DIVERSITY 
2.5.1. COMBINATIONS 
In this subsection, I consider the possibility of applying proportional balance to 
combinations across two or more diversity attributes. For example, in Germany, a 
gender quota has been effective since January 2016. It requires a 30% female 
representation on supervisory boards of the top 100 firms that are publicly traded and 
subject to the Codetermination Act. According to this Act, the supervisory boards of 
these large firms should have 50% employee representatives. In this setting, from a 
social justice perspective, diversity in gender and representational type can be 
conceptualized as balanced diversity. Consequently, board diversity can be calculated 
by applying proportional balance (as in equation 4) to four combinations: (i) female 
employee representatives; (ii) female shareholder representatives; (iii) male employee 
representatives; (iv) male shareholder representatives. This measure then reaches its 
maximum when each combination has a 25% board representation. 
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In this example, diversity is operationalized as multi-combinational balance 
across two bi-categorical attributes. This operationalization implies two assumptions: 
categories in each attribute are equally weighted, and each attribute is equally 
weighted. The former assumption is general, and even desirable, for all proxies of 
balanced diversity, as suggested by Criterion (c) in Panel B of Table 1. The latter 
assumption has been followed typically in constructing composite measures of 
diversity across more than one attribute (Bernile et al. 2018; Van Peteghem et al., 2018). 
Both assumptions can be justified following the social justice perspective underlying 
balanced diversity in the above example. 
If neither of the two assumptions is palatable and scholars are interested in the 
separate effects of the combinations, case-based asymmetry is the theoretical 
construct. In this case, four variables (e.g., proportions) can be used to capture the 
separate effects.25 
Although multi-combinational balance can be employed across many 
categorical attributes in groups with very large sizes, I do not recommend using it for 
more than two bi-categorical attributes in board settings. This is because sizes of 





25 Similarly, if the first assumption is not accepted for categories within a single attribute, case-




Faultline theory (Lau and Murnighan, 1998) suggests that multiple similarities 
(or ties) and dissimilarities (or distances) among members in a diverse group can 
provide bases for fragmentations along faultlines. These faultlines signify potential 
internal conflicts that result from subdividing a diverse group into smaller subgroups. 
This theory drives its value from the psychological behavioural framework 
underlying individuals’ tendencies to compare, attract and categorize one another. 
These tendencies are captured by social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), 
similarity attraction theory (Bryne, 1961), and social-categorization theories (social 
identity theory and self-categorization theory; Tajfel, 1978 and Turner, 1985). 
Together, these theories support potential faultline formation within a diverse group 
and predict potential internal conflicts between subgroups when these faultlines are 
activated. 
Following Harrison and Klein (2007), group diversity under faultline theory is 
conceptualized as separation. Yet, faultlines can form along not only continuous 
attributes, but also categorical ones. This is because social comparisons between board 
members are likely to depend on both types of attributes. Board members are then 
likely to form stronger (weaker) relationships with other members who are similar 
(dissimilar) to themselves in terms of multiple attributes, leading to subgroup 
formation within the boardroom.26 The level of separation between subgroup is then 
expected to be detrimental to the overall performance of the board. 
 
26 See Appendix A for an illustration of how faultlines may form along multiple attributes.  
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2.6. TOWARD A CONSISTENT MEASUREMENT IN BOARD DIVERSITY RESEARCH 
In this section, I uncover the potential of ‘pairwise distance’ as a measurement 
basis in board diversity research. A pairwise distance captures the difference between 
a pair of directors in an attribute. The distance can vary in length between different 
pairs of directors. When two directors are identical in any categorical or continuous 
attribute, the length of this distance reaches its minimum value of zero, indicating 
pairwise homogeneity.27 The maximum value of this distance, however, depends on 
the measurement scale of the attribute under investigation. 
For categorical attributes, any pairwise distance is typically assumed to have a 
maximum length of one. This assumption applies to bi-categorical attributes (e.g., 
gender) and multi-categorical attributes (e.g., nationality). It implies that any pair of 
directors who belong to two different categories of a categorical attribute has a fixed-
length pairwise distance of unity, indicating pairwise dissimilarity. Pairwise 
dissimilarity is therefore a special case of pairwise distance. In contrast, for continuous 
attributes, no assumption is generally made about the maximum length of pairwise 
distances. 
Operationalizing differences in director attributes as pairwise distances maps 
onto the definition of board diversity. This operationalization goes beyond the simple 
rule of ‘one director one vote’ to account for pairwise director interactions that can 
affect their behaviour and, hence, their votes on the board. The use of pairwise 
distances in diversity measurement is therefore consistent with behavioural theories 
 
27 Pairwise homogeneity is sometimes referred to as pairwise similarity. I prefer the former 
term as it highlights that directors are identical, rather than similar, in an attribute. 
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of group dynamics, such as the theory of groupthink (Janis, 1972) and faultline theory 
(Lau and Murnighan, 1998), which refute that simple rule. Pairwise dissimilarities also 
map onto theories underpinning unique diversity, such as resource dependence 
theory (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) and theories of information/decision making 
(Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). 
Pairwise distance provides a measurement basis for measures of unique 
diversity (e.g., dissimilarity proportion and Uniqueness index). It also serves as a basis 
to measure diversity as separation by using mean Euclidean distance (MED). This is 
because dissimilarity proportion, which maps onto unique diversity, is a special case 
of mean Euclidean distance (MED), which maps onto separation (see a proof in 
Appendix B). Furthermore, pairwise distance is the measurement basis of the Gini 
coefficient, which maps onto diversity as disparity (see Appendix C, which uncovers 
the link between MED and Gini coefficient). Given that, pairwise distance can serve 
as a consistent measurement basis across three diversity constructs: unique diversity, 
separation, and disparity. 
2.7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between board diversity and board 
effectiveness is mixed. Understanding the diversity paradox has, therefore, inspired 
scholars in different fields. Drawing on the seminal work of Harrison and Klein (2007), 
I aim to contribute to unlocking that paradox. 
My study distinguishes between three theoretical constructs of board diversity 
in categorical attributes: case-based asymmetry, balanced diversity, and unique 
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diversity. The first construct emphasises the representation level of certain directors 
of interest (the case directors) on the board. In contrast, all directors are equally 
weighted under the second construct, which is concerned with equal board 
representations of dissimilar categories of directors. Whereas the third construct 
underscores the distinctiveness and scarcity of every single board member. It is 
therefore the purest construct of board diversity. 
Unique diversity is not a completely new construct. While distinguishing 
variety from separation and disparity, Harrison and Klein (2007) have questioned: 
“is diversity maximized when the attribute in question is evenly distributed among unit 
members such that each point along the continuum or each category is represented?” [p.1201] 
In their paper, however, Harrison and Klein (2007) refer to even representation 
(i.e., balanced diversity) and unique representation (i.e., unique diversity) of group 
members as two forms of diversity as variety. I extend their work by distinguishing 
between balanced diversity and unique diversity as two different constructs. The 
former construct is more aligned to separation (Carton and Cummings, 2013), whereas 
variety is more aligned to the latter. Under variety, diversity attributes should be 
categorical. Unlike variety, I argue that unique diversity applies not only to categorical 
attributes, but also to continuous attributes (i.e., along continuums, in line with the 
above quote). 
Future research is needed on the costs and benefits of balanced diversity. 
Considering it as a form of categorical separation does not necessarily mean that 
categorical balance adversely affects board effectiveness. For example, board gender 
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balance may enhance mental independence and monitoring effectiveness, yet it may 
create relational conflicts on the board. 
Table 7 integrates my constructs with those proposed by Harrison and Klein 
(2007). In this table, I consider balanced diversity as categorical separation. 
Consequently, there are four different theoretical constructs of group (board) 
diversity: asymmetry, separation, uniqueness, and disparity. The first construct 
applies only to categorical-scaled attributes, whilst the last one applies only to ratio-
scaled attributes. Contrary to both constructs, separation and uniqueness apply to 
categorical and continuous attributes. All constructs, except the first one, are at their 
minimum limits whenever a board is homogeneous. The first construct reaches its 
minimum limit only if case directors are not represented on the board. The maximum 
limit for each construct is yet different. 
[Table 7 about here] 
In terms of measurement, I review four potential proxies per each construct 
that applies to categorical attributes. For each construct, I develop a set of desirable 
properties (or criteria) for an empirical construct that maps onto it. My assessment 
criteria reveal that proportion of the case directors, proportional balance (excluding 
null categories/combinations), and dissimilarity proportion are the best available 
proxies for case-based asymmetry, balanced diversity, and unique diversity, 
respectively. I then provide evidence that those proxies do rank boards differently. I 




For constructs that applies to interval-scaled or ratio-scaled attributes, I discuss 
the potentials of pairwise distance to serve as a consistent measurement basis for their 
empirical proxies. Based on pairwise distance, I develop Uniqueness index as a proxy 
for unique diversity in continuous attributes. In comparison with standard deviation 
and coefficient of variation,28 I identify one advantage for MED and Gini coefficient as 
potential proxies for separation and disparity in continuous-scaled and ratio-scaled 
attributes, respectively. The advantage is their use of pairwise distance as their 
underlying measurement basis. That basis maps onto the definition of board diversity 
as differences in director attributes. It is also consistent with behavioural theories of 
board dynamics (e.g., the theory of groupthink and faultline theory; Janis, 1972 and 
Lau and Murnighan, 1998) and theories advocating board diversity as uniqueness 
(e.g., resource dependence theory and theories of information/decision making; 
Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978 and Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). Consequently, Table 7 
specifies MED and Gini coefficient as potential proxies for separation and disparity. 
Nevertheless, future research may provide a more comprehensive comparison 
between potential measures of diversity constructs that applies to interval-scaled or 
ratio-scaled attributes. 
In conclusion, board diversity has different theoretical constructs with several 
potential proxies. Selecting the proper construct along with the appropriate proxy is a 
key to conclusive results. My study provides some guidance in this direction. This 
could be of interest to scholars and managers who are concerned with board diversity.
 
28 Harrison and Klein (2007) state that standard deviation and MED are alternative proxies for 
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Table 1 – Assessment of Current Empirical Proxies for Diversity Constructs 















Minimum  0  0  0  0 
Maximum  1  1  n  1 
Criteria         
(i)      ✓  ✓ 
(ii)      ✓  ✓ 
(iii)        ✓ 
(iv)  ✓  ✓    ✓ 
(v)  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Score  2/5  2/5  3/5  5/5 
The above panel provides a checklist of five desirable properties (criteria) for an empirical measure that 
maps onto case-based asymmetry. The criteria are defined as follows: 
(i) It reaches its maximum only when the board is homogeneous in terms of the directors of interest 
(the case directors), i.e., when the number of these directors is equal to board size (n). 
(ii) It does not assign the same value to several distinctive levels of board concentration 
(homogeneity) in terms of the case directors. 
(iii) It accounts for variations in board size in a systematic and unbiased way (Biemann and 
Kearney, 2010). 
(iv) It occupies a tidy range of variation from zero to unity (Teachman, 1980; Harrison and Klein, 
2007). 















Minimum  0  0  0  −0.5 
Maximum  0.5  (K − 1)/K  ln(K)  0 
Criteria         
(a)  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
(b)    ✓  ✓  ✓ 
(c)  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
(d)  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
(e)  ✓      ✓ 
(f)        ✓ 
(g)  ✓      ✓ 
(h)         
(i)  ✓  ✓    ✓ 
Score  6/9  5/9  4/9  8/9 
K is the number of all possible categories/combinations. The above panel provides a checklist of nine 
criteria for an empirical measure that maps onto balanced diversity. The criteria are defined as follows: 
(a) It reaches its maximum only when each category (in case of a single attribute) or combination 
(in case of two or more attributes) includes an equal number of directors, i.e., all 𝑝𝑖s are equal 
(Blau, 1977b). 
(b) It can summarize variations among multiple categorical proportions of directors (𝑝𝑖s), where 
each 𝑝𝑖  belongs to one category/combination (Teachman, 1980). 
(c) It is not biased towards one category/combination over another. It then should take the same 
value for all boards that have the same 𝑝𝑖s, regardless of which 𝑝𝑖  belongs to which 
category/combination. It also should capture all cases of board homogeneity, i.e., it reaches its 
minimum value if any 𝑝𝑖  takes a value of one, indicating that all directors fall into the same 
category/combination (Teachman, 1980). 
(d) It does not assign the same value to several distinctive levels of categorical/combinational 
balance. 
(e) It increases (decreases) by the same value per each director replacement that increases 
(decreases) the balance between two categories/combinations. This indicates that equal weight 
is assigned to every director regardless of whether they belong to a unique, minority, or 
majority category/combination. 
(f) It is flexible to include or exclude null categories/combinations, i.e., those with 𝑝𝑖  = zero 
(Coulter, 1989). 
(g) It accounts for variations in board size in a systematic and unbiased way (Biemann and 
Kearney, 2010). 
(h) It occupies a tidy range of variation from zero to unity (Teachman, 1980; Harrison and Klein, 
2007). 




Panel C: Unique Diversity in Categorical Attributes 
 
 








Minimum  0  1/n  0  0 
Maximum  1  1  ln(K)×(K/(K−1))  1 
Criteria*         
(1)  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
(2)      ✓  ✓ 
(3)  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
(4)      ✓  ✓ 
(5)      ✓  ✓ 
(6)        ✓ 
(7)  ✓  ✓    ✓ 
(8)  ✓      ✓ 
(9)  ✓  ✓    ✓ 
Score  5/9  4/9  5/9  9/9 
The above panel provides a checklist of nine criteria for an empirical measure that maps onto unique 
diversity in categorical attributes. The criteria are defined as follows: 
(1) It reaches its maximum when each category of an attribute includes only one director (i.e., each 
𝑝𝑖 =  1/𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒), indicating that each director brings in a distinctive source of talents, 
expertise, networks, and so forth (Teachman, 1980; Harrison and Klein, 2007). 
(2) It can summarize variations among multiple categorical proportions of directors (𝑝𝑖s), where 
each 𝑝𝑖  belongs to one category (Teachman, 1980). 
(3) It is not biased towards one category over another. It then should take the same value for all 
boards that have the same 𝑝𝑖s, regardless of which 𝑝𝑖  belongs to which category. It also should 
capture all cases of board homogeneity, i.e., it reaches its minimum value if any 𝑝𝑖  takes a value 
of one, indicating that all directors fall into the same category (Teachman, 1980). 
(4) It does not assign the same value to several distinctive levels of unique diversity. 
(5) It systematically accounts for changes in board diversity according to the scarcity of the 
category in which a new director falls, thereby higher scarcity results in higher incremental 
value (Shannon, 1948; Harrison and Klein, 2007). This is consistent with the economic law of 
diminishing returns underlying the resource dependence theory (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). 
(6) Commencing from a complete homogeneity case where all directors fall into a single category, 
the measure yields a fixed rate of decrease in the incremental value brought by each additional 
replacement of a director from that single category by another director who falls in a given 
alternative category. 
(7) It accounts for variations in board size in a systematic and unbiased way (Biemann and 
Kearney, 2010). 
(8) It occupies a tidy range of variation from zero to unity (Teachman, 1980; Harrison and Klein, 
2007). 




Table 2 – Gender Diversity on Ten-sized Boards 













 Value ∆  Value ∆  Value ∆  Value ∆ 
0.00  0.00   0.00   0.00   -0.50  
1.00  0.10 0.10  0.18 0.18  0.33 0.33  -0.40 0.10 
2.00  0.20 0.10  0.32 0.14  0.50 0.18  -0.30 0.10 
3.00  0.30 0.10  0.42 0.10  0.61 0.11  -0.20 0.10 
4.00  0.40 0.10  0.48 0.06  0.67 0.06  -0.10 0.10 
5.00  0.50 0.10  0.50 0.02  0.69 0.02  0.00 0.10 
6.00  0.40 -0.10  0.48 -0.02  0.67 -0.02  -0.10 -0.10 
7.00  0.30 -0.10  0.42 -0.06  0.61 -0.06  -0.20 -0.10 
8.00  0.20 -0.10  0.32 -0.10  0.50 -0.11  -0.30 -0.10 
9.00  0.10 -0.10  0.18 -0.14  0.33 -0.18  -0.40 -0.10 


















 Value ∆ 
Rate of 
Change  Value ∆ 
Rate of 
Change  Value ∆ 
Rate of 
Change  Value ∆ 
Rate of 
Change 
0.00  0.00  
 
 0.10    0.00    0.00   
1.00  0.10 0.10 
 
 0.20 0.10 
 
 0.36 0.36 
 
 0.20 0.20 
 
2.00  0.00 -0.10 -0.20  0.20 0.00 -0.10  0.56 0.19 -0.17  0.36 0.16 -0.04 
3.00  0.00 0.00 0.10  0.20 0.00 0.00  0.68 0.12 -0.07  0.47 0.11 -0.04 
4.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.20 0.00 0.00  0.75 0.07 -0.05  0.53 0.07 -0.04 
5.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.20 0.00 0.00  0.77 0.02 -0.05  0.56 0.02 -0.04 
6.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.20 0.00 0.00  0.75 -0.02 -0.04  0.53 -0.02 -0.04 
7.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.20 0.00 0.00  0.68 -0.07 -0.05  0.47 -0.07 -0.04 
8.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.20 0.00 0.00  0.56 -0.12 -0.05  0.36 -0.11 -0.04 
9.00  0.10 0.10 0.10  0.20 0.00 0.00  0.36 -0.19 -0.07  0.20 -0.16 -0.04 







Table 3 – Balanced Diversity vs. Unique Diversity: Shape at Maximum  
Panel A: Board Data in Terms of a Diversity Attribute with Six Categories 
 Number of Directors 
Board ID: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Categories:          
(A) 7.00 6.00 1.00 6.00 5.00 1.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 
(B) 7.00 6.00 1.00 6.00 5.00 1.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 
(C) 7.00 6.00 1.00 6.00 5.00 1.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 
(D) 7.00 6.00 1.00 6.00 5.00 1.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 
(E) 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 5.00 1.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 
(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 4.00 1.00 
Board Size 28.00 24.00 4.00 30.00 25.00 5.00 30.00 24.00 6.00 
 
Panel B: Proxies for Balanced Diversity* 
Board ID: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Blau index 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Teachman index 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.79 1.79 1.79 
Size-based balance 
(including null cat.) -3.30 -2.83 -0.47 -2.24 -1.86 -0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Proportional balance 
(including null cat.) -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Proportional balance 
(excluding null cat.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
* This panel excludes Minority proportion as it does not apply to multi-categorical attributes. 
 
Panel C: Proxies for Unique Diversity in Categorical Attributes 
Board ID: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Proportion of unique 
directors 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Categories ratio 0.14 0.17 1.00 0.17 0.20 1.00 0.20 0.25 1.00 
Adjusted Teachman 
index 1.44 1.45 1.85 1.66 1.68 2.01 1.85 1.87 2.15 
Dissimilarity 













Categorical Proportions (𝒑𝒊s)  Balance  Uniqueness 
𝒑𝟏 𝒑𝟐 𝒑𝟑 𝒑𝟒 𝒑𝟓 𝒑𝟔 𝒑𝟕 𝒑𝟖 𝒑𝟗 𝒑𝟏𝟎  Value Rank  Value Rank 
(1) 10+0 1.00 0.00                  -0.50 1  0.00 1 
(2) 9+1 0.90 0.10                  -0.40 2  0.20 2 
(3) 8+2 0.80 0.20                  -0.30 4  0.36 3 
(4) 8+1+1 0.80 0.10 0.10                -0.33 3  0.38 4 
(5) 7+3 0.70 0.30                  -0.20 9  0.47 5 
(6) 7+2+1 0.70 0.20 0.10                -0.26 5  0.51 6 
(7) 6+4 0.60 0.40                  -0.10 22  0.53 7 
(8) 7+1+1+1 0.70 0.10 0.10 0.10              -0.26 6  0.53 7 
(9) 5+5 0.50 0.50                  0.00 35  0.56 8 
(10) 6+3+1 0.60 0.30 0.10                -0.21 8  0.60 9 
(11) 6+2+2 0.60 0.20 0.20                -0.19 10  0.62 10 
(12) 5+4+1 0.50 0.40 0.10                -0.17 11  0.64 11 
(13) 6+2+1+1 0.60 0.20 0.10 0.10              -0.21 7  0.64 11 
(14) 6+1+1+1+1 0.60 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10            -0.20 9  0.67 12 
(15) 5+3+2 0.50 0.30 0.20                -0.12 17  0.69 13 
(16) 4+4+2 0.40 0.40 0.20                -0.09 23  0.71 14 
(17) 5+3+1+1 0.50 0.30 0.10 0.10              -0.17 12  0.71 14 
(18) 4+3+3 0.40 0.30 0.30                -0.05 32  0.73 15 
(19) 4+4+1+1 0.40 0.40 0.10 0.10              -0.15 14  0.73 15 
(20) 5+2+2+1 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.10              -0.15 14  0.73 15 
(21) 5+2+1+1+1 0.50 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10            -0.15 13  0.76 16 
(22) 4+3+2+1 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10              -0.11 18  0.78 17 
(23) 5+1+1+1+1+1 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10          -0.15 15  0.78 17 
(24) 3+3+3+1 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.10              -0.09 25  0.80 18 
(25) 4+2+2+2 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.20              -0.09 25  0.80 18 
(26) 4+3+1+1+1 0.40 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.10            -0.13 16  0.80 18 
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Categorical Proportions (𝒑𝒊s)  Balance  Uniqueness 
𝒑𝟏 𝒑𝟐 𝒑𝟑 𝒑𝟒 𝒑𝟓 𝒑𝟔 𝒑𝟕 𝒑𝟖 𝒑𝟗 𝒑𝟏𝟎  Value Rank  Value Rank 
(27) 3+3+2+2 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.20              -0.05 30  0.82 19 
(28) 4+2+2+1+1 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10            -0.11 20  0.82 19 
(29) 3+3+2+1+1 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.10            -0.09 24  0.84 20 
(30) 4+2+1+1+1+1 0.40 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10          -0.11 19  0.84 20 
(31) 3+2+2+2+1 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.10            -0.06 29  0.87 21 
(32) 3+3+1+1+1+1 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10          -0.09 23  0.87 21 
(33) 4+1+1+1+1+1+1 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10        -0.10 21  0.87 21 
(34) 2+2+2+2+2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20            0.00 35  0.89 22 
(35) 3+2+2+1+1+1 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10          -0.07 26  0.89 22 
(36) 2+2+2+2+1+1 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10          -0.05 32  0.91 23 
(37) 3+2+1+1+1+1+1 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10        -0.07 27  0.91 23 
(38) 2+2+2+1+1+1+1 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10        -0.05 31  0.93 24 
(39) 3+1+1+1+1+1+1+1 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10      -0.07 28  0.93 24 
(40) 2+2+1+1+1+1+1+1 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10      -0.04 33  0.96 25 
(41) 2+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10    -0.03 34  0.98 26 
(42) 1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10  0.00 35  1.00 27 
The above table compares the ranking of all different compositions of ten-director boards in terms of balanced diversity and unique diversity. For categorical 
attributes, board composition refers to how directors are categorised. In Board (2), for example, nine members fall in one category and only one member belongs 
to a different category (9+1). All categories are equally weighted. Balanced diversity is measured by using the proportional balance (excluding null categories). 
Unique diversity is measured by using a dissimilarity proportion. The boards are ranked in ascending order in terms of unique diversity.
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Table 5 – Main Assessment Results 
Theoretical 
Construct  
Shape at  
Minimum 






None of the board 
members is a 
director of interest. 





    
Balanced 
Diversity 
All board members 
belong to a single 
category 
(combination). 
Two or more categories 
(combinations) of 
directors are equally 






    
Unique 
Diversity 
All board members 
belong to a single 
category. 
Each board member 






Table 6 – Age Diversity as Uniqueness in a Sample of Ten-sized Boards 
 Director Age 
Board ID: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Director:       
(A) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 35.00 
(B) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 35.00 38.00 
(C) 30.00 30.00 30.00 35.00 40.00 41.00 
(D) 30.00 30.00 35.00 40.00 45.00 44.00 
(E) 30.00 35.00 40.00 45.00 50.00 47.00 
(F) 75.00 70.00 65.00 60.00 55.00 50.00 
(G) 75.00 75.00 70.00 65.00 60.00 53.00 
(H) 75.00 75.00 75.00 70.00 65.00 56.00 
(I) 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 70.00 59.00 
(J) 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 62.00 
STDEV of Age 22.50 21.59 19.91 17.50 14.36 8.62 





Table 7 – Diversity Typology 
Theoretical Construct 
(Type)  Measurement Scale Suggested Empirical Proxy 
Case-based Asymmetry Categorical Proportion of case directors 
Continuous — 






Proportional balance (excluding 
null categories/combinations) 
Continuous Mean Euclidean distance (MED) 
   
Uniqueness 
(i.e., Unique Diversity) 
Categorical Dissimilarity proportion 
Continuous Uniqueness index 
   
Disparity Categorical/Interval — 





Table A1 – An Illustration of Faultlines Across Multiple Attributes  
 Board I  Board II 
Director ID: A B C D  E F G H 
Gender Male Male Female Female  Male Male Female Female 
Nationality British British Chinese Chinese  British Chinese Chinese British 
Age 65 64 45 42  65 45 64 42 
Suppose there are two equal-sized boards with the above data on directors’ social attributes: gender, nationality, and age.  In each board, there are four members. 
Although both boards have the same percentages of female directors (50%), Chinese directors (50%), and old directors (50%), the distribution pattern of these 
attributes among board members is different in the two boards. The pattern (or structure) of diversity in Board I potentially creates a strong faultline that would 




Proof A1 – The Link between Dissimilarity Proportion and MED 
This appendix provides a proof that dissimilarity proportion, a measure of unique 
diversity, is a special case of MED, which is a proxy for separation. Let L = the length 
of pairwise Euclidean distances in a group (I assume that L is constant); AED = actual 
pairwise Euclidean distances in a group; NAED = number of AED; NPED = number 
of all possible pairwise Euclidean distances in a group; NZED = number of zero-length 
pairwise Euclidean distances in a group. Then: 
∑ 𝐴𝐸𝐷   =  𝐿  ×          𝑁𝐴𝐸𝐷   






 =  𝐿  ×   [ 𝑁𝑃𝐸𝐷 − 𝑁𝑍𝐸𝐷 ] 
(Where the left-hand side is divided by 2 to account for repetition) 












 ]  Multiply both sides by 2 gives 




𝑖=1 =  𝐿  ×   [ 𝑛 (𝑛 − 1) −  ∑ 𝑛𝑖  (𝑛𝑖 − 1) ]  




𝑖=1 =  𝑛 (𝑛 − 1) − ∑ 𝑛𝑖  (𝑛𝑖 − 1)         (1)  This is assuming L = 1 









  This is MED, according to Biemann and Kearney (2010). 









∴ 𝑀𝐸𝐷 =  






  Substitute from (1), assuming unity-length distances, gives 
𝑀𝐸𝐷 =  
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1) −  ∑ 𝑛𝑖  (𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
 






 = 1 −  
∑ 𝑛𝑖 (𝑛𝑖−1)
𝑛 (𝑛−1)
= Dissimilarity proportion 





Proof B1 – The Link between MED and Gini Coefficient 
This appendix provides a proof that Gini coefficient, a measure of disparity, equals 
MED (a measure of separation) divided by twice the group mean value of an attribute. 









  This is MED, according to Biemann and Kearney (2010). 









∴ 𝑀𝐸𝐷 =  






      (2) 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =  





2 𝑛 𝑆𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝑛−1)
  This is the Gini coefficient by Biemann and Kearney (2010). 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =  





𝑛 (𝑛−1) × 2 𝑆𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
  This is after a reorganization of the Gini’s denominator. 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =  
𝑀𝐸𝐷
2 𝑆𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛




THE DETERMINANTS AND VALUE OF BOARD NATIONALITY DIVERSITY: THE ROLE OF 
THE NATIONALITY COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECTORS 
ABSTRACT 
The nationality composition of foreign directors determines three core elements of 
board nationality diversity: (i) the level of diversity, (ii) the strength of cultural 
faultlines, and (iii) the marginalization of foreign minorities. I examine the 
determinants and the performance outcome of diversity, after accounting for the 
composition of foreign directors’ nationalities.  I find the magnitude, rather than the 
number, of foreign activities to be a positive determinant of the diversity level. I next 
find that boards with higher levels of nationality diversity are associated with higher 
firm value.  This relationship holds after addressing potential endogeneity by using 
2SLS regressions.  I further find no significant role for the strength of board cultural 
separation in moderating the above relationship. Yet, I find this relationship to be 
moderated by levels of firm complexity, suggesting that diversity provides net 
benefits only for complex firms.  My study could be of interest to regulators and firms. 
JEL classification: G30; G32; G38; D70. 
Keywords: director nationality; board diversity; cultural faultlines; firm performance. 




I examine the demand side and the outcome side of diversity, after accounting 
for the nationality composition of non-domestic (foreign) directors.  This composition 
can play a vital role in shaping board dynamics as it determines three elements of 
diversity: (i) the level of board nationality diversity, (ii) the strength of cultural 
subgrouping along faultlines, and (iii) the possible presence of marginalized foreign 
minorities.  These elements have not yet been directly investigated in the literature on 
the antecedents and consequences of board nationality diversity.  I fill this gap. 
On the demand side of diversity, earlier research has mainly investigated why 
foreign directors exist on corporate boards (Oxelheim, Gregorič, Randøy and 
Thomsen, 2013; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki, 2017).  In this 
investigation, non-domestic directors from different foreign countries have been 
regarded as similar.  I extend earlier work by exploring why firms choose a given level 
of nationality diversity on their boards.  I conceptualize board nationality diversity as 
uniqueness.  In this context, a unique board is one in which each member’s nationality 
is unique from (or dissimilar to) the nationalities of other members.  A board with two 
domestic directors and two non-domestic directors will then be less (more) diverse if 
the non-domestic directors are (are not) from a single foreign country. This means that 
national-origin dissimilarities among foreign directors contribute to the level of 
diversity.  I introduce dissimilarity of director nationalities (DDN) as a multi-
categorical measure that accounts for the composition of foreign board members, to 
capture the level of board nationality diversity.  From a resource dependence 
perspective (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978), dissimilarities in directors’ nationalities could 
93 
 
bring valuable expertise and networks of help to the operation of corporate boards.  If 
pure economic reasons are behind firms’ choice of the diversity level on their boards, 
we would expect the level of diversity each year to be more strongly driven by the 
magnitude, rather than the number, of foreign activities in the preceding year. 
On the outcome side of diversity, I explore the circumstances under which 
diversity might or might not be a good thing. As noted earlier, from a resource 
dependence perspective, nationality diversity might enlarge board resources in terms 
of expertise and networks.  Building on the theory of groupthink, prior studies have 
also attributed poor decision-making to cohesive homogeneous boards (Chen, Leung 
and Goergen, 2017; Lai, Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2017).  Nationality diversity could then 
encourage directors to engage in critical discussions rather than the detrimental 
behaviour of groupthink.  If diversity enlarges the board’s resources and reduces 
groupthink, the level of diversity will be positively associated with firm value. 
However, nationality diversity among board members is accompanied by 
differences in their cultural backgrounds, which may serve as bases for cultural 
separation.  Such separation could push the costs of diversity up to outweigh its 
benefits.  Drawing on theories of faultline (Lau and Murnighan, 1998) and critical mass 
(Joecks, Pull and Vetter, 2013), cultural differences may sub-divide the board into 
opposing cliques or marginalize singleton directors.29  Both sub-categorization and 
marginalization of directors are forms of board cultural separation, which may 
 
29 Throughout the study, the term ‘clique’ refers to a subgroup of at least two board members 
who share similar cultural backgrounds. The term ‘singleton director’ refers to a board member who 
does not share the same nationality with any other members of the same board. 
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provoke communication breakdowns, misunderstandings, internal conflicts, and lack 
of trust between board members, to the detriment of board’s operation (Frijns, Dodd 
and Cimerova, 2016; Van Peteghem, Bruynseels and Gaeremynck, 2018; Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979).  Board cultural separation is therefore expected to mitigate any positive 
impact of board nationality diversity on firm value. 
In addition, earlier work has suggested that complex firms benefit more from 
the diverse expertise brought by board diversity (Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay and 
Zhao, 2011).  Frijns et al. (2016) also find that the adverse impact of board cultural 
differences on firm performance is mitigated by firm complexity.  Firm complexity is 
thus another potential moderator of the relationship between board nationality 
diversity and the firm value. 
In light of the above, I ask three main questions.  First, what are the 
determinants of the level of board nationality diversity?  Second, does this diversity 
add value to shareholders? Third, do board cultural separation and firm complexity 
moderate any relationship between this diversity and firm value?  To answer these 
questions, I employ a dataset of 11,384 firm-years of UK-domiciled non-financial firms 
that are listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period from 1999 to 2018.  I use 
a UK sample for two main reasons.  First, variations in directors’ nationalities are 
deemed relatively high in the UK compared to US samples (Frijns et al., 2016; Delis, 
Gaganis, Hasan and Pasiouras, 2017).  Second, empirical UK-based evidence on the 
value of board nationality diversity is inconclusive (Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Delis et 
al., 2017; Frijns et al., 2016; Hahn and Lasfer, 2016). 
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I find that the level of diversity is driven by the magnitude of foreign activities 
(measured by the proportion of foreign sales), rather than the number of geographical 
regions in which a firm operates.  This result is robust to a battery of control variables 
and is based on a two-limit Tobit estimation, which accounts for my use of a censored 
dependent variable (DDN) with a lower limit of zero and an upper limit of one.  I next 
find that higher diversity is associated with higher firm value, after controlling for a 
wide range of board-level, firm-level, industry, and year controls. This relationship 
holds after addressing potential endogeneity by implementing an instrumental 
variable approach using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions.  The results also 
hold after controlling for firm value in previous years (i.e., one and two lags of Tobin’s 
Q).  Additionally, I find that my measure of the level of board nationality diversity 
(DDN) is positively and significantly related to firm value after controlling for prior 
measures of diversity, including the proportion of foreign board members, the 
proportion of foreign non-executive board members, genetic diversity (Delis et al., 
2017) and cultural diversity (Frijns et al., 2016).  I further find that the presence of 
strong cultural faultlines or marginalized directors on boards do not significantly 
mitigate the positive impact of diversity on firm value. Yet, I find this impact to be 
mitigated by levels of operational complexity, suggesting that board nationality 
diversity contributes to firm value only under certain circumstances (i.e., when firms 
are complex). 
My study makes three contributions to the literature on board diversity.  First, 
it responds to recent calls for refining of the measurement of board diversity (Carcello, 
Hermanson, and Ye, 2011) by accounting for the nationality composition of foreign 
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directors.  I introduce a set of new measures to capture the level of nationality 
diversity, the strength of cultural faultlines, and the presence of marginalized foreign 
minorities on corporate boards.  My measurement approach thus accounts for both 
the upside and the downside aspects of diversity: the level of diversity and the 
strength of cultural separation.  To measure the former, I develop a set of nine criteria 
to assess how well available empirical proxies map onto the theoretical construct of 
board nationality diversity as uniqueness.  I then find that DDN is the best available 
proxy for that construct.  In measuring the latter, I identify the strength of cultural 
subgrouping along faultlines and the marginalization of foreign minorities as two 
channels through which board cultural separation may reduce the value of diversity 
to shareholders.  Second, I extend earlier work on why foreign nationals exist on 
corporate boards (e.g., Estélyi and Nisar, 2016) by exploring why firms choose a given 
nationality diversity level on their boards.  My findings suggest that the magnitude, 
rather than the number, of foreign activities matters for the level of board nationality 
diversity. Third, my study provides evidence that board nationality diversity creates 
value for shareholders only for complex firms.    
This essay proceeds as follows.  Section 3.2 provides a review of related 
literature and develops my hypotheses.  Section 3.3 presents a discussion on my 
measurement of nationality diversity and cultural separation on corporate boards.  
Section 3.4 specifies my empirical models, and Section 3.5 describes the data.  I then 
report the results of my univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analyses in Sections 3.6, 




3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Earlier research has mainly investigated why foreign directors exist on 
corporate boards (Oxelheim et al., 2013; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Miletkov et al., 2017).  
In this investigation, non-domestic directors from different foreign countries have 
been regarded as similar. This treatment does not account for the nationality diversity 
within foreign directors as an integral component of the overall diversity level of the 
whole board. For example, a board with two non-domestic directors from two 
different countries is more diverse than a board with two non-domestic directors from 
a single foreign country. 
From a resource dependence perspective (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978), 
dissimilarities in directors’ nationalities could bring valuable expertise and networks 
of help to the operation of corporate boards.  Going back to the above example, the 
former board is then expected to tap into more international expertise and networks 
than the latter one. This suggests that firms need to increase the level of nationality 
diversity on their board to gain higher international expertise, networks, and other 
valuable resources. Yet, the economic benefits from these resources are likely to 
depend on the magnitude of a firm’s foreign operations. Investing in such resources 
is therefore less attractive if a firm’s foreign operations contribute only a little to its 
key performance indicators (e.g., its overall sales revenue). This should be the case 
regardless of the number of these foreign operations. For example, a firm operating in 
three foreign countries with a foreign sales proportion of 50% will be more willing to 
invest in board nationality diversity than a firm operating in five foreign countries 
with a foreign sales proportion of 10%. Accordingly, I expect that the mere existence 
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of a bigger number of foreign operations in a year is not sufficient to trigger higher 
nationality diversity in the next year because some of these operations may not be 
economically significant to justify the economic cost of adding more foreign and 
dissimilar board members. The appointment of dissimilar foreign nationals to the 
board is therefore expected to rely on the magnitude or the economic significance of 
foreign operations (i.e., their contribution to the key performance indicators of the firm 
such as its overall sales revenue). 
In my first research hypothesis, I extend prior work on why foreign directors 
exist on corporate boards (Oxelheim et al., 2013; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Miletkov et 
al., 2017) by exploring why firms choose a given level of nationality diversity on their 
boards.  I conceptualize board nationality diversity as uniqueness, which refers to the 
distinctiveness of board members from one another. Drawing on the resource 
dependence theory (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978), the economic benefits a firm drive 
from its foreign board members depend on the use of these human resources to 
support existing foreign operations that are economically significant to the overall 
performance of the firm. Therefore, I expect the magnitude of a firm’s foreign 
operations in year (t-1) to be a key factor in determining the magnitude (level) of board 
nationality diversity in year (t). I also expect this factor to be a more significant 
determinant of the diversity level than the number of foreign countries in which the 
firm operates. This extends earlier work by Estélyi and Nisar (2016) that find the latter 
factor to be a key determinant of the presence of at least one foreign director on the 
board. Put another way, the number of foreign operations is found to be a key 
determinant of the existence of at least one foreign director on the board, but it is less 
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likely to be a key determinant of the magnitude (level) of nationality diversity on the 
board.  Rather, the magnitude of such diversity is likely to depend on the magnitude 
of foreign operations (as measured by the proportion of foreign sales). This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of board nationality diversity in a year will be more 
strongly driven by the magnitude, rather than the number, of 
foreign activities in the preceding year. 
  
Research on the outcomes of board diversity typically adopt the notion that 
firms do not make decisions, but people in charge do (Kachelmeier, 2010). The board 
of directors is charged with a dual role of simultaneously advising and monitoring 
corporate management (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010). In discharging this role, 
directors give consultations and make decisions that are shaped by factors such as 
their expertise (Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003; Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi, 2010; 
Adams, Akyol and Verwijmeren, 2018) and independence (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Weisbach, 1988; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). The level of 
board nationality diversity can influence both the pool of expertise and the 
independence of the board.  I discuss this below. 
From a resource dependence perspective, nationality diversity enlarges board 
resources in terms of expertise and networks (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). These 
resources reduce external dependencies, uncertainty, and transactions costs (Dass, 
Kini, Nanda, Onal and Wang, 2013).  Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) find that US firms 
with foreign independent directors exhibit higher returns from cross-border 
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acquisitions when the targets are from the home regions of the foreign directors.  This 
is attributed to the overseas task-relevant expertise of foreign directors.  In addition to 
overseas expertise and networks, foreign nationals may bring distinctive talents that 
are not available domestically.  For example, Delis et al. (2017) argue that differences 
in genetic origins between board members bring creative approaches for solving 
corporate problems.  In support of their argument, they find a positive association 
between board genetic diversity and firm performance—measured by Tobin’s Q and 
risk-adjusted returns.  Giannetti and Zhao (2019) find that differences in ancestral 
origins among board members are positively associated with firm innovation in terms 
of the number of patents and their average number of citations. Such expertise, 
networks, and talents are valuable resources to firms with overseas and complex 
operations (Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Anderson et al., 2011). 
Related work emphasises differences in the quality of corporate governance 
and investor protection systems between a board’s host country and the home 
countries of foreign directors.  For example, Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) propose that 
outsider Anglo-American directors are employed by Norwegian and Swedish firms 
to signal their willingness to expose themselves to improved corporate governance 
systems.  In support of their proposition, they find that outsider Anglo-American 
directors are associated with higher firm value—measured by Tobin’s Q.  Using 62,066 
firm-years from eighty countries, Miletkov et al. (2017) find, on average, no significant 
differences in firm value between firms with and without foreign board members. 
However, the presence of these board members is positively associated with 
shareholder value when their home countries have higher quality legal institutions 
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than those of the firm’s host country.  The authors also find that the announcement 
returns of cross-border acquisitions are higher for firms with foreign independent 
directors from countries with stronger investor protection systems.  Both studies thus 
suggest that foreign directors add to (distort) shareholder value through their 
exposure to relatively higher (lower) quality systems of corporate governance and 
investor protection in their home countries. 
Another potential reason for hiring foreign directors is to meet the demand of 
foreign shareholders (Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). Unlike domestic directors, foreign 
nationals tend to have weaker ties with domestic management and share more 
interests with foreign shareholders. This could make it easier for foreign agents to 
fulfil their duty to dissent when needed.  Accordingly, foreign owners may exercise 
pressure on firms to have foreign agents on their boards.  From an agency perspective, 
foreign board members may enhance board independence by reducing ‘groupthink’, 
originally defined as 
“a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive 
in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (Janis, 1972, p.9).  
Drawing on the theory of groupthink, prior studies have attributed higher 
governance quality to firms with gender-diverse boards compared to those with all-
male boards (Chen et al., 2017; Lai et al., 2017).  This is based on the premise that diverse 
boards are less susceptible to groupthink compared to homogeneous boards.  
Contrary to nationality-diverse boards, all-domestic boards are more likely to share a 
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homogeneous cultural background. The latter are therefore more cohesive, and their 
consequent susceptibility to groupthink is higher than the former. Bénabou (2013) 
points out two symptoms of groupthink: an ex-ante dissent-aversion (i.e., willful 
blindness) and an ex-post denial of bad news (i.e., wishful thinking).  This 
dysfunctional behaviour by board members has been blamed for high-profile business 
failures, such as the collapse of Enron Corporation (Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and 
Nanda, 2015). If groupthink features less on diverse boards, foreign directors will 
contribute to board independence and effective monitoring. In support of this 
argument, Oxelheim et al. (2013) find evidence to suggest that Nordic firms employ 
foreign board members to satisfy foreign shareholders’ need for monitoring, whereas 
nationals with international experience are put in office for advice on overseas 
operations.  Estélyi and Nisar (2016) further find that UK firms with higher foreign 
ownership are more likely to have foreign board members.  The authors also find that 
firms with foreign directors have a higher performance—measured by the natural 
logarithm of Tobin’s Q and return on assets. 
To sum up, prior studies have attributed some benefits to the existence of 
foreign directors on corporate boards. For example, these directors bring overseas 
expertise and networks to the board (e.g., Masulis et al., 2012; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016) 
and tend to have week ties with domestic management (Oxelheim et al., 2013). Yet, 
these studies do not consider the nationality composition of foreign directors. Taking 
this composition into account is crucial as it determines the level of distinctive 
international expertise, networks, and talents that is brought by nationality diversity 
to the board. Drawing on theories of resource dependence (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) 
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and groupthink (Janis, 1972), I expect the distinctiveness of board members from each 
other to contribute to the pool of expertise and the independence of the board. The 
level of board nationality diversity is therefore expected to improve board decisions 
and create value for shareholders. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The level of board nationality diversity will have a positive impact 
on firm value. 
  
Nationality diversity among board members comes with potential logistical 
and cultural challenges. The logistical challenge stems from the geographical distance 
of foreign directors from the country of corporate headquarters. For example, Masulis 
et al. (2012) find that independent non-US-domiciled directors are more likely than 
their US-domiciled counterparts to have a poor attendance record (below 75%) of 
board meetings. Together with their lack of domestic networks and less familiarity 
with the US environment, the former are then argued to be less effective than the latter 
in monitoring corporate management.  In support of this argument, the authors find 
that firms with independent non-US-domiciled directors are associated with 
aggressive CEO compensation, lower likelihood of firing CEOs with poor 
performance, and a higher probability of intentional financial misreporting. Yet, the 
geographical location of the UK is more easily accessible to many foreign nationals 
than that of the US, which requires a longer time to cross the Atlantic Ocean. Empirical 
evidence in support of this argument is provided by Estélyi and Nisar (2016), who 




Related work has compared the frequency of board meetings between diverse 
and domestic boards.  Hahn and Lasfer (2016) find that UK firms with foreign non-
executive board members have lower board meeting frequency.  The fewer board 
meetings are then associated with lower shareholder returns and higher 
compensation for the CEO and the chairman.  In the US, Giannetti and Zhao (2019) 
find that diversity in directors’ ancestral origins is associated with higher board 
meeting frequency and higher director turnover, which is not related to firms’ 
performance.  The US findings are then interpreted, by the authors, as indicative of 
difficulties and disagreements in the decision-making process on diverse boards.  This 
interpretation relates to the concept of cultural separation among members of diverse 
boards. 
Cultural separation is another potential challenge to boards with foreign 
nationals. This challenge stems from differences in board members’ cultural 
backgrounds that could serve as bases for cultural separation. Such separation could 
diminish the board's functionality and have devastating consequences on shareholder 
value. Empirical evidence in support of this argument is provided by Frijns et al., 
(2016). Their findings relate higher cultural differences among board members to 
lower firm performance—measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets. 
One form of cultural separation is cultural faultlines.  Faultlines are 
hypothetical dividing lines that may divide a heterogeneous set of actors into 
subgroups based on one or more attributes of these actors (Lau and Murnighan, 1998).  
In the case of board cultural faultlines, subgroups form along cultural attribute(s) of 
directors. Cultural faultlines are therefore defined as the degree of separation between 
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cliques that may form based on one or more cultural dimensions. A clique is a 
subgroup of two or more board members who share similar cultural backgrounds.  
The higher the cultural similarities within each clique, and the cultural differences 
between cliques, the stronger the faultline(s) on the board (Meyer and Glenz, 2013; 
Van Peteghem et al., 2018). Individual board members are then expected to favour, 
trust, and cooperate with those belonging to their clique more than those who do not 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979). The strength of the separation between cliques along 
faultline(s) is hypothesized to diminish the overall effectiveness of the board through 
poor communication, conflicts, and distrust between board members (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979; Harrison and Klein, 2007; Van Peteghem et al., 2018).  In support of this 
hypothesis, Van Peteghem et al. (2018) find that stronger board faultlines are 
associated with lower firm performance, aggressive CEO compensation, and lower 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. 
Another form of cultural separation is the marginalization of singleton 
directors.  Singleton directors are unique-nationality board members who do not share 
an identical national culture with any other members of the same board.  When all 
board members are singleton directors, nationality diversity reaches its maximum, 
and cultural faultlines reach their lowest possible level for a diverse board.  Singleton 
directors are therefore instrumental in the design of an effective board nationality 
diversity policy.  Underrepresentation of these directors may suppress their potential.  
This argument finds its roots in the critical mass hypothesis, which stipulates that the 
influence on board decisions of minority directors remains insignificant until their 
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representation exceeds a critical threshold level (Joecks et al., 2013).  Evidence in line 
with this hypothesis is provided by Liu Wei and Xie (2014). 
In sum, nationality diversity among board members is not without potential 
problems. Examples of challenges that could face nationality-diverse boards include 
logistical challenges arising from the geographical distance of foreign directors from 
the country of corporate headquarters (Masulis et al., 2012) and cultural challenges 
emanating from cultural differences among board members (Frijns et al., 2016). The 
former challenges are less likely in the UK setting compared to the US setting (Estélyi 
and Nisar, 2016). Therefore, I focus on the latter challenges that may negatively impact 
the dynamics of nationality-diverse boards. Building on theories of faultline (Lau and 
Murnighan, 1998) and critical mass (Joecks et al., 2013), these boards may face serious 
cultural challenges in the forms of strong cultural faultlines and marginalized foreign 
minorities. The strength of cultural subgrouping along faultlines may generate 
conflicts and lack of trust, leading to limited cooperation and information sharing 
across cultural divides (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Harrison and Klein, 2007; Van 
Peteghem et al., 2018).  The marginalization of foreign minorities is also expected to 
limit their contributions to the board.  Both forms of cultural separation could increase 
the costs of diversity to offset or exceed its benefits.  Board cultural separation is then 




Hypothesis 3: The strength of board cultural separation (cultural faultlines, 
marginalized directors) will moderate the relationship between the 
level of board nationality diversity and firm value. 
  
Next, I discuss other prior studies on the circumstances under which diversity 
might or might not add net benefits to shareholders. For example, Anderson et al. 
(2011) argue that diversity benefits are higher for firms with higher complexity of 
operations compared to those with lower complexity. The authors then find that firm 
complexity mitigates the positive impact on firm value of board diversity, measured 
by using a composite diversity index across six dimensions (including education, 
professional experience, board experience, age, gender, and ethnicity). Frijns et al. 
(2016) also find that the complexity of operations moderates the negative association 
between board cultural differences and firm performance. 
I extend the work of Anderson et al. (2011) by using nationality as another 
dimension of diversity that is specifically relevant to firms with international complex 
operations. Unlike Anderson et al. (2011) and Frijns et al. (2016), my measure of 
operational complexity considers not only the number of business segments but also 
the number of geographical regions in which the firm operates. I also extend the work 
of Frijns et al. (2016) by investigating the impact of firm complexity on the performance 
outcome of board nationality diversity as uniqueness, rather than board cultural 
separation. Accordingly, if the level of complexity has a bearing on the benefits 
derived from the level of board nationality diversity, I would expect firm complexity 
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to influence the association between diversity and firm value.  Based on this reasoning, 
I formulate my final hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Firm complexity will moderate the relationship between the level of 
board nationality diversity and firm value. 
  
3.3. MEASUREMENT OF NATIONALITY DIVERSITY AND CULTURAL SEPARATION  
Guided by various theoretical backgrounds, corporate governance scholars 
have proxied for aspects of nationality diversity by applying different measurement 
scales to director nationality.  One approach is to scale director nationality as a binary 
attribute.  For example, Estélyi and Nisar (2016) classify directors into domestic 
directors (i.e., the base case) and foreign directors.  Similarly, Masulis et al. (2012) 
categorize directors into foreign independent directors and other directors.  This 
approach often assumes foreign directors to be a homogeneous set of actors, thereby 
masking variations between them.  A second approach involves attaching country-
specific value(s) to board members based on their respective nationalities. This 
approach changes the measurement scale of director nationality from a categorical 
scale to an interval scale.  Frijns et al. (2016) have adopted this approach in developing 
a measure for cultural diversity as separation. Delis et al. (2017) have also employed 
this approach to develop a proxy for genetic diversity. 
Panel A of Table 1 presents examples of both approaches and shows that 
current empirical evidence on the value of board nationality diversity to shareholders 
is inconclusive.  For instance, Estélyi and Nisar (2016) and Frijns et al. (2016) employ 
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UK samples to examine the impacts on firm performance of two diversity aspects: the 
existence of foreign board members and cultural diversity, respectively.  Estélyi and 
Nisar (2016) conclude that diversity is useful as firms, on average, do accrue a net 
positive value from having foreign nationals on their boards.  In contrast, Frijns et al. 
(2016) conclude that the costs of diversity outweigh its benefits because cultural 
differences among board members negatively affect firm value.  In light of these 
results, I distinguish between the level of board nationality diversity and the strength 
of board cultural separation as two diversity aspects with potential opposing effects 
on board performance which can influence shareholder value. 
First, I measure the level of board nationality diversity as uniqueness using 
DDN.  It captures national-origin dissimilarities and reaches its maximum when each 
director comes from a different country. This measure is given by the following 
formula (Simpson, 1949; Rae and Taylor, 1970): 
𝐷𝐷𝑁 = 1 − 
∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
  
   (1) 
where: ni is the number of board members in the ith nationality; n is board size. 
DDN is the complement of Simpson‘s (1949) concentration index, which is the number 
of pairs with identical nationality in a board, 
1
2
∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝑘
𝑖=1 , over the total number 
of all possible pairs in the board, 
1
2
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1).  DDN then represents the number of pairs 
with dissimilar nationality in a board, 
1
2
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1) −
1
2
∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝑘
𝑖=1 , as a proportion 
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of all possible pairs in the board, 
1
2
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1). Therefore, I refer to that proportion as 
dissimilarity of director nationalities. 
[Table 1 about here] 
In Panel B of Table 1, I develop nine desirable properties (criteria) for a measure 
of board nationality diversity as uniqueness. Based on these criteria, I compare DDN 
to the binary-categorization measures, which involve scaling director nationality as a 
binary attribute.  I find that dummy indicators satisfy only two out of the nine criteria.  
The proportions of foreign or foreign non-executive directors on the board meet three 
of the desired criteria.  In contrast, DDN meets all nine criteria. 
Similar to DDN, Delis et al. (2017) argue that Genetic diversity captures the 
upside aspect of board nationality diversity.30  I summarize the main differences 
between the two measures in Panel C of Table 1.  DDN involves a multi-categorical 
scaling of director nationality and reaches its maximum only when each director 
comes from a different country.  In contrast, Genetic diversity involves applying the 
standard deviation to genetic diversity scores that are attached to directors’ 
nationalities on the board.  The standard deviation, as Harrison and Klein (2007) point 
out, is a proxy for separation because it reaches its maximum when board members 
are polarized: half of them are at the highest endpoint, and the other half are at the 
lowest endpoint of a continuum.  This is the genetic score continuum in the case of 
 
30 Delis et al. (2017: 231) state: “We hypothesize that diversity … may result in board members who 
have (among other things) developed different perspectives, skills, and abilities that allow them to interpret and 
solve problems differently.”  Their verbal theorizing is therefore more aligned to the upside rather than 
the downside aspect of diversity. 
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Genetic diversity.  Genetic diversity is therefore a measure of genetic separation on the 
board. The separation between board members is theoretically constructed as a 
downside aspect of diversity (Harrison and Klein, 2007).  Unlike Genetic diversity, DDN 
captures unique diversity, which represents the upside aspect of diversity.31 DDN also 
follows a more conservative definition of director similarity, which considers directors 
to be similar only if they possess an identical nationality.  This is in line with my 
conceptualization of board nationality diversity as uniqueness. Like Genetic diversity, 
DDN consistently assigns the same value to the same board regardless of other boards 
in the sample. Both measures are therefore unbiased towards sample specification. 
Unlike Genetic diversity, DDN applies to all countries of director nationality.  Examples 
of countries with no available genetic diversity scores include Belize, Cyprus, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Singapore, Slovakia, Taiwan, and 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
Second, board cultural separation may take two forms: subgrouping along 
faultlines or marginalization of foreign minorities.  I measure the strength of cultural 
faultlines using the degree of separation between cultural subgroups within each 
board.  Its computation involves three steps.  In step 1, I follow Frijns et al. (2016) and 
attach four cultural scores to each director based on their country of nationality. 
According to Hofstede (2001), the scores quantify four dimensions of national culture: 
(i) the individualism score measures the disintegration level of individuals from their 
families or other groups in a society; (ii) the masculinity score captures the degree of 
social preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for 
 
31 Harrison and Klein (2007) refer to unique diversity as a form of diversity as variety. 
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success; (iii) the power distance score quantifies the degree of social acceptance for an 
unequal distribution of power among individuals; (iv) the uncertainty avoidance 
score proxies for the degree of intolerance towards risk and ambiguity.  In step 2, I 
cluster members of each board into cultural subgroups based on the four cultural 
scores.  The strength of cultural faultlines (Cultural faultlines) is computed in step 3.  
The last two steps are executed simultaneously using a clustering algorithm, 
developed by Meyer and Glenz (2013). The clustering step stops only when a 
clustering solution has a maximum value of the average silhouette width. A silhouette 
width quantifies how well a director i fits into one cluster (cultural subgroup) in 
comparison to another.  Its computational formula is as follows: 
Silhouette width (i) = 
𝑏𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖) 
 
   (2) 
where: ai is the average cultural distances between director i and all directors 
within her cluster, and bi is the minimum average cultural distances between director 
i and all directors of any other clusters.  Cultural distances are computed using the 
following formula: 
Cultural Distance (i,j) = √∑ (𝐼𝑑𝑖 − 𝐼𝑑𝑗)2
4
𝑑=1 , ∀ 𝑖 < 𝑗 
   (3) 
where: Idi is the culture score on dimension d for director i; Idj is the culture score 
on dimension d for director j; d is one of the four cultural dimensions (individualism, 
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masculinity, power distance, or uncertainty avoidance).  The maximum value of the 
average silhouette width is my proxy for the strength of cultural faultlines.32 
A comparison between Cultural faultlines and Cultural diversity is provided in 
Panel C of Table 1. The former maps onto a specific form of cultural separation, i.e., 
cultural subgrouping, whereas the latter captures overall cultural differences among 
board members. Both employ ‘pairwise distance’ as a basis of measurement. A 
pairwise cultural distance captures the difference between a pair of directors in one of 
the four cultural dimensions. The faultline measure (Cultural faultlines) involves 
clustering directors into cliques and reaches its maximum when the board is split into 
two equal-sized cliques who are at the opposite endpoints of all the four cultural 
dimensions. Cultural diversity reaches its maximum when board members are 
polarized: half of them are at the highest endpoint, and the other half are at the lowest 
endpoint of all the four cultural dimensions. Both measures are therefore similar in 
terms of their shape at the maximum. Cultural diversity, however, involves scaling 
cultural differences by in-sample variances, resulting in different cultural diversity 
scores for the same board depending on other boards in the sample.  In contrast, the 
faultline measure (Cultural faultlines) is unbiased towards sample specification 
because it yields the same value for each board regardless of other boards in the 
sample.  Both measures follow a broad definition of director similarity, under which 
directors with different nationalities can be similar in terms of certain cultural 
dimensions.  For example, German and British directors are assigned the same 
 
32 See Appendix A for an illustration of the difference between the strength of cultural faultlines 
and cultural diversity. Appendix B provides a numerical example of how the strength of cultural 
faultlines is computed. 
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Hofstede's culture scores of 66 and 35 for the cultural dimensions of masculinity and 
power distance, respectively.  The data required to compute both measures are also 
not available for all countries of nationality.  Examples of countries with no available 
cultural scores include Belize, Bolivia, DR Congo, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, 
and Paraguay.33 
The other form of cultural separation is the marginalization of singleton 
directors.  I consider singleton directors to be marginalized if they represent less than 
25% of board members.  Together with my proxy for the strength of cultural faultlines, 
my measures map onto specific mechanisms through which cultural separation may 
reduce firm value.  To illustrate these mechanisms, Figure 1 presents four example 
cases of eight-sized boards.  In Case (1), there is no nationality diversity, as all directors 
are British (i.e., domestic).  Cultural separation is therefore not an issue in that case.   
In Case (2), the board is composed of two balanced cliques, who are separated by a 
single faultline. This case demonstrates that complete homogeneity of foreign 
directors, on a nationality-diverse board, poses a high risk for unintended formation 
of a strong cultural faultline that would split the board into two equal-sized opposing 
cliques: four British directors versus four American directors.34 This subgroup 
configuration can trigger more severe internal conflicts and other sub-categorization 
problems between board members (Carton and Cummings, 2013). Another cultural 
 
33 To address concerns on the potential subjectivity and data availability of the cultural scores, 
an indicator for having two nationality subgroups on the board (i.e., having a single nationality-based 
faultline) is employed in a supplementary analysis as another proxy for a strong faultline formation. 
34 Replacing the four American directors with four directors from a non-Anglo-Saxon country 
may increase the severity of the resultant cultural faultline.  This is accounted for when computing the 
strength of cultural faultlines. 
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separation problem appears in Case (3), where I expect the singleton Chinese director 
to be marginalized.  Case (4) seems better than the other three cases.  Unlike Case (1), 
the diversity of board expertise and networks is expected to be higher, and groupthink 
is less likely, in Case (4).  The likelihood of both cultural faultlines and marginalization 
of singleton directors is also lower in Case (4) compared with Cases (2) and (3). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
3.4. EMPIRICAL MODELS 
I start with a model of diversity determinants. Unlike earlier models (e.g., 
Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Miletkov et al., 2017), my model employs a new dependent 
variable (DDN) which captures the level of nationality diversity on boards.  I expect 
the level of diversity to be driven by the magnitude of foreign activities (measured by 
the proportion of foreign sales), rather than the number of geographical regions in 
which the firm operates.  To test this proposition, I include both the proportion of 
foreign sales and the natural logarithm of the number of geographical segments as 
potential determinants in my model.  I also include other potential determinants that 
are deemed important in explaining the representation of foreign directors on boards 
(Oxelheim et al., 2013; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Miletkov et al., 2017). 
My model comprises potential firm-level and board-level determinants of 
diversity. Following Hwang and Kim, (2009), board selection decisions are 
determined by past values, rather than current values, of the economic determinants. 
Yet, these decisions are likely influenced by the current governance structure. My 
firm-level variables are therefore based on lagged values, whereas board-level 
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variables are current values. I also include industry and year controls. My 
determinants model is hence specified as follows. 
𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽9𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽11𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐿𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽13𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽14𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽16𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽17𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛴 𝛽𝑥 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑥
+ 𝛴 𝛽𝑡 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 
  (4) 
where: DDNi,t is the dissimilarity of director nationalities, as defined in Eq. (1), 
for firm i in current year t; Foreign salesi,t-1 is sales generated from overseas operations 
in last year t-1 as a proportion of net sales in the last year; Ln(Geographical segmentsi,t-1) 
is the natural logarithm of a firm’s number of geographical segments in the last year; 
Foreign ownershipi,t-1 is lagged proportion of common shares held by foreign investors 
owning 5% or more; Institutional ownershipi,t-1 is lagged proportion of common shares 
held by investment banks or other institutions owning 5% or more and seeking a long-
term return; Firm sizei,t-1 is the natural logarithm of opening total assets; Leveragei,t-1 is 
opening long-term liabilities over opening total assets; Capital intensityi,t-1 is opening 
property, plant and equipment (PPE) over opening total assets; Sales growthi,t-1 is 
lagged sales growth; Stock returni,t-1 is last year’s ending stock price minus last year’s 
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opening stock price, scaled by last year’s opening stock price; Ln(Director ownershipi,t) 
is the natural logarithm of mean director ownership on the board, where the 
ownership represents the total value of equity held by a director at the end of the 
current year; Independent directorsi,t is the proportion of independent directors on the 
board; Ln(Director tenurei,t) is the natural logarithm of mean director tenure on the 
board; Busy directorsi,t is the number of directors with at least three current 
appointments, scaled by board size; Retirement-age directorsi,t is the number of directors 
whose age is at least 65 years, scaled by board size; Female directorsi,t is the proportion 
of female directors on the board; Ln(Board sizei,t) is the natural logarithm of the number 
of directors on the board; CEO dualityi,t is a dummy indicator that equals one if the 
CEO serves as the chair of the board, and zero otherwise; INDUSTRYx is a set of 
industry controls; YEARt is a set of year controls; ηi,t is an error term.  The independent 
variables do not include an indicator for whether the CEO is a foreigner to avoid 
introducing a mechanical association between the indicator and DDN: a foreign CEO 
indicator would have a value of one only when DDN is positive. 
Next, I model firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q) as a function of DDN and a 
wide range of control variables, including board-level, firm-level, industry, and year 
controls.  To qualify for inclusion in my controls, a variable must be a potential 
determinant of firm value, board nationality diversity, or both.  Controlling for the 
determinants of board nationality diversity in my value model reduces concerns about 
the problem of correlated omitted variables.35  Potential determinants of firm value in 
 
35 This problem occurs if the value model omits an independent variable that is correlated with 
both the dependent variable and one (or more) of the included independent variables. If this happens, 
OLS will produce biased and inconsistent estimates. 
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my model are defined as in Van Peteghem et al. (2018).  I add to my controls a dummy 
indicator for whether the CEO is a foreign national (Foreign CEOi,t).  This is because 
foreign CEOs may bring valuable specialized non-domestic expertise and networks to 
their firms (Conyon, Haß, Vergauwe and Zhang, 2019).  The value model is then 
specified as follows. 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛’𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽9𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽13𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽17𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽18𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽19𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛴 𝛽𝑥 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑥 + 𝛴 𝛽𝑡 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
  (5) 
where: Tobin’s Qi,t is my proxy for firm value and is computed as total assets 
plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity, scaled by total assets; 
DDNi,t proxies for the level of board nationality diversity and is defined in Eq. (1); εi,t 
is an error term.  I provide full definitions of all variables in Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Finally, I consider two potential moderators of the relationship between the 
level of board nationality diversity and the firm value.  The first potential moderator 
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is the strength of board cultural separation, which has two aspects: sub-categorization 
and marginalization.  To capture the first aspect, I employ a dummy indicator (Strong 
faultlinesi,t) that takes a value of one if the strength of board cultural faultlines (Cultural 
faultlinesi,t) is at least equal to its 90th percentile value (0.9), and zero otherwise. 
Cultural faultlinesi,t captures the strength of cultural separation between cultural 
subgroups on the board.  It ranges from a minimum value of zero, indicating no 
faultlines, to a maximum value of one.  To capture the second aspect, I use a dummy 
indicator (Marginalized directorsi,t) that takes a value of one if the board has unique-
nationality directors who represent less than 25% of board members, and zero 
otherwise.  The 25% threshold is based on the work of Bilimoria (2006), who measures 
the presence of a critical mass of women in top management team by using a dummy 
indicator for having at least 25% female representation on the team. Similarly, Harris 
(2014) employs the same threshold to measure the presence of a critical mass of female 
directors on the board. Below this threshold, minority groups (e.g., female directors 
or unique-nationality directors) are likely to be marginalized. 
The second potential moderator is the level of operational complexity, 
measured by a dummy indicator (Low complexityi,t) that takes a value of one if the total 
number of business and geographical segments in a given year is below its sample 
median for the same year, and zero otherwise.  I use the same control variables as in 
Eq. (5).  Υi,t is an error term.  My moderation model is then specified as follows. 
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𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛’𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽11𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽15𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽16𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽18𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽19𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽20𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽21𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽22𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽23𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽24𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽25𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛴 𝛽𝑥 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑥 + 𝛴 𝛽𝑡 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + Υ𝑖𝑡 
  (6) 
3.5. DATA 
Board diversity has gained the attention of regulators since 2003. In this year, 
Norway has become the first nation in the world to adopt a gender quota on corporate 
boards (Matsa and Miller, 2013). In the same year, the UK regulator has commissioned 
the Dean of London Business School, Laura Tyson, to prepare a report on ‘The 
Recruitment and Development of Non-Executive Directors’ (Tyson, 2003). In it, she 
has argued that diversity is an important area for improvement on UK boards. More 
recently, Lord Davies and Sir Parker have been calling for greater diversity on 
corporate boards, including diversity in gender, ethnicity, and nationality (Davies, 
2011 and 2015; Parker, 2017). Thus, UK boards have been officially encouraged to 
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embrace board diversity as a multi-dimensional concept that “is not solely limited to 
gender, but also includes many aspects of the human condition” (Parker, 2017). 
However, empirical evidence on the outcomes of board diversity is 
inconclusive. For example, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) report substantial drops in firm 
value and operating performance following the imposition of a 40% quota for female 
board members in Norway. However, Liu et al. (2014) find that gender diversity on 
Chinese boards is positively associated with firm performance. Carter, D’Souza, 
Simkins and Simpson (2010) look at both gender and ethnic diversity on US boards 
and find no association between either of these diversity attributes and firm 
performance. In a later sample, Guest (2019) continues to find no evidence that ethnic 
diversity on the board affects firm performance. 
In terms of nationality diversity, Estélyi and Nisar (2016) find that foreign 
nationals on UK boards are associated with higher firm performance. Delis et al. (2017) 
argue that differences in genetic origins between board members bring creative 
approaches for solving corporate problems. Using a sample of UK- and North 
American-listed firms, they find a positive association between board genetic 
diversity and firm performance. In contrast, Frijns et al. (2016) find that nationality 
diversity on UK boards brings cultural differences that negatively affect firm 
performance. Hahn and Lasfer (2016) find that UK firms with foreign non-executive 
board members have lower board meeting frequency.  The fewer board meetings are 
then associated with lower shareholder returns and higher compensation for the CEO 
and the chairman. Further, Miletkov et al. (2017) use a sample of 62,066 firm-years 
from eighty countries, including the UK, to investigate the impact of foreign 
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independent directors on firm performance. They find, on average, no significant 
differences in firm value between firms with and without foreign independent board 
members. However, the presence of these board members is negatively associated 
with shareholder value when their home countries have lower quality legal 
institutions than those of the firm’s host country. Empirical UK-based evidence on the 
value of board nationality diversity is therefore mixed. 
Despite that, nationality diversity on UK boards has been increasing over 
time.36  The average UK board has also been one of the most nationality-diverse boards 
in the world. For example, Delis et al. (2017) have reported the mean value of their 
board diversity measure to be higher in their UK sample (0.011) than their US sample 
(0.006).  Similarly, Frijns et al. (2016) have found the percentage of firm-years with 
foreign independent directors in their UK sample to be around four times that in the 
US sample of Masulis et al. (2012).    
Thus, earlier research has shown that the presence of foreign directors on 
corporate boards is relatively high in UK samples compared to US samples, yet UK-
based empirical evidence on the value of board nationality diversity is inconclusive. 
This issue thus merits further investigation in the UK setting. 
To construct my UK sample, I begin by merging available UK board data from 
the BoardEx database with their respective financial data from the Worldscope 
database, excluding unlisted firms and those with missing industry classification 
 
36 Despite some slight decreases in the average proportion of foreign nationals on the board 
(FDs), an overall upward trend is observed across my sample period: from an average of 0.12 in the 
year 1999 to an average of 0.18 in the year 2018. 
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benchmark (ICB) code.37  My study period extends over twenty years, starting from 
the earliest available month, January 1999, on the BoardEx database to December 2018.  
To ensure the accuracy of my merge, I require any difference in corporate annual 
reporting date between BoardEx data and Worldscope data to be less than or equal to 
one month.38  In cases where the difference is at least 358 (365 − 7) days, I check if this 
difference is due to the Worldscope mid-January rule.  This rule stipulates a cut-off 
date of 15 January of each year as the basis for classifying non-US firms’ financial data 
into years on the Worldscope platform (Worldscope, 2013, p. 41).  Accordingly, if a 
firm’s fiscal year ends before mid-January in year t, its financial data will be classified 
by Worldscope as belonging to year t-1.  However, this firm’s board data will still be 
classified by BoardEx as belonging to year t.  The rule then can result in a difference 
of a year between reporting dates on the BoardEx and Worldscope databases.  My 
correction procedures for this rule involve dropping firm-years with a reporting year 
that is more than seven days above or below 365. 
The merge results in an initial sample of 24,805 firm-year observations for 2,795 
unique firms. Panel A of Table 3 shows that some firm-years are then excluded due to 
one of the following criteria: (1) belonging to the financial or real-estate sectors—ICB 
industry codes of 30 and 35, respectively; (2) domiciled outside the UK;39 (3) missing 
age data for at least one board member; (4) missing nationality data for at least one 
 
37 The ICB code is launched by the FTSE Russell Group to classify firms by industry. 
38 The BoardEx database follows a monthly, rather than a daily, reporting of firms’ fiscal year 
end. A firm’s annual report date on the BoardEx database is hence reported at the beginning of the 
month in which the firm’s fiscal year ends. Therefore, I allow a difference of one month between 
reporting dates on the BoardEx database and the Worldscope database, while merging the data from 
both databases. 
39 The second exclusion criterion ensures that firms traded in currencies other than GBP are 
excluded from the sample. 
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board member; (5) having a board size of fewer than three directors; (6) missing data 
of some required variables.  I end up with a final sample of 11,384 firm-years from 
1,457 unique firms.  Panel B of Table 3 provides a breakdown of the final sample by 
industry and across years. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The sample comprises 80,500 director-years from 74 countries.  Panel C of Table 
3 decomposes the number of directors by nationality and across years.  Foreign 
directors represent 15.61% of my sample of directors.  The top-nine foreign countries 
of director nationality include: (i) the US, which accounts for 34% of foreign directors; 
(ii) five UK-neighbour countries (Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Sweden); (iii) three founding nations of the commonwealth (Australia, South Africa, 
and Canada).  Despite some slight decreases in the average proportion of foreign 
nationals on the board (FDs), an overall upward trend is observed across my sample 
period: from an average of 0.12 in the year 1999 to an average of 0.18 in the year 2018. 
A similar pattern is observed for the level of board nationality diversity, measured by 
DDN.  It has increased from an average of 0.18 in the year 1999 to an average of 0.27 
in the year 2018. 
Panel D of Table 3 splits my sample of boards into 6,238 board-years with a 
single nationality per each board (i.e., homogeneous boards) and 5,146 observations 
with two or more nationalities per each board (i.e., diverse boards).  The sample of 
homogeneous boards contains a few cases where the board is composed entirely of 
foreign directors with an identical nationality.  The sample of diverse boards, which 
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represents 45.2% of my final sample, consists of 2,309 board-years with a single foreign 
director each and 2,837 observations with at least two foreign nationals on the board.  
Overall, the number of nationalities (foreign directors) on a board has a maximum 
value of 9 (15). 
3.6. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Before conducting my analyses, I winsorize continuous financial variables at 
their 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers. Table 4 reports 
descriptive statistics for my variables.  The statistics show an average board size of 
seven directors, including 13.7% foreign nationals (FDs) and 65.69% of them are non-
executive directors (FNEDs).  The percentage of firms with foreign CEOs (Foreign 
CEO) is 13% of the cases, and the average genetic diversity score (Genetic diversity) is 
0.002.  My measure of dissimilarity in directors’ nationalities (DDN) ranges from a 
minimum value of zero, indicating homogeneous boards, to a maximum value of one, 
indicating a board of unique-nationality (singleton) directors. According to this 
measure, the nationality diversity level for the average board is 0.21.  Since more than 
50% of the firm-years have homogeneous boards, the median for all diversity-related 
variables is equal to zero. This includes DDN, FDs, FNEDs, Genetic diversity, Cultural 
diversity, Strong faultlines, and Marginalized directors.  Cultural diversity has an average 
score of 0.871.40  The percentage of boards with strong faultlines (marginalized 
directors) is 8.8% (28.7%) of my sample. For the average board, the mean value of 
 
40 For countries with no available country-specific cultural scores, I use average cultural scores 
of their neighbour countries. 
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equity held per director is 6,310,903 USD.41 About 21% of board-years have the CEO 
as the chair.  Firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q) has a mean of 1.919, with a median 
of 1.443 and a range from 0.518 to 10.539. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 presents the results of univariate comparisons, using the difference of 
means tests, between firm-years with diverse boards (DIVERSE) and those with 
homogeneous boards (HOMOGENEOUS).  The nationality diversity level (DDN) for 
the average diverse board is 0.47, which is more than double its value for the average 
board if homogeneous boards are included.  The percentage of boards with strong 
faultlines (marginalized directors) is 19.5% (63.5%) of the diverse board sample. 
Director ownership is significantly higher in diverse boards compared to 
homogeneous ones: 8,056,452 USD versus 4,870,924 USD, respectively.  CEO duality 
is less frequently observed among diverse boards compared with homogeneous 
boards.  The difference between the two sets of boards in the percentage of 
independent directors (7%) further indicates that diverse boards have, on average, a 
higher level of independence.  The average director tenure per diverse (homogeneous) 
board is 5.36 (6.16) years, with an overall average of 5.8 years.  I also observe a higher 
average representation of female directors on diverse boards (9.4%) than 
homogeneous ones (7.1%). 
 
41 Director ownership data is obtained from the BoardEx database, where values are reported 
in US dollars. 
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Nevertheless, the percentage of directors aged at least 65 years is 2.7% higher 
among diverse boards compared with homogeneous ones.  On average, directors on 
diverse boards are also busier than those on homogeneous boards.  While director age 
and business may reflect director experience and expertise (Dao, Huang and Zhu, 
2013; Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan, 2013), some prior works find retirement-age and 
busy directors to be associated with weaker monitoring of corporate management 
(Masulis, Wang, Xie, and Zhang, 2018; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
Turning to firm characteristics, firms with diverse boards have significantly 
greater average firm value (Tobin’s Q) than those with homogeneous boards: 1.99 
versus 1.86, respectively.  The former is, on average, bigger and has a higher sales 
growth rate than the latter. The average diverse-board firm is more capital intensive 
and exhibits higher leverage than the average firm with a homogeneous board.  
Differences between both firms in stock returns and institutional ownership are 
marginally significant and insignificant, respectively. On average, measures of foreign 
orientation, including Foreign sales, Foreign ownership, and the number of geographical 
segments in which the firm operates (Geographical segments), are all significantly higher 
for firms with diverse boards than those without.  Finally, 35.7% (52.9%) of the former 
(latter) have low complexity of operations (Low complexity). Firms with diverse boards 
are therefore more likely to have complex operations compared to those with 
homogeneous boards.42     
 
42 When I set missing values for the number of business segments to a value of one, I obtain 
similar results (untabulated). 
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[Table 5 about here] 
3.7. BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Panel A of Table 6 shows Pearson correlations between my measure of board 
nationality diversity (DDN) and other diversity-related measures, including my proxy 
for the strength of board cultural faultlines (Cultural faultlines) and four prior measures 
of diversity (FDs, FNEDs, Genetic diversity, and Cultural diversity). All variables are 
defined in Table 2.  The correlations are quite high between the variables in the full 
sample (n = 11,384) because all of them have the same value of zero for firms with all-
domestic boards (n=6225).  Excluding these firms yields 5,159 observations of firms 
with at least one foreign board member.  In this set of firms, the correlations of DDN 
with Cultural faultlines, FDs, FNEDs, Genetic diversity, and Cultural diversity are −0.30, 
0.83, 0.68, 0.35, and 0.68, respectively. The correlations decrease to −0.28, 0.65, 0.53, 
0.29, and 0.61, respectively, for firms with at least two foreign board members 
(n=2,850). This is consistent with my expectations that my measure of diversity (DDN) 
is not highly correlated with my faultline measure (Cultural faultlines), and both 
measures are different from prior measures of diversity. 
Prior to multivariate analysis, I report Pearson correlations between main 
regression variables in Panel B of Table 6.  My measure of nationality diversity (DDN) 
is positively correlated with Ln(Board size) and Firm size: the correlation coefficients 
are 0.29 and 0.30, respectively. DDN is also correlated with measures of foreign 
orientation: Foreign CEO (0.56), Foreign sales (0.45), Foreign ownership (0.29), and the 
natural logarithm of the number of geographical segments, Ln(Geographical segments), 
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(0.28).  Overall, pairwise correlations among control variables are not high enough to 
introduce issues of multicollinearity to my multivariate tests, which are presented 
below. 
[Table 6 about here] 
3.8. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
This section reports the results of my multivariate tests on the determinants of 
diversity, the value of diversity, and the potential moderators of the relationship 
between diversity and firm value. 
3.8.1. THE DETERMINANTS OF DIVERSITY 
In the determinants model, Eq. (4), I investigate the relationship between the 
magnitude of last-year’s foreign activities (measured by lagged foreign sales) and the 
level of board nationality diversity (measured by DDN), after controlling for a wide 
array of variables including the number of geographical regions in which the firm 
operates. I use a two-limit Tobit to estimate the determinants model.  The Tobit 
estimation accounts for the specific distribution of my dependent variable (DDN), 
which is censored from both sides with a right-censoring limit of zero and a left-
censoring limit of one.43  The estimation is based on firm clustered standard errors to 
account for serial correlation. Table 7 reports the estimation results. I find the 
magnitude of foreign activities in the last year to be positively and significantly 
 
43 Two-limit Tobit models have also been estimated using other dependent variables that are 
censored from both sides.  Examples include the percentage of shareholder-elected foreign directors on 




associated with the level of diversity in the current year.  The estimated coefficient on 
lagged foreign sales (Foreign salesi,t-1) is positive and significant at the 1% level 
(coefficient = 0.496 and t-stat. = 13.30), indicating that the proportion of foreign sales 
in year t-1 is positively associated with the level of diversity in year t. The results 
further indicate no significant association between the natural logarithm of the 
number of geographical segments in year t-1 and the level of diversity in year t.  The 
results lend support to my proposition that the magnitude, rather than the number, of 
foreign activities matters when it comes to determining the level of diversity. In 
particular, the higher the economic significance of a firm’s foreign operations (as 
measured by the proportion of foreign sales) in a year, the more likely that the firm 
will increase its level of nationality diversity in the following year to support these 
foreign operations.  Yet, the mere existence of a bigger number of foreign operations 
in a year is not sufficient to trigger higher nationality diversity in the next year because 
some of these operations may not be economically significant to justify the economic 
cost of adding more foreign board members.  
The results also show that firms with higher lagged institutional ownership 
have lower nationality diversity level on their board. This finding runs counter to the 
argument of Estélyi and Nisar (2016) that institutional activism facilitates the 
appointment of foreign nationals to UK boards. This argument does not account for 
institutional differences between a foreign director’s home country (i.e., the sending 
country) and the country of the recruiting firm (i.e., the receiving country). These 
differences are deemed to instigate frictions and result in bearing extra costs. For 
example, Van Veen, Sahib and Aangeenbrug (2014) find that the institutional distance 
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between the sending country and the receiving country has a significantly negative 
impact on the proportion of directors from the sending country on the boards of the 
receiving country. Accordingly, domestic institutional investors are not expected to 
actively demand higher levels of board nationality diversity in its broader sense, 
rather they are expected to be less reluctant to the appointment of foreign board 
members only when they come from institutionally more similar countries. Another 
possible reason for why domestic institutional investors may prefer domestic board 
members over foreign board members is the existence of domestic networks between 
domestic institutional investors and domestic directors. Such networks could be 
valuable to the domestic institutional investors. The signs on the coefficients of other 
control variables are generally in the expected directions. 
Lastly, I re-estimate the model using lagged values of the potential board-level 
determinants of diversity to address timing issues.  I find similar results (untabulated), 
except that the coefficient on lagged firm size is significant. To sum up, the results 
strongly support my first hypothesis (H1) that the level of diversity is more strongly 
driven by the magnitude, rather than the number, of foreign activities. 
[Table 7 about here] 
3.8.2. THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY 
3.8.2.1. MAIN RESULTS 
I now examine the relationship between the level of board nationality diversity 
and firm value.  In Panel A of Table 8, Model (1) reports my baseline results using OLS 
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estimation of the value model, Eq. (5).44  The coefficient on dissimilarity of director 
nationalities (DDN) is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.393 and t-stat. = 2.51), 
suggesting that board nationality diversity is positively associated with firm value.  
Consistent with Van Peteghem et al. (2018), coefficient estimates on the natural 
logarithm of mean director ownership and the proportions of independent directors 
and female directors are positive and significant. The natural logarithm of mean 
director tenure has a significant negative coefficient, and CEO duality has a 
marginally significant one, indicating adverse impacts on firm value.  The natural 
logarithm of board size and the proportion of busy directors are positively and 
significantly related to firm value.  The coefficients on the proportion of directors aged 
at least 65 years and the indicator for having a foreign CEO have the expected signs 
but are not statistically significant.  Coefficient estimates on firm-level controls are 
generally in line with expectations. 
A potential interpretation of the OLS results, in Model (1), is that board 
nationality diversity creates value for shareholders by alleviating groupthink on 
corporate boards and enlarging their resource pool. A major concern with this 
interpretation is the potential endogenous nature of the relationship between board 
nationality diversity and firm value.  In particular, the endogeneity problem occurs 
when foreign directors are not randomly distributed among firms, and their 
 
44 Variance inflation factors for 𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑖,𝑡, 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡, 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡, 
and 𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡) are 1.99, 1.47, 2.09, 1.15, and 1.87, respectively.  The factors for 
𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 are 2.05 and 3.40, respectively.  Overall, variance inflation factors 
indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem.  All models are estimated using robust t-statistics, 
which are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustered at the 
firm level (Petersen, 2009). 
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representation on boards is indirectly related to firm value (Masulis et al., 2012).  This 
implies that my measure of board nationality diversity (DDN) may be correlated with 
the error term in Eq. (5) causing OLS estimates to be biased.  To mitigate this concern, 
I allow DDN to be endogenous and implement an instrumental variable approach 
using 2SLS regressions. To be relevant, the instrument should be strongly correlated 
with DDN and satisfy the exclusion restriction of being uncorrelated with the error 
term from the second-stage regression. This restriction requires no association 
between the instrument and the dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) when the endogenous 
regressor (DDN) is held constant. 
I employ the average value of my endogenous variable (DDN) for firms 
headquartered within the same postcode area as my instrumental variable (Local 
diversity).  This instrument is motivated by the role of a firm’s headquarters location 
in attracting foreign directors. For example, foreign directors are more likely to sit on 
boards of firms headquartered within 100 km of a large airport (Masulis et al., 2012) 
or within a large metropolitan area (Frijns et al., 2016). Accordingly, geographical 
proximity between firms’ headquarters can drive similar levels of nationality diversity 
on their boards.45 My instrument is thus likely to be correlated with a firm’s board 
nationality diversity level, but unlikely to have a direct association with firm value. In 
Panel A of Table 8, Models (2) and (3) present the results of the first and second stages 
of the 2SLS estimation.  Tests for the relevance of my instrument indicate that it is 
 
45 Prior studies have considered similarity in firm size (Faleye, 2015) and firm industry (Van 
Peteghem et al., 2018; Faleye, 2015) to drive similar corporate governance practices.  Likewise, similarity 




correlated with the endogenous regressor (DDN),46 and the correlation is not weak.47 
The first stage results show that the coefficient on the instrument (Local diversity) is 
positive and significant at the 1% level, confirming my expectations. In the second 
stage results, I find that the coefficient on Instrumented DDN has bigger magnitude 
and stronger significance than that reported on DDN in the OLS results: coefficient = 
2.244 and t-stat. = 2.66 versus coefficient = 0.393 and t-stat. = 2.51, respectively.  The 
2SLS results thus confirm my OLS results.  Together, the results indicate that board 
nationality diversity positively affects firm value, supporting my second hypothesis 
(H2). 
[Table 8 about here] 
3.8.2.2. CONTROLLING FOR PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE 
Given that my dependent variable is a measure of firm performance, both the 
current firm performance and the current level of diversity maybe determined by 
previous firm performance (i.e., firm value in previous years).  If this is the case, 
omitting previous performance from the value model would result in a spurious 
relationship between board nationality diversity and firm value. To mitigate this 
concern, I control for firm value in the last two years by adding one and two lags of 
the dependent variable to the right-hand side in Eq. (5). The resultant new equations 
are subsequently estimated by using OLS and 2SLS regressions.  Panels B and C of 
 
46 The p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap-LM statistic is 0.0000. Therefore, I reject the null 
hypothesis that the first-stage model is under-identified. 
47 The first stage results reveal that the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic on the excluded 
instrument is 77.043, which is greater than the threshold value of 10 (Staigler and Stock, 1997), and the 
value of Cragg-Donald F-statistic is 428.272, which is larger than the Stock-Yogo critical value of 16.38 
(Stock and Yogo, 2005). Both statistics indicate that my instrument is not weak. 
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Table 8 report the results after controlling for one and two lags of Tobin’s Q.48  In Panel 
B, Model 1 shows that lagged firm value (Tobin’s Qi,t-1) is a significant determinant of 
contemporaneous firm value.  The inclusion of lagged firm value has not taken away 
the significance of the DDN’s coefficient, which continues to be positive but smaller 
in magnitude than its value in the absence of a lagged Tobin’s Q.  In Model (2), lagged 
Tobin’s Q has an insignificant coefficient in the first stage results of the 2SLS 
estimation, where DDN is the dependent variable.  The second stage results, in Model 
(3), further confirm that board nationality diversity has a positive and significant 
impact on firm value after mitigating endogeneity concerns about the direction of 
causality between the two variables. In Panel C, I re-estimate the models reported in 
Panel A while controlling for two lags of Tobin’s Q.  The results reconfirm that board 
nationality diversity matters for firm value, providing further support to my second 
hypothesis (H2). 
3.8.2.3. CONTROLLING FOR PRIOR MEASURES OF DIVERSITY 
The corporate governance literature has advanced different measures to 
capture aspects of board nationality diversity other than uniqueness.  I control for 
these measures by including each of them in the right-hand side of the value model, 
Eq. (5). I then estimate the resultant new equations by using OLS with robust t-
statistics, which are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 
 
48 In Panels B and C of Table 8, the maximum variance inflation factor is 3.02 and 2.05 for the 
lags of Tobin’s Q and DDN, respectively.  For 2SLS regressions in these panels, I re-test the strength of 
my instrumental variable (Local diversity) and find that: (i) the p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap-LM 
statistic is 0.0000; (ii) the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic on the instrument (64.518 and 57.025, 
respectively) is greater than the threshold value of 10; (iii) the value of Cragg-Donald F-statistic (336.606 
and 276.846, respectively) is larger than the Stock-Yogo critical value of 16.38. Therefore, I conclude that 
the instrument is still relevant in both panels. 
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1980) and clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009).  Estimation results are reported 
in Table 9.  In Models (1) to (4), I control for the proportion of foreign directors on the 
board (e.g., Dong, Girardone and Kuo, 2017), the proportion of foreign non-executive 
directors on the board (e.g., Hahn and Lasfer, 2016), genetic diversity (Delis et al., 
2017), and cultural diversity (Frijns et al., 2016), respectively.  The results show that 
my measure of board nationality diversity as uniqueness (DDN) has positive and 
significant coefficients throughout the four models, whereas none of the other 
measures has a significant coefficient, except for cultural diversity (Cultural diversity), 
which has a significant negative coefficient.49 Model (5) reports the results of the full 
model, which are largely consistent with those presented in Models (1) to (4). 
Coefficient estimates on other control variables are generally consistent with 
expectations. 
To address the potential multicollinearity problem in Model (5), I decompose 
my measure of diversity (DDN) into two components (predicted part and unpredicted 
part) by using a 2SLS procedure.  In the first stage, I regress DDN on the four prior 
measures of diversity without industry or year controls.  From the first stage, I get the 
residual, which represents the part of DDN that is not explained by the prior measures 
of diversity (the unpredicted part).  I also get the predicted part as the difference 
between DDN and the unpredicted part.  In the second stage, I estimate the value 
model, Eq. (4), after replacing DDN with its components.  The second stage results 
 
49 The maximum variance inflation factor for all variables in Models (2) to (4) is 4.36, while the 
factor for the variables in Model (1) is 7.74.  To address the potential collinearity problem between my 
measure (DDN) and the proportion of foreign board members (FDs), I re-estimate Model (1) after 
excluding my measure. Untabulated results reveal that the proportion of foreign board members is an 
insignificant determinant of firm value (coefficient = 0.338 and t-stat. = 1.60). 
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(untabulated) show that the coefficient on the unpredicted part is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, whereas the coefficient on the predicted part is positive but 
insignificant: coefficient = 1.015 and t-stat. = 3.12 versus coefficient = 0.239 and t-stat. 
= 1.47, respectively.  The results thus indicate that the information content of DDN is 
empirically different from those of the earlier measures. 
In summary, the results of this final set of tests for my second hypothesis (H2) 
confirm that board nationality diversity as uniqueness (DDN) has a positive and 
significant impact on firm value and this impact is not explained by earlier measures 
of diversity.  I next investigate whether this impact depends on the strength of board 
cultural separation and the complexity of firm operations. 
[Table 9 about here] 
3.8.3. MODERATION 
In this subsection, I investigate the conditions under which the benefits of 
board nationality diversity exceed its costs. In particular, I examine the roles of board 
cultural separation and firm complexity in moderating the relationship between board 
nationality diversity and firm value. This is motivated by the discussion in Section 3.2, 
which suggests: (a) that diversity costs are higher for firms with stronger board 
cultural separation compared to those without and (b) diversity benefits are lower for 





3.8.3.1. BOARD CULTURAL SEPARATION 
I employ two proxies for board cultural separation: Strong faultlines and 
Marginalized directors.  The former takes a value of one if the strength of board cultural 
faultlines (Cultural faultlines) is at least equal to its 90th percentile value (0.9), and zero 
otherwise.  The latter takes a value of one if the board has unique-nationality directors 
who represent less than 25% of board members, and zero otherwise.  To test the impact 
of board cultural separation on the relationship between board nationality diversity 
and firm value, I interact each of the two proxies with board nationality diversity, as 
in Models (1) and (2) of Table 10.50 In Model (1), I examine changes in the significance 
and the direction of this relationship for firms with strong board cultural faultlines 
relative to those without. The results show that board nationality diversity (DDN) has 
a positive and significant impact on firm value in the absence of strong faultlines. The 
coefficient on the interaction term of DDN times Strong faultlines has a negative sign, 
as expected, but it is insignificant.51  Similarly, Model (2) investigates changes in the 
significance and the direction of the above relationship for firms with marginalized 
board members compared to those without. The results in Model (2) indicate that 
board nationality diversity positively impacts firm value in the absence of 
marginalized directors. The interaction term of DDN times Marginalized directors has 
a negative, albeit insignificant, coefficient. Taken together, the coefficients on the 
interactions of my diversity measure with measures of board cultural separation have 
 
50 In Table 10, all models are estimated using OLS with robust t-statistics, which are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 
2009). 
51 I re-estimate Model (1) after replacing Strong faultlines with an indicator for having two 
nationality subgroups on the board (i.e., having a single nationality-based faultline) as another proxy 
for a strong faultline formation (Carton and Cummings, 2013), I find similar results (untabulated). 
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the expected signs but are not statistically significant, providing no statistically 
significant support to my third hypothesis (H3). In particular, the results suggest that, 
on average, board cultural separation increases the costs of diversity but not to the 
extent that they outweigh its benefits. One potential explanation for these results is 
that the compound effect of board cultural separation, measured by cultural diversity 
(Cultural diversity) in Table 9, could be stronger than the separate effects of its 
component parts: the strength of cultural subgrouping along faultlines (Strong 
faultlines) and the marginalization of foreign minorities (Marginalized directors). Future 
research could also add new channels, other than strong cultural faultlines and 
marginalized directors, through which board cultural separation may reduce the 
value of diversity to shareholders.  In addition, the insignificant role for strong cultural 
faultlines in moderating the relationship between board nationality diversity and firm 
value could be due to the fact that only 19.5% (8.8%) of my diverse-board sample (all-
firms sample) have strong faultlines. This indicates that boards with strong faultlines 
are not common in my sample, suggesting that most firms with nationality-diverse 
boards are actively avoiding the creation of such strong faultlines. 
[Table 10 about here] 
3.8.3.2. FIRM COMPLEXITY 
To proxy for firm complexity, I use an indicator (Low complexity) that takes a 
value of one if the total number of business and geographical segments in a given year 
is below its sample median for the same year, and zero otherwise.  In Model (3) of 
Table 10, I introduce an interaction term of that indicator times board nationality 
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diversity (DDN) to examine the impact of firm complexity on the value of diversity to 
shareholders. Specifically, Model (3) examines changes in the significance and the 
direction of the diversity-value relationship among firms with low versus high 
complexity of operations.  The findings show a positive and significant coefficient on 
board nationality diversity as a stand-alone term, indicating that diversity provides 
net benefits for complex firms.  However, the coefficient estimate on the interaction of 
Low complexity times DDN is negative and significant, implying that the relationship 
between diversity and firm value is significantly different between firms with high 
complexity and those without. The results thus attribute a significant role for firm 
complexity in mitigating the impact of diversity on firm value, supporting my final 
hypothesis (H4).52 
Model (4) reports the estimation results of the full moderation model, Eq. (6). 
The results in Model (4) are consistent with those reported in Models (1) to (3). 
Throughout all models, control variables are generally in line with expectations.  In 
sum, moderation results reveal that the strength of board cultural separation does not 
significantly mitigate the positive impact of board nationality diversity on firm value. 
Rather, this impact does depend on the complexity of firm operations, suggesting that 




52 When I set missing values for the number of business segments to a value of one and re-




This essay studies the determinants of board nationality diversity and its 
impact on firm value.  On the determinants side, earlier research has regarded foreign 
directors as a homogeneous set of actors, thereby masking variations among them.  I 
go beyond the existence of one or more foreign directors on the board to explore the 
composition of foreign directors, to capture the level of diversity.  I then find the level 
of diversity to be more strongly driven by the magnitude of foreign activities 
(measured by the proportion of foreign sales), rather than the number of geographical 
regions in which the firm operates. 
On the value side, prior studies have mainly captured a single aspect of 
nationality diversity. I extend earlier work by accounting for both the upside and the 
downside aspects of diversity. Drawing on theories of resource dependence and 
groupthink, the level of uniqueness in directors’ nationalities (the upside aspect of 
diversity) is deemed beneficial as it enlarges the board’s resource pool and mitigates 
groupthink. On the other hand, theories of faultline and critical mass suggest that 
cultural separation (the downside aspect of diversity) may give rise to severe sub-
categorization and marginalization problems.  I introduce a new proxy for the level of 
uniqueness in board members’ nationalities. I also employ two other measures to 
capture the strength of board cultural faultlines and the marginalization of unique-
nationality directors as mechanisms through which cultural separation may 
undermine board effectiveness. My results indicate that board nationality diversity as 
uniqueness has a positive impact on firm value. Levels of board cultural separation 
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do not mitigate this impact, but levels of firm complexity mitigate it. These results 
suggest that board nationality diversity is not always a good thing. 
While my results survive a battery of robustness checks to mitigate sources of 
endogeneity, including self-selection bias and reverse causality, I cannot completely 
rule out endogeneity concerns. Another possible limitation is that only 19.5% of my 
diverse board sample have strong faultlines. A possible reason for this is that most 
firms with nationality-diverse boards are actively avoiding the creation of such strong 
faultlines on their boards to get the most out of diversity. 
My study has implications for future research as it suggests that both the 
positive and the negative aspects of board diversity should be accounted for 
simultaneously.  The study also reviews a set of theoretical and empirical constructs 
of diversity that could be applied to nationality diversity within other workgroups 
(e.g., top management teams and audit teams).  This study could be of interest to 
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The above panel classifies prior research on the relationships between aspects of board nationality 
diversity and firm performance into two groups: binary-categorization group and interval-scale group. 
The former comprises studies that classify board members into one of two mutually exclusive 
categories.  The latter consists of studies that assign country-specific values to board members based 
on their respective countries of nationality. The explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
First: Binary-categorization Measures 
- Foreign (Anglo-American) director indicator is a dummy indicator that takes a value of one 
if the board has a foreign (an Anglo-American) director, and zero otherwise. 
- Foreign independent (non-executive) director indicator is an indicator that takes a value of 
one if the board has a foreign independent (non-executive) director, and zero otherwise. 
- FDs is the proportion of foreign directors on the board. 
- FNEDs is the proportion of foreign non-executive directors on the board. 
Second: Interval-scale Measures 
- Genetic diversity is the standard deviation of genetic diversity scores that are attached to 
directors’ nationalities on the board. 




𝑑=1𝑖,𝑗  ÷ 𝑛 (𝑛 − 1), ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, where Idi is the culture 
score on dimension d for director i, Idj is the culture score on dimension d for director j, 
and Vd is the in-sample variance of the score for the specific Hofstede cultural dimension. 












Indicators  FDs  FNEDs  DDN 
(1) to (6)        ✓ 
(7)    ✓  ✓  ✓ 
(8)  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
(9)  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Score  2/9  3/9  3/9  9/9 
In this panel, I compare DDN as a proxy for the level of board nationality diversity to the binary-
categorization measures defined in Panel A.  The comparisons are based on nine desirable properties 
(criteria) for a measure of board nationality diversity as uniqueness. The criteria are: 
(1) It reaches its maximum only when each director comes from a different country, indicating that 
each director brings in a distinctive source of talents, expertise, and networks (Harrison and 
Klein, 2007). 
(2) It can summarize variations among multiple categorical proportions of directors (pis), where 
each proportion (pi) belongs to one nationality (Teachman, 1980). 
(3) It is not biased towards one nationality over another. It then should take the same value for all 
boards that have the same pis, regardless of which pi belongs to which nationality.  It also should 
capture all cases of board homogeneity, i.e., it reaches its minimum value if any pi takes a value 
of one, indicating that all directors share the same nationality (Teachman, 1980). 
(4) It does not assign the same value to several distinctive levels of nationality diversity as 
uniqueness. 
(5) It systematically accounts for changes in board diversity according to the scarcity of the 
nationality in which a new director falls, thereby higher scarcity results in higher incremental 
value (Shannon, 1948; Harrison and Klein, 2007). This is consistent with the economic law of 
diminishing returns underlying the resource dependence theory (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). 
(6) Commencing from an all-domestic board, the measure yields a fixed rate of decrease in the 
incremental value brought by each additional replacement of a domestic director by a non-
domestic director from a given foreign country. 
(7) It accounts for variations in board size in a systematic and unbiased way (Biemann and 
Kearney, 2010). 
(8) It occupies a tidy range of variation from zero to unity (Teachman, 1980; Harrison and Klein, 
2007). 
(9) It is simple to understand and interpret (Coulter, 1989). 
Dummy indicators include Foreign director indicator, Anglo-American director indicator, Foreign 
independent director indicator, and Foreign non-executive director indicator. DDN is computed as 1 −
[ ∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)  ÷  𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1  ] , where ni is the number of directors in the ith nationality on the board 
and n is board size. 
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Panel C: DDN and Cultural Faultlines versus Interval-scale Measures 
  National Origins  Cultural Separation 







Which aspect of nationality 









         
Which measurement scale 
is employed?  Categorical 
 
Interval  Interval  Interval 
         
Which definition of director 
similarity is adopted?  Narrow 
 
Broad  Broad  Broad 
         
Is it unbiased towards 
sample specification?  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  No 
         
Is its computational data 
available for all countries of 
nationality?  Yes 
 
No  No  No 
The above panel summarizes the main differences between my measures (DDN and Cultural faultlines) 
and the two interval-scale measures (Genetic diversity and Cultural diversity) defined in Panel A. DDN is 
defined in Panel B. Cultural faultlines is the strength of cultural separation between cultural subgroups 
on the board. The comparisons are based on the following criteria: 
Diversity Aspects: 
- Unique diversity refers to national-origin dissimilarities.  It reaches its maximum when each 
director comes from a different country. 
- Genetic differences refer to genetic deviations among board members.  It reaches its maximum 
when board members are polarized: half of them are at the highest endpoint, and the other half 
are at the lowest endpoint of the genetic score continuum. 
- Cultural subgrouping refers to the strength of separation between cultural subgroups on the 
board.  It reaches its maximum when the board is split into two equal-sized cliques who are at 
the opposite endpoints of all the four cultural dimensions. 
- Cultural differences refer to cultural distances among board members.  It reaches its maximum 
when board members are polarized: half of them are at the highest endpoint, and the other half 
are at the lowest endpoint of all the four cultural dimensions. 
Measurement scale: 
- Categorical refers to nominal-scaling of the diversity attribute (i.e., nationality). 
- Interval refers to interval-scaling of the diversity attribute (as defined in Panel A). 
Director Similarity Definitions: 
- The narrow definition considers directors to be similar only if they share the same nationality. 
- The broad definition allows directors to have different distances from each other based on their 
respective genetic or cultural backgrounds.  For example, German and British directors are 
assigned the same Hofstede's culture scores of 66 and 35 for the cultural dimensions of 
masculinity and power distance, respectively.  However, different Hofstede's culture scores are 
assigned to these directors for individualism and uncertainty avoidance. 
Bias Towards Sample Specification: 
- It means that the measure yields different scores for the same board, depending on other boards 
in the sample. 
Data Availability: 
- Genetic and cultural scores are not available for some countries of nationality.  Examples of 
countries with no available genetic diversity scores include Belize, Cyprus, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Singapore, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Trinidad and 
Tobago.  Examples of countries with no available cultural scores include Belize, Bolivia, DR 
Congo, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, and Paraguay.
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Table 2 – Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Source Definitions 
Board characteristics   




= 1 − [ ∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1) ÷  𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1  ], where: ni is the number of directors in the ith nationality on 
the board, and n is board size (Simpson, 1949; Rae and Taylor, 1970). 
Ln(Director ownership) BoardEx = The natural logarithm of mean director ownership on the board, where the ownership 
represents the total value of equity held by a director at year-end (Van Peteghem et al., 2018). 
Independent directors BoardEx = The proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Ln(Director tenure) BoardEx = The natural logarithm of mean director tenure on the board. 
Busy directors BoardEx = The number of directors with at least three current appointments/board size. 
Retirement-age directors BoardEx 
and FAME 
= The number of directors whose age is at least 65 years/board size (Van Peteghem et al., 2018). 
Female directors BoardEx = The proportion of female directors on the board. 
Ln(Board size) BoardEx = The natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board. 
CEO duality BoardEx = A dummy indicator that equals one if the CEO is the board’s chair, and zero otherwise. 
Foreign CEO BoardEx 
and FAME 
= A dummy indicator that equals one if the CEO is not British, and zero otherwise. 
Firm characteristics   
Tobin’s Q Worldscope = (Total assets + market value of equity − book value of equity)/total assets. 
Foreign sales Worldscope = Sales generated from operations in foreign countries/net sales. 
Ln(Geographical segments) Worldscope = The natural logarithm of the number of geographical segments in which the firm operates. 
Foreign ownership Datastream = The proportion of common shares held by foreign investors owning 5% or more. 
Institutional ownership Datastream = The proportion of common shares held by investment banks or other institutions owning 5% 
or more and seeking a long-term return. 
Firm size Worldscope = The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage Worldscope = Long-term liabilities/total assets. 
Capital intensity Worldscope = Property, plant, and equipment (PPE)/total assets. 
Sales growth Worldscope = (Net sales in the current year − net sales in the previous year)/net sales in the previous year. 
Stock return Worldscope = (Ending stock price − beginning stock price)/beginning stock price. 
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Table 2 – Continued 
Variable Source Definitions 
Instrumental variable   
Local diversity BoardEx 
and FAME 
= The average value of my endogenous variable (DDN) for firms headquartered within the same 
postcode area. 
Prior measures of diversity   
FDs BoardEx 
and FAME 
= The proportion of foreign directors on the board (e.g., Dong et al., 2017). 
FNEDs BoardEx 
and FAME 
= The proportion of foreign non-executive directors on the board (e.g., Hahn and Lasfer, 2016). 
Genetic diversity BoardEx 
and FAME 
= The standard deviation of genetic diversity scores, that are attached to directors’ nationalities, 
on the board (Delis et al., 2017). 
Cultural diversity BoardEx 







 ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, where Idi is the culture score on dimension d for director i, Idj is the 
culture score on dimension d for director j, and Vd is the in-sample variance of the score for the 
specific Hofstede cultural dimension (Frijns et al., 2016). 
Diversity-value moderators   
Strong faultlines BoardEx 
and FAME 
= A dummy indicator that equals one if the strength of board cultural faultlines has a value of at 
least 0.9, and zero otherwise.  The strength of board cultural faultlines (Cultural faultlines) is 
a proxy for the strength of cultural separation between cultural subgroups on the board.   Its 
computation involves attaching Hofstede’s four-dimensional scores to directors’ nationalities, 
then clustering directors into cultural subgroups by using a clustering algorithm developed by 
Meyer and Glenz (2013). The software used for executing the algorithm provides a summary 
value of the strength of the cultural separation. 
Marginalized directors BoardEx 
and FAME 
= A dummy indicator that takes a value of one if the percentage of unique-nationality directors 
(who do not share the same nationality with any other director on the board) is positive but 
below 25% of board members, and zero otherwise. 
Low complexity Worldscope = A dummy indicator that takes a value of one if the total number of business and geographical 
segments in which the firm operates in a given year is below the sample median value of the 
total number of business and geographical segments for the same year, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 3 – Sample 





Initial sample 24,805 2,795 
Exclusion criteria   
(1) Belonging to the financial or real-estate sectors (6,296) (732) 
(2) Domiciled outside the UK (126) (12) 
(3) Missing age data for at least one board member (48) (3) 
(4) Missing nationality data for at least one board member (869) (50) 
(5) Having a board size of less than three directors (173) (8) 
(6) Missing data of some required variables (5,909) (533) 
Final sample 11,384 1,457 
 
Panel B: Sample by Industry and Year 
Year 
ICB Industry Code 
Total (10) (15) (20) (40) (45) (50) (55) (60) (65) 
1999 18 6 11 56 20 82 15 12 5 225 
2000 36 7 21 78 24 109 19 14 5 313 
2001 58 11 27 97 28 132 22 16 6 397 
2002 61 14 29 113 30 139 26 20 6 438 
2003 79 16 40 127 29 164 30 24 6 515 
2004 95 23 46 146 31 181 36 27 7 592 
2005 105 23 50 163 34 200 36 30 9 650 
2006 123 27 60 171 35 206 38 33 12 705 
2007 119 25 69 174 39 203 44 29 11 713 
2008 113 23 62 168 39 202 45 34 14 700 
2009 96 23 54 157 34 200 40 33 12 649 
2010 97 15 47 156 37 188 44 35 14 633 
2011 90 19 44 149 37 179 44 34 14 610 
2012 88 23 42 143 39 175 46 41 13 610 
2013 87 24 50 149 37 186 49 44 16 642 
2014 94 21 52 144 35 190 46 34 16 632 
2015 78 18 53 144 36 172 45 35 13 594 
2016 74 19 53 151 38 160 47 27 13 582 
2017 82 16 53 154 38 157 45 32 10 587 
2018 85 13 60 158 34 160 42 32 13 597 
Total 1,678 366 923 2,798 674 3,385 759 586 215 11,384 
The ICB industry (codes) names are: (10) Technology; (15) Telecommunications; (20) Health Care; (40) 




Panel C: Sample by Director Nationality and Year (Sorted by the Total Number of Directors per Nationality) 
Nationality 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
British 1659 2232 2744 2932 3326 3707 4026 4189 4120 4044 3709 3633 3581 3487 3619 3598 3414 3312 3294 3308 67934 
American 98 140 160 192 204 220 232 230 252 247 209 201 202 215 243 260 244 240 252 272 4313 
Irish 14 16 18 25 33 37 39 49 46 57 50 53 48 47 50 59 52 51 57 63 864 
French 24 24 30 39 38 38 41 44 43 38 36 37 49 42 49 53 55 48 43 46 817 
Australian 17 15 27 31 34 37 37 41 50 51 48 55 46 43 33 43 41 34 35 34 752 
Dutch 9 9 17 24 34 37 34 37 35 40 39 38 38 35 38 42 36 25 32 34 633 
German 12 19 30 33 39 38 37 34 40 37 32 27 25 26 27 23 34 33 39 39 624 
South African 12 18 36 35 21 27 24 28 31 31 28 24 30 35 38 38 40 36 42 41 615 
Canadian 11 16 15 20 23 20 20 27 26 26 21 23 34 27 30 29 34 30 36 37 505 
Swedish 14 18 23 20 17 24 26 27 29 21 23 25 21 20 20 22 21 22 23 24 440 
Italian 6 4 5 6 9 8 12 5 5 7 6 12 17 20 20 16 18 22 24 20 242 
Belgian 3 4 6 9 8 9 8 12 10 11 16 14 17 11 11 11 19 18 15 20 232 
Swiss 3 3 6 6 8 8 7 7 9 14 12 12 14 15 19 17 14 11 10 14 209 
New Zealander 0 2 5 8 14 9 10 5 13 11 15 17 12 15 13 12 9 10 8 11 199 
Malaysian 10 9 5 6 9 8 9 8 8 11 10 10 8 11 16 11 10 7 8 8 182 
Chinese 2 2 1 3 7 5 14 13 9 14 13 10 6 7 11 8 7 7 9 7 155 
Indian 1 3 3 5 5 5 3 1 4 6 5 4 3 7 11 12 13 16 14 17 138 
Singaporean 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 6 7 7 6 7 8 12 9 13 14 12 11 12 132 
Norwegian 6 5 4 5 6 5 9 10 7 7 5 4 3 4 4 4 8 8 11 8 123 
Danish 1 0 0 1 3 3 5 7 6 9 9 5 4 6 7 9 8 8 11 16 118 
Chilean 4 3 3 3 4 4 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 6 6 7 4 4 12 12 117 
Spanish 1 0 1 2 5 7 5 6 6 4 3 7 12 8 7 7 5 8 9 10 113 
Israeli 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 4 10 7 8 8 12 12 8 7 7 9 7 6 110 
Austrian 2 5 5 5 5 4 3 6 7 6 6 6 8 4 5 4 4 5 6 6 102 
Russian 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 2 4 4 5 4 5 8 10 5 10 5 9 1 80 
Greek 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 4 6 4 1 7 7 4 8 7 1 1 1 2 72 
Portuguese 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 66 
Kazakhstani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 5 4 6 9 8 8 64 
Jordanian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 48 
Argentine 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 3 5 4 4 5 35 
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Panel C – Continued 
Nationality 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Peruvian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 0 32 
Japanese 3 2 1 1 2 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 24 
Pakistani 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 24 
Brazilian 0 0 0 1 3 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 2 1 22 
Icelander 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 2 3 3 1 1 6 22 
Ukrainian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 
Zimbabwean 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 3 2 2 2 22 
Egyptian 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 21 
Finnish 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 1 2 0 0 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 20 
Polish 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 4 2 3 20 
Kenyan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 17 
Emirian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 2 3 4 16 
Ghanaian 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 16 
Turkish 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
Colombian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 12 
Indonesian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 3 0 0 0 0 1 12 
Salvadoran 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 12 
Taiwanese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 1 3 11 
Congolese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 10 
Zambian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 8 
Lithuanian 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Paraguayan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 7 
Romanian 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Bolivian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 
Georgian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 6 
Liechtensteiner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Nigerian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
Slovak 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
South Korean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Tanzanian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 
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Panel C – Continued 
Nationality 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Mauritian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Mozambican 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Trinidadian/ 
Tobagon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 5 
Belizean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Czech 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 
Malian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Thai 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Croatian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Luxembourger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Mexican 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Moroccan 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Lebanese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Saudi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Syrian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 1922 2561 3160 3426 3877 4290 4638 4833 4818 4752 4352 4283 4253 4170 4365 4377 4180 4042 4071 4130 80500 
Average FDs 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.14 
Average DDN 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.21 
 
Variable Definitions: 
FDs = the proportion of foreign directors on the board. 
Dissimilarity of director nationalities (DDN) =  1 − [ ∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)  ÷  𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1  ], where ni is the number of directors in the ith nationality on the board and n 
is board size. 
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Panel D: Sample by Number of Foreign Directors and Number of Nationalities 
Number of 
Foreign Directors 
Number of Nationalities 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0 6225 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6225 
1 0 2309 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2309 
2 0 369 772 0 0 0 0 0 0 1141 
3 3 120 262 246 0 0 0 0 0 631 
4 9 60 141 116 68 0 0 0 0 394 
5 1 17 73 73 44 25 0 0 0 233 
6 0 5 28 66 54 16 1 0 0 170 
7 0 5 20 30 33 18 4 1 0 111 
8 0 6 13 30 16 16 2 2 0 85 
9 0 0 3 8 20 2 3 0 0 36 
10 0 0 0 7 4 8 2 1 0 22 
11 0 0 2 4 1 4 2 1 1 15 
12 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 0 7 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
15 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 3 
Total 6238 2891 1314 581 244 90 17 6 3 11384 
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Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. Std. Dev. 
Board characteristics         
DDN 11384 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 1.000 0.265 
Director ownership (in 000s) 11384 6310.903 0.500 215.775 744.250 2420.770 1388694.000 34328.640 
Independent directors 11384 0.425 0.000 0.333 0.444 0.571 1.000 0.207 
Director tenure 11384 5.799 0.100 3.500 5.086 7.350 26.600 3.330 
Busy directors 11384 0.174 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.286 1.000 0.166 
Retirement-age directors 11384 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.250 1.000 0.154 
Female directors 11384 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.154 0.600 0.111 
Board size 11384 7.071 3.000 5.000 7.000 8.000 23.000 2.358 
CEO duality 11384 0.209 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.406 
Foreign CEO 11384 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.336 
Firm characteristics         
Tobin’s Q 11384 1.919 0.518 1.074 1.443 2.139 10.539 1.550 
Foreign sales 11384 0.392 0.000 0.013 0.320 0.721 1.000 0.359 
Geographical segments 11384 3.120 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 10.000 1.928 
Foreign ownership 11384 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.080 0.970 0.131 
Institutional ownership 11384 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.140 0.850 0.108 
Firm size 11384 11.836 7.246 10.267 11.660 13.301 17.416 2.208 
Leverage 11384 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.205 0.672 0.150 
Capital intensity 11384 0.236 0.002 0.048 0.156 0.355 0.894 0.232 
Sales growth 11384 0.192 -0.696 -0.022 0.072 0.211 4.597 0.628 
Stock return 11384 0.097 -0.849 -0.252 0.028 0.320 2.495 0.560 
Prior measures of diversity         
FDs 11384 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.200 1.000 0.199 
FNEDs 11384 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.143 1.000 0.150 
Genetic diversity 11384 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.046 0.004 
Cultural diversity 11384 0.871 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.236 7.843 1.403 
Diversity-value moderators         
Strong faultlines 11384 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.284 
Marginalized directors 11384 0.287 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.452 
Low complexity 10711 0.451 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.498 
All variables are defined in Table 2.
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HOMOGENEOUS  Difference 
Board characteristics       
DDN  0.465  0.000  0.465 *** 
Director ownership (in 000s)  8056.452  4870.924  3185.528 *** 
Independent directors  0.463  0.393  0.070 *** 
Director tenure  5.360  6.161  -0.801 *** 
Busy directors  0.215  0.139  0.076 *** 
Retirement-age directors  0.171  0.144  0.027 *** 
Female directors  0.094  0.071  0.023 *** 
Board size  8.001  6.304  1.697 *** 
CEO duality  0.184  0.229  -0.045 *** 
Foreign CEO  0.287  0.000  0.287 *** 
Firm characteristics       
Tobin’s Q  1.993  1.858  0.135 *** 
Foreign sales  0.556  0.258  0.298 *** 
Geographical segments  3.699  2.643  1.056 *** 
Foreign ownership  0.097  0.040  0.057 *** 
Institutional ownership  0.082  0.085  -0.003 
Firm size  12.583  11.221  1.362 *** 
Leverage  0.142  0.112  0.030 *** 
Capital intensity  0.246  0.228  0.019 *** 
Sales growth  0.209  0.178  0.030 ** 
Stock return  0.086  0.106  -0.020 * 
Prior measures of diversity      
FDs  0.300  0.002  0.298 *** 
FNEDs  0.198  0.001  0.197 *** 
Genetic diversity  0.004  0.000  0.004 *** 
Cultural diversity  1.927  0.000  1.927 *** 
Diversity-value moderators      
Strong faultlines  0.195  0.000  0.195 *** 
Marginalized directors  0.635  0.000  0.635 *** 
Low complexity  0.357  0.529  -0.172 *** 
The above table presents the results of the difference of means tests between the characteristics of firms 
with diverse boards (DIVERSE) relative to the characteristics of those with homogeneous boards 
(HOMOGENEOUS). All variables are defined in Table 2. The number of observations for the DIVERSE 
(HOMOGENEOUS) set of firms is 5,146 (6,238), except for the last test that has 4,878 (5,833) 
observations.53
 
53 When I set missing values for the number of business segments to a value of one, I obtain 
similar results (untabulated).  
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Table 6 – Correlations 
Panel A: Diversity Variables 
 DDN 
Cultural 





All Firms (n= 11384)       
DDN 1.00      
Cultural faultlines 0.84 1.00     
FDs 0.92 0.71 1.00    
FNEDs 0.83 0.63 0.90 1.00   
Genetic diversity 0.62 0.53 0.62 0.57 1.00  
Cultural diversity 0.84 0.64 0.79 0.72 0.66 1.00 
       
Firms with at least one 
foreign board member 
(n= 5159)  
 
    
DDN 1.00      
Cultural faultlines -0.30 1.00     
FDs 0.83 -0.26 1.00    
FNEDs 0.68 -0.21 0.81 1.00   
Genetic diversity 0.35 -0.09 0.38 0.34 1.00  
Cultural diversity 0.68 -0.26 0.58 0.50 0.47 1.00 
       
Firms with at least two 
foreign board members 
(n= 2,850)  
 
    
DDN 1.00      
Cultural faultlines -0.28 1.00     
FDs 0.65 -0.26 1.00    
FNEDs 0.53 -0.23 0.75 1.00   
Genetic diversity 0.29 -0.07 0.33 0.31 1.00  
Cultural diversity 0.61 -0.25 0.44 0.37 0.46 1.00 
Variable Definitions: 
DDN is the dissimilarity of director nationalities and is computed as 1 − [ ∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)  ÷  𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1  ], 
where ni is the no. of directors in the ith nationality on the board and n is board size; Cultural faultlines 
proxies for the strength of cultural separation between cultural subgroups on the board.  It is based on 
four cultural dimensions: individualism, masculinity, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance 
(Hofstede, 2001); FDs is the proportion of foreign board members; FNEDs is the proportion of foreign 
non-executive board members; Genetic diversity is the standard deviation of genetic diversity scores, 
that are attached to directors’ nationalities, on the board (Delis et al., 2017); Cultural diversity proxies for 
cultural differences among board members and is also based the Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions 
(Frijns et al., 2016). 
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Panel B: Main Regression Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) 1.00                    
(2) 0.03 1.00                   
(3) 0.16 -0.04 1.00                  
(4) -0.12 0.20 -0.08 1.00                 
(5) 0.28 -0.01 0.30 -0.14 1.00                
(6) 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.25 -0.02 1.00               
(7) 0.11 0.06 0.28 -0.03 0.15 -0.02 1.00              
(8) 0.29 0.18 0.32 0.01 0.27 -0.01 0.20 1.00             
(9) -0.05 0.13 -0.22 0.11 -0.11 0.05 -0.12 -0.08 1.00            
(10) 0.56 0.03 0.12 -0.09 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.16 -0.04 1.00           
(11) 0.03 0.23 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00          
(12) 0.45 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.19 0.13 0.02 0.12 -0.06 0.29 0.01 1.00         
(13) 0.28 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.19 -0.08 0.17 -0.02 0.63 1.00        
(14) 0.29 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.11 0.03 1.00       
(15) -0.05 -0.07 0.10 -0.06 0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.07 1.00      
(16) 0.30 0.18 0.52 0.02 0.42 0.02 0.30 0.68 -0.13 0.19 -0.20 0.18 0.24 0.05 0.02 1.00     
(17) 0.10 -0.04 0.19 -0.07 0.17 -0.02 0.10 0.24 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.40 1.00    
(18) 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.06 -0.15 -0.03 -0.12 0.08 -0.08 0.28 0.34 1.00   
(19) 0.04 0.06 -0.11 -0.18 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.01 -0.09 0.03 0.00 -0.12 -0.06 -0.04 1.00  
(20) -0.03 0.23 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.25 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 1.00 
The above panel presents Pearson correlations between the main variables in the value model, Eq. (5). The variables are in the following order: (1) DDN; (2) 
Ln(Director ownership); (3) Independent directors; (4) Ln(Director tenure); (5) Busy directors; (6) Retirement age directors; (7) Female directors; (8) Ln(Board size); (9) CEO 
duality; (10) Foreign CEO; (11) Tobin’s Q; (12) Foreign sales; (13) Ln(Geographical segments); (14) Foreign ownership; (15) Institutional ownership; (16) Firm size; (17) 
Leverage; (18) Capital intensity; (19) Sales growth; (20) Stock return.  All variables are defined in Table 2.  The number of observations is 11,384.
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Intercept ?  -1.013 *** 
   (-11.88) 
Foreign salesi,t-1 +  0.496 *** 
   (13.30) 
Ln(Geographical segmentsi,t-1) +  0.000 
   (0.02) 
Foreign ownershipi,t-1 +  0.591 *** 
   (6.91) 
Institutional ownershipi,t-1 +  -0.208 ** 
   (-2.56) 
Firm sizei,t-1 +  0.013 
   (1.62) 
Leveragei,t-1 +  0.019 
   (0.27) 
Capital intensityi,t-1 ?  -0.066 
   (-1.26) 
Sales growthi,t-1 +  0.007 
   (0.79) 
Stock returni,t-1 ?  -0.009 
   (-1.07) 
Ln(Director ownershipi,t) ?  -0.001 
   (-0.23) 
Independent directorsi,t +  -0.101 
   (-1.61) 
Ln(Director tenurei,t) −  -0.105 *** 
   (-5.39) 
Busy directorsi,t +  0.270 *** 
   (4.70) 
Retirement-age directorsi,t ?  0.190 *** 
   (2.88) 
Female directorsi,t +  0.095 
   (0.92) 
Ln(Board sizei,t) +  0.370 *** 
   (8.84) 
CEO dualityi,t −  0.016 
   (0.62) 
Industry controls   Yes 
Year controls   Yes 
n   9374 
Pseudo R2   0.308 
The dependent variable is board nationality diversity (DDNi,t). Foreign salesi,t-1 is the lagged proportion 
of sales generated from operations in foreign countries. Ln(Geographical segmentsi,t-1) is the natural 
logarithm of the lagged number of geographical segments in which the firm operates.  Other variables 
are defined in Table 2. The above model is estimated by using a two-limit Tobit specification. Below 
coefficient estimates are t-statistics, which are based on clustered standard errors to account for serial 
correlation.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
Coefficient estimates of industry and year controls are suppressed for brevity.
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Table 8 – Value Model 





(1) and (3) 
 OLS  2SLS 
  
Tobin’s Qi,t 
 First Stage  Second Stage 
   DDNi,t  Tobin’s Qi,t 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Intercept ?  3.663 ***  -0.276 ***  4.056 *** 
   (13.66)  (-8.16)  (12.48) 
DDNi,t +  0.393 **  -  - 
   (2.51)     
Local diversity -  -  0.393 ***  - 
     (8.78)   
Instrumented DDNi,t +  -  -  2.244 *** 
       (2.66) 
Ln(Director ownershipi,t) +  0.199 ***  -0.001  0.201 *** 
   (12.17)  (-0.43)  (11.84) 
Independent directorsi,t +  0.793 ***  -0.052 **  0.903 *** 
   (4.55)  (-2.22)  (4.90) 
Ln(Director tenurei,t) ?  -0.116 **  -0.025 ***  -0.062 
   (-2.50)  (-3.94)  (-1.11) 
Busy directorsi,t ?  0.639 ***  0.120 ***  0.383 ** 
   (4.17)  (4.75)  (2.03) 
Retirement-age directorsi,t −  -0.296  0.075 ***  -0.456 ** 
   (-1.63)  (2.93)  (-2.37) 
Female directorsi,t +  0.782 ***  0.009  0.714 *** 
   (3.05)  (0.23)  (2.71) 
Ln(Board sizei,t) ?  0.919 ***  0.098 ***  0.716 *** 
   (7.78)  (6.03)  (5.15) 
CEO dualityi,t −  -0.110 *  0.005  -0.124 * 
   (-1.68)  (0.56)  (-1.81) 
Foreign CEOi,t +  0.008  0.281 ***  -0.546 ** 
   (0.10)  (22.99)  (-2.05) 
Foreign salesi,t +  0.127  0.172 ***  -0.217 
   (1.12)  (10.48)  (-1.07) 
Ln(Geographical segmentsi,t) ?  -0.041  -0.006  -0.035 
   (-0.82)  (-0.78)  (-0.67) 
Foreign ownershipi,t ?  -0.023  0.310 ***  -0.635 * 
   (-0.12)  (8.57)  (-1.81) 
Institutional ownershipi,t ?  -0.134  -0.143 ***  0.155 
   (-0.65)  (-5.15)  (0.62) 
Firm sizei,t ?  -0.360 ***  0.009 ***  -0.377 *** 
   (-12.95)  (2.78)  (-12.91) 
Leveragei,t +  0.953 ***  0.031  0.896 *** 
   (3.46)  (1.06)  (3.21) 
Capital intensityi,t −  -0.423 ***  -0.028  -0.334 *** 
   (-3.61)  (-1.35)  (-2.59) 
Sales growthi,t +  0.074 **  0.004  0.065 * 
   (2.32)  (0.97)  (1.94) 
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Panel A – Continued 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Stock returni,t +  0.604 ***  -0.007 **  0.618 *** 
   (15.83)  (-2.15)  (15.63) 
Industry controls   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   11384  11384  11384 
Adjusted R2   0.260  0.513  0.210 
 





(1) and (3) 
 OLS  2SLS 
  
Tobin’s Qi,t 
 First Stage  Second Stage 
   DDNi,t  Tobin’s Qi,t 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Intercept ?  0.739 ***  -0.300 ***  0.882 *** 
   (6.47)  (-7.86)  (6.38) 
DDNi,t +  0.133 **  -  - 
   (2.37)     
Local diversity -  -  0.384 ***  - 
     (8.03)   
Instrumented DDNi,t +  -  -  0.714 ** 
       (2.53) 
Tobin’s Qi,t-1 +  0.748 ***  0.005  0.744 *** 
   (44.94)  (1.59)  (44.86) 
Ln(Director ownershipi,t) +  0.018 ***  -0.002  0.019 *** 
   (2.81)  (-0.82)  (2.94) 
Independent directorsi,t +  0.242 ***  -0.065 **  0.285 *** 
   (3.77)  (-2.50)  (4.08) 
Ln(Director tenurei,t) ?  -0.004  -0.026 ***  0.015 
   (-0.18)  (-3.32)  (0.61) 
Busy directorsi,t ?  0.184 ***  0.120 ***  0.105 
   (3.42)  (4.46)  (1.57) 
Retirement-age directorsi,t −  -0.083  0.076 ***  -0.135 ** 
   (-1.39)  (2.73)  (-2.04) 
Female directorsi,t +  0.192 **  0.029  0.160 * 
   (2.09)  (0.69)  (1.65) 
Ln(Board sizei,t) ?  0.197 ***  0.106 ***  0.129 ** 
   (4.51)  (6.15)  (2.38) 
CEO dualityi,t −  0.013  0.009  0.007 
   (0.59)  (0.81)  (0.31) 
Foreign CEOi,t +  0.037  0.277 ***  -0.134 
   (1.23)  (20.76)  (-1.53) 
Foreign salesi,t +  0.026  0.173 ***  -0.082 
   (0.69)  (9.64)  (-1.27) 
Ln(Geographical segmentsi,t) ?  0.005  -0.004  0.006 
   (0.26)  (-0.45)  (0.28) 
Foreign ownershipi,t ?  -0.111 *  0.300 ***  -0.299 *** 
   (-1.85)  (7.12)  (-2.66) 
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Panel B – Continued 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Institutional ownershipi,t ?  -0.007  -0.124 ***  0.072 
   (-0.08)  (-4.06)  (0.79) 
Firm sizei,t ?  -0.091 ***  0.010 ***  -0.097 *** 
   (-8.36)  (2.83)  (-8.45) 
Leveragei,t +  0.358 ***  0.028  0.342 *** 
   (3.42)  (0.88)  (3.27) 
Capital intensityi,t −  -0.013  -0.022  0.011 
   (-0.33)  (-0.97)  (0.24) 
Sales growthi,t +  -0.106 ***  0.007  -0.111 *** 
   (-3.04)  (1.19)  (-3.18) 
Stock returni,t +  0.820 ***  -0.009 *  0.825 *** 
   (22.52)  (-1.95)  (22.59) 
Industry controls   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   9374  9374  9374 
Adjusted R2   0.735  0.519  0.729 
 





(1) and (3) 
 OLS  2SLS 
  
Tobin’s Qi,t 
 First Stage  Second Stage 
   DDNi,t  Tobin’s Qi,t 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Intercept ?  0.484 ***  -0.306 ***  0.597 *** 
   (4.31)  (-7.34)  (4.39) 
DDNi,t +  0.151 ***  -  - 
   (2.66)     
Local diversity -  -  0.382 ***  - 
     (7.55)   
Instrumented DDNi,t +  -  -  0.599 ** 
       (2.30) 
Tobin’s Qi,t-1 +  0.711 ***  0.004  0.708 *** 
   (28.34)  (1.20)  (28.71) 
Tobin’s Qi,t-2 +  0.081 ***  0.002  0.080 *** 
   (4.04)  (0.97)  (3.99) 
Ln(Director ownershipi,t) +  0.017 ***  -0.002  0.018 *** 
   (2.73)  (-0.58)  (2.79) 
Independent directorsi,t +  0.274 ***  -0.070 **  0.310 *** 
   (4.14)  (-2.41)  (4.27) 
Ln(Director tenurei,t) ?  -0.032  -0.031 ***  -0.015 
   (-1.61)  (-3.12)  (-0.64) 
Busy directorsi,t ?  0.103 *  0.119 ***  0.042 
   (1.84)  (4.15)  (0.63) 
Retirement-age directorsi,t −  -0.083  0.076 **  -0.123 ** 
   (-1.52)  (2.53)  (-2.09) 
Female directorsi,t +  0.189 **  0.041  0.158 * 
   (2.05)  (0.92)  (1.65) 
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Panel C – Continued 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Ln(Board sizei,t) ?  0.171 ***  0.114 ***  0.114 ** 
   (4.09)  (6.15)  (2.20) 
CEO dualityi,t −  0.023  0.010  0.019 
   (1.05)  (0.81)  (0.82) 
Foreign CEOi,t +  0.022  0.276 ***  -0.109 
   (0.77)  (19.26)  (-1.37) 
Foreign salesi,t +  -0.012  0.175 ***  -0.097 
   (-0.30)  (8.93)  (-1.49) 
Ln(Geographical segmentsi,t) ?  0.005  -0.004  0.005 
   (0.23)  (-0.45)  (0.25) 
Foreign ownershipi,t ?  -0.130 **  0.290 ***  -0.271 *** 
   (-2.16)  (6.16)  (-2.63) 
Institutional ownershipi,t ?  -0.048  -0.117 ***  0.011 
   (-0.61)  (-3.52)  (0.12) 
Firm sizei,t ?  -0.076 ***  0.009 **  -0.080 *** 
   (-6.91)  (2.49)  (-6.96) 
Leveragei,t +  0.235 **  0.030  0.222 ** 
   (2.19)  (0.87)  (2.08) 
Capital intensityi,t −  0.008  -0.020  0.026 
   (0.22)  (-0.82)  (0.65) 
Sales growthi,t +  -0.070 **  0.003  -0.072 ** 
   (-2.42)  (0.37)  (-2.46) 
Stock returni,t +  0.777 ***  -0.005  0.779 *** 
   (20.99)  (-0.98)  (21.16) 
Industry controls   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   7776  7776  7776 
Adjusted R2   0.761  0.527  0.757 
The above table investigates the value of board nationality diversity to shareholders. The dependent 
variable is firm value (Tobin’s Qi,t) = (total assets + the market value of equity – the book value of 
equity)/total assets.  I proxy for board nationality diversity by using DDNi,t =  1 − [ ∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)  ÷
𝐾
𝑖=1
 𝑛 (𝑛 − 1) ], where ni is the number of directors in the ith nationality on the board and n is board size.  
Other variables are defined in Table 2. The table consists of three panels.  Models in Panel A do not 
control for firm value in previous years. I control for one and two lags of firm value in Panels B and C, 
respectively. In each panel, OLS, first-stage 2SLS, and second-stage 2SLS estimation results are 
presented in Models (1), (2), and (3), respectively.  In 2SLS regressions, I allow DDNi,t to be endogenous 
and employ the average value of my endogenous variable for firms headquartered within the same 
postcode area as my instrumental variable (Local diversity). In each panel, the dependent variable is 
DDNi,t in Model (2) and Tobin’s Qi,t in Models (1) and (3). Below coefficient estimates are robust t-
statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustered at the 
firm level (Petersen, 2009).  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), 
respectively. Coefficients of industry and year controls are suppressed for brevity.
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Table 9 – Controlling for Prior Measures of Diversity 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5) 
Intercept 3.656 ***  3.643 ***  3.657 ***  3.649 ***  3.647 *** 
 (13.62)  (13.58)  (13.64)  (13.66)  (13.65) 
DDNi,t 0.669 **  0.525 **  0.438 ***  0.791 ***  1.022 *** 
 (2.40)  (2.56)  (2.68)  (3.31)  (3.15) 
FDsi,t -0.445        -0.422 
 (-1.20)        (-0.79) 
FNEDsi,t   -0.287      0.021 
   (-0.91)      (0.05) 
Genetic diversityi,t     -5.603    3.856 
     (-0.64)    (0.41) 
Cultural diversityi,t       -0.093 **  -0.095 ** 
       (-2.56)  (-2.54) 
Ln(Director ownershipi,t) 0.200 ***  0.199 ***  0.199 ***  0.201 ***  0.202 *** 
 (12.14)  (12.13)  (12.21)  (12.47)  (12.40) 
Independent directorsi,t 0.788 ***  0.805 ***  0.793 ***  0.792 ***  0.786 *** 
 (4.52)  (4.59)  (4.55)  (4.54)  (4.46) 
Ln(Director tenurei,t) -0.119 **  -0.117 **  -0.116 **  -0.116 **  -0.119 ** 
 (-2.55)  (-2.52)  (-2.50)  (-2.50)  (-2.55) 
Busy directorsi,t 0.658 ***  0.657 ***  0.641 ***  0.642 ***  0.657 *** 
 (4.32)  (4.30)  (4.17)  (4.19)  (4.29) 
Retirement-age directorsi,t -0.280  -0.283  -0.292  -0.293  -0.282 
 (-1.55)  (-1.57)  (-1.60)  (-1.61)  (-1.56) 
Female directorsi,t 0.782 ***  0.791 ***  0.784 ***  0.771 ***  0.768 *** 
 (3.05)  (3.09)  (3.06)  (3.03)  (3.02) 
Ln(Board sizei,t) 0.915 ***  0.920 ***  0.922 ***  0.914 ***  0.908 *** 
 (7.76)  (7.81)  (7.79)  (7.84)  (7.86) 
CEO dualityi,t -0.107 *  -0.112 *  -0.109 *  -0.117 *  -0.115 * 
 (-1.65)  (-1.71)  (-1.67)  (-1.78)  (-1.75) 
Foreign CEOi,t 0.029  -0.009  0.004  0.011  0.035 
 (0.36)  (-0.11)  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.38) 
172 
 
Table 9 – Continued 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5) 
Foreign salesi,t 0.137  0.125  0.127  0.111  0.120 
 (1.21)  (1.11)  (1.13)  (0.98)  (1.07) 
Ln(Geographical segmentsi,t) -0.044  -0.041  -0.040  -0.040  -0.043 
 (-0.88)  (-0.81)  (-0.80)  (-0.80)  (-0.88) 
Foreign ownershipi,t 0.033  0.011  -0.004  0.074  0.114 
 (0.17)  (0.06)  (-0.02)  (0.37)  (0.55) 
Institutional ownershipi,t -0.155  -0.144  -0.140  -0.166  -0.182 
 (-0.75)  (-0.70)  (-0.68)  (-0.82)  (-0.89) 
Firm sizei,t -0.360 ***  -0.359 ***  -0.360 ***  -0.359 ***  -0.359 *** 
 (-12.95)  (-12.95)  (-12.96)  (-12.98)  (-12.97) 
Leveragei,t 0.957 ***  0.958 ***  0.951 ***  0.959 ***  0.964 *** 
 (3.48)  (3.48)  (3.46)  (3.50)  (3.52) 
Capital intensityi,t -0.416 ***  -0.422 ***  -0.418 ***  -0.414 ***  -0.410 *** 
 (-3.55)  (-3.60)  (-3.59)  (-3.56)  (-3.55) 
Sales growthi,t 0.074 **  0.074 **  0.074 **  0.074 **  0.075 ** 
 (2.33)  (2.32)  (2.31)  (2.33)  (2.34) 
Stock returni,t 0.602 ***  0.602 ***  0.604 ***  0.602 ***  0.601 *** 
 (15.78)  (15.77)  (15.82)  (15.81)  (15.76) 
Industry controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
n 11384  11384  11384  11384  11384 
Adjusted R2 0.261  0.260  0.260  0.262  0.262 
In the above table, I include prior measures of diversity as controls in the value model.  The dependent variable is firm value (Tobin’s Qi,t).  In Models (1) to (4), 
I control for FDsi,t, FNEDsi,t, Genetic diversityi,t, and Cultural diversityi,t, respectively.  Model (5) reports the full model results.  All variables are defined in Table 
2.  All models are estimated using OLS with robust t-statistics, which are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustered 
at the firm level (Petersen, 2009).  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. Coefficients of industry/year controls 
are suppressed for brevity.
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Table 10 – Moderation Model 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
Intercept 3.716 ***  3.686 ***  3.383 ***  3.470 *** 
 (13.69)  (13.79)  (11.65)  (11.73) 
DDNi,t 0.366 **  0.362 **  0.529 ***  0.470 *** 
 (2.43)  (2.31)  (3.02)  (2.86) 
Strong faultlinesi,t 0.246      0.233 
 (1.20)      (1.07) 
DDNi,t × Strong faultlinesi,t -0.187      -0.147 
 (-0.42)      (-0.33) 
Marginalized directorsi,t   0.193    0.171 
   (1.62)    (1.45) 
DDNi,t × Marginalized directorsi,t   -0.297    -0.208 
   (-1.09)    (-0.75) 
Low complexityi,t     0.246 ***  0.252 *** 
     (3.51)  (3.58) 
DDNi,t × Low complexityi,t     -0.456 ***  -0.494 *** 
     (-2.68)  (-2.95) 
Ln(Director ownershipi,t) 0.199 ***  0.199 ***  0.195 ***  0.196 *** 
 (12.21)  (12.18)  (11.75)  (11.81) 
Independent directorsi,t 0.804 ***  0.787 ***  0.838 ***  0.843 *** 
 (4.61)  (4.51)  (4.81)  (4.84) 
Ln(Director tenurei,t) -0.117 **  -0.115 **  -0.097 **  -0.097 ** 
 (-2.51)  (-2.47)  (-2.04)  (-2.04) 
Busy directorsi,t 0.637 ***  0.658 ***  0.575 ***  0.587 *** 
 (4.14)  (4.28)  (3.70)  (3.77) 
Retirement-age directorsi,t -0.298  -0.289  -0.281  -0.279 
 (-1.65)  (-1.59)  (-1.53)  (-1.52) 
Female directorsi,t 0.784 ***  0.785 ***  0.773 ***  0.777 *** 
 (3.07)  (3.07)  (2.93)  (2.97) 
Ln(Board sizei,t) 0.886 ***  0.886 ***  0.911 ***  0.841 *** 
 (7.55)  (7.38)  (7.43)  (6.87) 
CEO dualityi,t -0.113 *  -0.109 *  -0.122 *  -0.125 * 
 (-1.74)  (-1.67)  (-1.83)  (-1.89) 
Foreign CEOi,t 0.004  0.029  0.016  0.027 
 (0.05)  (0.37)  (0.20)  (0.33) 
Foreign salesi,t 0.123  0.121  0.162  0.152 
 (1.09)  (1.07)  (1.43)  (1.34) 
Ln(Geographical segmentsi,t) -0.040  -0.045  0.019  0.016 
 (-0.80)  (-0.89)  (0.30)  (0.26) 
Foreign ownershipi,t -0.037  -0.001  -0.066  -0.060 
 (-0.19)  (-0.00)  (-0.35)  (-0.32) 
Institutional ownershipi,t -0.135  -0.151  -0.104  -0.122 
 (-0.66)  (-0.73)  (-0.49)  (-0.58) 
Firm sizei,t -0.360 ***  -0.358 ***  -0.354 ***  -0.353 *** 
 (-12.95)  (-12.81)  (-12.09)  (-12.00) 
Leveragei,t 0.946 ***  0.959 ***  0.996 ***  0.994 *** 
 (3.45)  (3.49)  (3.54)  (3.55) 
Capital intensityi,t -0.420 ***  -0.425 ***  -0.420 ***  -0.417 *** 
 (-3.60)  (-3.62)  (-3.49)  (-3.47) 
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Table 10 – Continued 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
Sales growthi,t 0.074 **  0.073 **  0.091 ***  0.091 *** 
 (2.32)  (2.28)  (2.73)  (2.70) 
Stock returni,t 0.604 ***  0.603 ***  0.585 ***  0.584 *** 
 (15.85)  (15.78)  (14.62)  (14.60) 
Industry controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
n 11384  11384  10711  10711 
Adjusted R2 0.261  0.261  0.258  0.259 
The dependent variable is firm value (Tobin’s Qi,t). In Models (1) to (3), I investigate the roles of board 
cultural faultlines, marginalized board members, and firm complexity in moderating the relationship 
between board nationality diversity (DDNi,t) and firm value. Strong faultlinesi,t is an indicator that equals 
one if the strength of board cultural faultlines has a value of at least 0.9, and zero otherwise.  
Marginalized directorsi,t is an indicator that equals one if the board has unique-nationality directors who 
represent less than 25% of board members, and zero otherwise. Low complexityi,t is an indicator that 
equals one if the total number of business and geographical segments in a given year is below its sample 
median for the same year, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 2. Model (4) reports 
the full model results. All models are estimated using OLS with robust t-statistics, which are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 
2009).  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. Coefficients 




Table A1 – An Illustration of Cultural Faultlines versus Cultural Diversity 
 Board I  Board II 
Director ID: A B C D  E F G H 
Director nationality: American Australian Russian Ukrainian  British Mexican South Korean Spanish 
Individualism 91 90 39 25  89 30 18 51 
Masculinity 62 61 36 27  66 69 39 42 
Power distance 40 36 93 92  35 81 60 57 
Uncertainty avoidance 46 51 95 95  35 82 85 86 
Suppose there are two equal-sized boards with the above data on directors’ cultural backgrounds: individualism, masculinity, power distance, and uncertainty 
avoidance.  In each board, there are four members, and the highest two scores per each cultural dimension are in bold. Both boards have very close cultural 
diversity scores of 2.83 and 2.54, respectively (Frijns et al., 2016).  Nevertheless, the strength of cultural faultline(s) on the first board (0.88) is more than double 
that on the second board (0.41).  This is because the pattern (or structure) of cultural diversity in the former potentially creates a strong faultline that would 





An Example of Faultline Computation 
Suppose a board is composed of four members (A, B, C, and D) with four different 
nationalities: American, Australian, Russian, and Ukrainian.  To compute the strength 
of cultural faultline for this board, I employ the following three steps: 
 
Step 1: Attaching Cultural Scores to Directors 
In this step, four cultural scores are attached to each director based on their nationality.  
For example, Director A is assigned the scores of 91, 62, 40, and 46 for the cultural 







 Cultural Dimension 





A  American  91 62 40 46 
B  Australian  90 61 36 51 
C  Russian  39 36 93 95 
D  Ukrainian  25 27 92 95 
 
Step 2: Clustering 
This step involves executing a hierarchical clustering algorithm (Ward, 1963) and an 
average linkage algorithm to identify a set of subgroups for each board (Meyer and 
Glenz, 2013).  Initially, each director is assigned to a cluster, resulting in a solution 
with four clusters. Next, Director B moves into Cluster 1, resulting in a solution with 
3 clusters. Finally, Director D moves into Cluster 3, resulting in a solution with 2 
clusters.  The final column shows the final clusters after putting them in sequence. The 
final clustering solution thus subdivides the board into two subgroups (clusters): 
Cluster 1 (Directors A and B) and Cluster 2 (Directors C and D).  This solution is 
optimal because no further reassignment of a single director will further increase the 
average silhouette width (ASW). 
Director 
ID 
 Cluster Association  Final 
Clusters  1  2  3  
A  1  1  1  1 
B  2 ➔ 1  1  1 
C  3  3  3  2 
D  4  4 ➔ 3  2 
 
Step 3: Computing Faultline Strength 
This step is simultaneously executed with Step 2 because Step 2 stops only when a 
clustering solution has a maximum ASW, which is my proxy for the strength of the 
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cultural faultline.  For the above board, the maximum ASW (i.e., Cultural faultlines) is 
0.88062.  This value is computed as follows:   
First: Cultural Distances Within Clusters 
Distance (A,B) = √(91 − 90)2 + (62 − 61)2  + (40 − 36)2 + (46 − 51)2 = 6.55744 
Distance (C,D) = √(39 − 25)2 + (36 − 27)2  + (93 − 92)2 + (95 − 95)2 = 16.67333 
 
Cluster 1  Cluster 2 
 Director A    Director C  
Director B 6.55744   Director D 16.67333  
 
Second: Cultural Distances Across Clusters 
Distance (A,C) = √(91 − 39)2 + (62 − 36)2  + (40 − 93)2 + (46 − 95)2 = 92.68225 
Distance (B,C) = √(90 − 39)2 + (61 − 36)2  + (36 − 93)2 + (51 − 95)2 = 91.71150 
Distance (A,D) = √(91 − 25)2 + (62 − 27)2  + (40 − 92)2 + (46 − 95)2 = 103.37311 
Distance (B,D) = √(90 − 25)2 + (61 − 27)2  + (36 − 92)2 + (51 − 95)2 = 102.23991 
 
 Director A  Director B  Average 
Director C 92.68225  91.71150  92.19688 
Director D 103.37311  102.23991  102.80651 
Average 98.02768  96.97571   
 
Third: Silhouette Width 
Director (i) ai bi Max (ai, bi) Silhouette Width (i) 
A 6.55744 98.02768 98.02768 0.93311 
B 6.55744 96.97571 96.97571 0.93238 
C 16.67333 92.19688 92.19688 0.81916 
D 16.67333 102.80651 102.80651 0.83782 




BOARD NATIONALITY DIVERSITY AND ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM 
ABSTRACT 
I examine whether nationality diversity on the board and its audit committee affect 
accounting conservatism. The theory of groupthink predicts excessive risk-taking by 
members of cohesive homogeneous groups. If heterogeneous groups make more 
conservative decisions, I propose more diverse boards and audit committees may 
encourage greater conservatism in financial reporting. I test this proposition using a 
large sample of UK firms from 1999 to 2018. I employ a measure of group diversity 
that captures dissimilarities in directors’ nationalities. I find the levels of nationality 
diversity on the board and the audit committee to be positively associated with 
conservatism. The association is stronger for firms with high diversity on both the 
board and its audit committee. The results hold after addressing potential 
endogeneity by using 2SLS regressions. My evidence suggests that demand for 
conservatism is higher among more nationality-diverse boards and audit committees. 
JEL classification: G30; G38; M41. 
Keywords: demographic diversity; audit committee; accounting conservatism. 




Directors from different foreign countries have been mainly regarded as a 
homogeneous set of actors in the accounting literature (e.g., Masulis, Wang and Xie, 
2012; Dong, Girardone and Kuo, 2017; Li and Wahid, 2018). I extend this literature by 
introducing the concept of board nationality diversity as uniqueness.  A unique board 
(or audit committee) is one in which each member’s nationality is unique from (or 
dissimilar to) the nationalities of other members. Adopting this concept of diversity, I 
examine the nationality compositions of the board and its audit committee in relation 
to conditional conservatism, which is defined as the requirement of “… a higher degree 
of verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses.” (Basu, 
1997, p.7). This area has not yet been investigated in corporate governance research. I 
fill this gap. 
Regulators have been calling for greater diversity on corporate boards, 
including diversity in ethnicity and nationality (Parker, 2017). One justification offered 
is that this reduces ‘groupthink’, which occurs when members of cohesive groups 
strive for within-group harmony and conformity rather than engaging in rigorous 
discussions of contentious issues (Janis, 1972). All-domestic groups are more likely to 
share a homogeneous cultural background and are therefore more cohesive and 
susceptible to groupthink than nationality-diverse groups. Since groupthink is 
associated with making excessively risky decisions (Janis, 1972; Bénabou, 2013), 
diverse boards are expected to adopt less risky financial policies. Empirical evidence 
in support of this argument is provided by Bernile, Bhagwat and Yonker (2018). If 
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diverse groups have less appetite for taking on financial risk, I expect diverse boards 
and audit committees to demand more conservative financial reporting. 
From a resource dependence perspective (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978), 
nationality diversity on boards and audit committees could also bring valuable 
expertise and insights relevant to a firm’s operations, especially for firms with 
complex and overseas operations (Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay and Zhao, 2011; Estélyi 
and Nisar, 2016). These resources are then expected to improve the ability of the board 
and its audit committee to restrain aggressive (less conservative) financial reporting 
by management, in the presence of agency problems. 
Conservative financial reporting results in deferred (timely) incorporation of 
probable gains (losses) in accounting income (Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev, 2013b). 
From an agency perspective, conservatism offsets managerial bias towards optimistic 
reporting of profits and net assets (Watts, 2003a). In cases of shareholder–management 
conflicts of interests, this bias stems from the adverse consequences of timely loss 
recognition on managers’ personal wealth in terms of bonuses, tenure, prestige, and 
other aspects of their welfare (Ball, 2001). In cases of debtholder–shareholder conflicts, 
the deferral of loss recognition leads to higher profits and higher dividends to existing 
shareholders at the expense of debtholders. In cases of prospective shareholder–
existing shareholder conflicts, avoiding timely loss recognition yields higher returns 
to existing shareholders at the expense of prospective shareholders. Therefore, I argue 
that, if nationality diversity improves the effectiveness of boards and audit 
committees, then they are likely to promote greater conservatism in financial 
reporting to facilitate efficient contracting between parties to the firm. 
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Based on the above, I ask the following question: does nationality diversity on 
the board and the audit committee affect conditional conservatism? To answer this 
question, I employ a sample of 6,469 firm-years of UK-domiciled non-financial firms 
that are listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period from 1999 to 2018. I use 
a UK sample because variations in directors’ nationalities are relatively high in the UK 
compared to US samples (Frijns, Dodd and Cimerova, 2016). I measure nationality 
diversity on the board (the audit committee) by using dissimilarity of director 
nationalities (DDN) as a multi-categorical measure that captures all dissimilarities in 
directors’ nationalities. Conditional conservatism is measured by Basu’s (1997) 
asymmetric timeliness coefficient. To estimate this coefficient, I employ a modified 
Basu model that includes size, leverage, and market-to-book ratio as drivers of 
conservatism (Khan and Watts, 2009). I also re-estimate the model after adjusting for 
cash flow asymmetry (Collins, Hribar and Tian, 2014), sticky costs (Banker, Basu, 
Byzalov and Chen, 2016), and deprecation (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Beaver and Ryan, 
2005; Banker et al., 2016). In addition, I estimate an extended model after adding other 
potential board-level determinants of conservatism, including the proportion of 
executive directors (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007), executives’ ownership (LaFond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008), the proportion of female directors (Srinidhi, Tsui and Zhou, 
2017), and the presence of strong cultural faultlines on the board. 
My multivariate analyses reveal that higher nationality diversity on the board 
and the audit committee is associated with greater conservatism. The association is 
stronger for firms with high diversity on both the board and its audit committee. The 
results hold after addressing potential endogeneity by implementing instrumental 
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variable tests using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. The results are also 
robust to the use of fixed-effects models and the inclusion of a battery of board-level, 
firm-level, industry, and year controls. My findings suggest that foreign nationals who 
qualify for audit committee membership negatively impact its appetite for risk-taking 
in financial reporting. This effect is strengthened when nationality diversity on the 
audit committee is supported with a high level of nationality diversity on the board. 
My study contributes to the literature on board composition and accounting 
conservatism in several ways. First, it refines the measurement of group nationality 
diversity by introducing a measure that accounts for the nationality composition of 
foreign directors, to capture the level of diversity. Second, it responds to calls for 
exploring group dynamics on specialized committees of the board (Adams, Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2010 and Carcello, Hermanson, and Ye, 2011) by examining the impact 
of nationality diversity within the audit committee, which is responsible for 
monitoring the firm’s financial reporting, on accounting conservatism. Third, it 
identifies a new source of variation in conservatism by providing robust evidence that 
nationality diversity on the board and its audit committee matters for conservatism in 
financial reporting. My findings may be of interest to regulators, firms, and investors. 
This study is related to Makhlouf, Al-Sufy and Almubaudeen (2018), who find 
that annual variations in the proportion of foreign directors on Jordanian boards are 
positively associated with total accruals before depreciation, which is averaged over 
three years (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). Unlike Makhlouf et al. (2018), my study 
relates annual variations in the levels of nationality diversity on the board and its audit 
committee to annual variations in conditional conservatism. My study is therefore 
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different from Makhlouf et al. (2018) in many ways. First, it conceptualizes diversity 
as uniqueness and relates it to conditional conservatism. Second, it employs empirical 
proxies for diversity and conservatism that are measured annually and differ from 
those employed by Makhlouf et al. (2018). The annual measurement of both proxies 
avoids the confounding effect of large changes in board nationality diversity during 
the period over which conservatism is measured (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008). 
Third, it emphasises the role of nationality diversity on the audit committee as 
opposed to the board. 
The study is also related to Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012), who find that 
independent directors domiciled outside the US are associated with a higher 
probability of intentional financial misreporting. This finding seems to run counter to 
my findings, which suggest that nationality diversity on the board and its audit 
committee is associated with higher conservatism in financial reporting. I argue that 
my results are mainly driven by audit committee diversity and the geographical 
location of the UK. First, foreign nationals who qualify for audit committee 
membership are likely to pay more attention to monitoring the financial reports. This 
is because the audit committee is charged with ultimate oversight of the financial 
reporting process (New York Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities 
Dealers, 1999). To qualify as a member of such a committee, a director should have a 
sufficient level of financial expertise to enable them to discharge their monitoring 
duties. Unlike the US case, foreign nationals on UK audit committees are expected to 
be more familiar with the accounting standards because of the widespread adoption 
of the international financial reporting standards (IFRS) worldwide since the year 
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2005. Second, the geographical location of the UK is more easily accessible to many 
foreign nationals than that of the US, which requires a longer time to cross the Atlantic 
Ocean. Empirical evidence in support of this argument is provided by Estélyi and 
Nisar (2016), who find that foreign nationals on UK boards are less likely to have a 
poor attendance record (below 75%) of board meetings. In contrast, Masulis et al. 
(2012) find the likelihood of missing the 75% board meeting attendance threshold to 
be higher among independent directors who are domiciled outside the US compared 
with their domestic (US-domiciled) counterparts. 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides 
information on the institutional and regulatory background to the diversity debate in 
the UK. Section 4.3 discusses prior literature and develops the hypotheses to be tested. 
In Section 4.4, I detail the research design adopted in this study, with the results of my 
main analyses then presented in Section 4.5. A summary and my conclusions are 
presented in Section 4.6. 
4.2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND TO BOARD DIVERSITY IN THE UK 
The board of directors is regarded as an essential pillar of a firm’s governance 
system. The composition of the board and its committees has therefore been under 
intense scrutiny by regulators. Recommendations for best practice in relation to board 
structure in the UK are contained in the Corporate Governance Codes, which are 
updated every few years, informed at times by reports from business leaders. 
The Higgs Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors is 
one such report (Higgs, 2003). Research commissioned by the review committee 
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chairman, Derek Higgs, revealed that only 6% of UK non-executive directors were 
female, and only 7% were non-British. These findings motivated the UK regulator54 to 
commission the Dean of London Business School, Laura Tyson, to prepare a report on 
‘The Recruitment and Development of Non-Executive Directors’ (Tyson, 2003). In it, 
Tyson argues that, 
“Diversity in the background, skills, and experiences of NEDs enhances board 
effectiveness by bringing a wider range of perspectives and knowledge to bear on issues 
of company performance, strategy and risk.” [p.1] 
She talks about diversity in relation to “background, experience, age, gender, 
ethnicity and nationality”. In listing the four broad responsibilities of non-executive 
directors, Tyson includes: the provision of advice and direction relating to company 
strategy; monitoring the executives in their implementation of the strategy; 
monitoring legal and ethical performance; and monitoring “the veracity and adequacy of 
the financial and other company information provided to investors and other stakeholders.” 
[p.4] 
After discussing the benefits of diversity within boards, she acknowledges the 
problems which may accompany it: 
“Despite these advantages of diversity to group performance, research also suggests 
that diversity can lead to lower cohesion, less trust and higher turnover within groups 
unless members are encouraged and trained to trust one another and work together. 
 
54 At the time, this was the Department for Trade and Industry, the DTI. 
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This finding is true across different kinds of diversity including age, gender, 
racial/ethnic background and tenure within a group.” [p.7] 
Both Higgs (2003) and Tyson (2003) discuss the benefits of increasing ethnic 
diversity on boards, an issue which is addressed more thoroughly in the Parker Report 
(Parker, 2017). This report acknowledges that board diversity is a multi-dimensional 
concept, where “… the term “diversity” is not solely limited to gender, but also includes 
many aspects of the human condition.” [p.25] 
The report then makes the business case for ethnic diversity, citing positive 
benefits such as the reduction of groupthink, increasing the board’s ability to deal with 
a more diverse range of stakeholders, access to a global talent pool, and improved 
understanding of cultural sensitivities in a global supply chain. The same benefits 
apply to nationality diversity, which is regarded in the report as a potential source for 
ethnic-diverse candidates with valuable expertise: 
“[there are not enough capable and qualified candidates] … such assumptions are 
outdated and do not reflect a full appreciation of the breadth and depth of expertise 
available in candidates from a minority ethnic background, not only amongst UK 
citizens, but also from non-UK nationals.” [p.39] 
Although the benefits of ethnic diversity and nationality diversity may overlap, 
the two constructs are different. In a second report by Sir Parker, firms are encouraged 
not to use director nationality (among other constructs) as a proxy for director 
ethnicity in their annual reports; rather they are recommended to distinguish clearly 
between these constructs (Parker, 2020). 
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Later, I will make the case that looking at the colour of board members’ faces 
or their names is a noisy way to capture the diversity of background, but it is 
important to note that this aspect of diversity is seen as an area for development within 
the UK corporate governance agenda. 
These shifts in attitude to the composition of UK boards, and evidence of 
changes in practice, have sparked a stream of literature which attempts to quantify 
the determinants and consequences of board diversity in various ways. I review some 
of this literature in the following section. 
4.3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Earlier research has documented that the independence and expertise of the 
board and its audit committee are important determinants of accounting conservatism 
(Beekes, Pope and Young, 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; García Lara, García 
Osma and Penalva, 2009; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). Nationality diversity can 
influence both the independence and the expertise of boards and audit committees. 
First, board independence is regarded as a key to board effectiveness 
(Weisbach, 1988; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Beasley, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998). The literature on the determinants of board nationality diversity has revealed 
that foreign nationals tend to have weak ties with domestic management and pay 
more attention to the interests of foreign shareholders. For example, Oxelheim, 
Gregorič, Randøy and Thomsen (2013) find that foreign nationals on Nordic boards 
are primarily driven by foreign ownership, suggesting that foreign directors are 
appointed to the board to meet the monitoring needs of foreign investors. Estélyi and 
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Nisar (2016) also find that UK firms with higher foreign ownership are more likely to 
hire foreign board members. Further evidence corroborating this finding is provided 
by Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki (2017) using a sample of 62,066 firm-years from 
eighty countries. From an agency perspective, if foreign directors attribute their board 
appointment to foreign shareholders, then their membership on the board is likely to 
enhance its independence. I argue that this likelihood is higher for foreign directors 
who qualify for membership of the audit committee, which is specifically tasked with 
monitoring the firm’s financial reporting. 
In addition, earlier research has documented evidence supporting the premise 
that board diversity mitigates groupthink (Abbott, Parker and Presley, 2012; Lai, 
Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2017; Chen, Leung and Goergen, 2017; Bernile et al., 2018). 
Groupthink is associated with an ex-ante dissent-aversion and an ex-post denial of 
bad news, leading to excessively risky decisions by group members (Bénabou, 2013). 
It has been cited in relation to the collapse of Enron (O’Connor, 2003) and the 
Volkswagen emissions scandal (Glebovskiy, 2019). Since harmful groupthink is most 
problematic in homogeneous groups (Bernile et al., 2018), nationality-diverse boards 
and audit committees are then less prone to groupthink than their homogeneous 
counterparts. 
In sum, nationality diversity could strengthen the independence of the board 
and its audit committee, leading to effective monitoring of the financial reporting 
process. Improved monitoring should then be reflected in the firm’s financial reports. 
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Second, the quality of financial reporting is also affected by the mix of expertise 
on the board and its audit committee. This incudes directors’ financial background 
(Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt, 2003), accounting expertise (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 
2008), finance expertise (Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi, 2010), and industry expertise 
(Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2014). From a resource dependence 
perspective, increasing board diversity provides access to extra skills, experience, and 
knowledge, which improves the board’s ability to make effective decisions (Salancik 
and Pfeffer, 1978; Singh, 2007). Similarly, it may be argued that diversity expands the 
set of resources at the audit committee’s disposal, leading to better oversight of the 
financial reporting process. 
In my second essay, I find that the level of board nationality diversity depends 
on the magnitude of a firm’s foreign activities. Foreign nationals may bring valuable 
expertise and insights relevant to these activities (Estélyi and Nisar, 2016) and other 
complex operations of the firm (Anderson et al., 2011). Therefore, I expect the expertise 
and knowledge brought by foreign nationals to complement those of domestic 
directors, to make better-informed operating and financial decisions for firms with 
overseas and complex operations. The knowledge of foreign directors could be 
particularly crucial when CEO entrenchment is a threat to corporate governance. This 
argument is supported by the model developed by Baldenius, Melumad and Meng 
(2014), who demonstrate that shareholders sometimes choose a more advising-heavy 
board to better serve corporate governance purposes. This happens in cases of severe 
agency problems in which CEOs entrench themselves by strategically exacerbating 
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project complexity causing substantial difficulties in the flow of information to the 
board. 
Under conservative financial reporting, the disclosed accounting value of net 
assets is prevented from exceeding, or even reaching, its underlying economic value. 
Watts (2003a) offers four explanations for the historical prevalence of conservatism in 
accounting: contracting (including debt and compensation contracts), litigation, 
taxation, and regulation. After providing a review of the evidence available at the 
time, Watts (2003b) concludes that the strong body of evidence that accounting is 
conservative is largely consistent with contracting and litigation explanations. Further 
evidence of the association between conservatism and litigation risk is provided by 
Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) who find that, among the common law countries in 
their sample, the UK has the least conservative financial reporting, in part due to 
litigation being less common in the UK relative to other countries. Therefore, 
contracting is potentially the primary explanation for conservatism in the UK setting. 
According to the contracting explanation, conservatism is demanded by capital 
providers (shareholders and debtholders) to mitigate agency problems emanating 
from shareholder–management conflicts and debtholder–shareholder conflicts (Ball, 
2001; Watts, 2003a; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). This is because conservatism prevents 
the disclosed accounting value of net assets from reaching its underlying economic 
value, thereby constraining management’s opportunistic payments to themselves and 
shareholders (Watts, 2003a). Conservatism is thus a means to efficient contracting 
between parties to the firm. 
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Recognizing the above role of conservatism and its benefits to their 
reputational capital, effective boards are likely to encourage greater conservatism in 
financial reporting. This proposition can be decomposed into three main points. First, 
effective boards may proactively elicit timely bad news from management to mitigate 
agency costs between shareholders and management (Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 
2010). Conservatism is therefore predicted to lower the firm’s cost of equity capital, 
and evidence supporting this prediction is documented by García Lara, García Osma 
and Penalva (2011). Second, effective boards may also demand conservatism to reduce 
agency costs between debtholders and shareholders. This point suggests that 
shareholders accrue indirect benefits from conservatism by lowering the cost of debt. 
Empirical evidence in line with this argument is provided by Ahmed, Billings, Morton 
and Stanford-Harris (2002) and Zhan (2008). Third, effective boards could create a 
demand for conservative financial reporting to preserve their reputational capital. 
Using board independence as a proxy for board effectiveness, Beekes et al. (2004) find 
that UK firms with higher board independence are more conservative in their financial 
reporting. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) provide US evidence to corroborate the earlier 
UK finding. Their results show a negative association between the percentage of inside 
board members and conservatism. Including the proportion of executive board 
members, García Lara et al. (2009) develop a composite proxy for the strength of a 
firm’s governance system. Using a US sample, the authors then find that their 
composite measure is positively associated with conservatism in financial reporting. 
Recent work has begun to relate other dimensions of board composition to 
board effectiveness. For example, board gender diversity is found to be positively 
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associated with various aspects of financial reporting quality, including the frequency 
of voluntary disclosure of “other” events in 8-K reports of large firms (Gul, Srinidhi 
and Ng, 2011), the quality of accruals (Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2011), a lower likelihood 
of financial restatement (Abbott et al., 2012), the accuracy of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (Gul, Hutchinson and Lai, 2013), audit quality (Lai et al., 2017), and 
conservatism in financial reporting (Srinidhi et al., 2017). 
Based on the above review of the literature, nationality diversity strengthens 
the independence of the board (Oxelheim et al., 2013; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Miletkov 
et al., 2017). In addition, the theory of groupthink predicts excessive risk-taking by 
members of cohesive homogeneous groups (Janis, 1972), suggesting that diverse 
boards adopt less risky financial policies. For example, Bernile et al. (2018) find that 
higher diversity on boards is associated with less reliance on debt financing.  Diverse 
boards are also more likely to distribute free cash flow as dividend payouts, thereby 
mitigating agency costs (Bernile et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2017). Accordingly, nationality-
diverse boards and audit committees are expected to demand more conservative 
financial reporting. Furthermore, these boards and audit committees will have access 
to international expertise and networks (Masulis et al., 2012; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016) 
that are expected to enhance corporate governance over firms with overseas 
subsidiaries or complex operations (Estélyi and Nisar, 2016; Anderson et al., 2011; 
Baldenius et al., 2014). To sum up, I extend the literature by arguing that nationality 
diversity improves the independence and the expertise of boards and audit 
committees who will then demand greater conservatism in financial reporting. This 
reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis: Nationality diversity on the board and the audit committee will be 
positively associated with conditional conservatism. 
  
The next section details my research design. 
4.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section describes my measures of board nationality diversity, audit 
committee nationality diversity, and conservatism. It also specifies my empirical 
models, data sources and sample selection criteria. 
4.4.1. MEASUREMENT OF NATIONALITY DIVERSITY 
I measure board nationality diversity using dissimilarity of director 
nationalities within the board (BDDDN), which is given by the following formula 
(Simpson, 1949; Rae and Taylor, 1970): 
𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑁 = 1 −  
∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1
𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
  
   (1) 
where: ni is the number of board members in the ith nationality; n is board size. 
It captures national-origin dissimilarities and reaches its maximum when each 
director comes from a different country. It also satisfies nine desirable properties for 
a measure of diversity as uniqueness in a multi-categorical attribute like nationality 
(see Section 3.3 in my second essay). By analogy, audit committee nationality diversity 
is measured using ACDDN, which is computed following Equation (1), but after 
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replacing board members with audit committee members and board size with audit 
committee size. 
Note that I measure nationality as opposed to ethnicity. This is for two main 
reasons. First, a lack of available data has forced authors of studies including ethnicity 
(e.g., Brammer, Millington and Pavelin, 2007; Guest, 2019) to resort to looking at 
photographs of board members to determine their ethnic status. This could be 
subjective and imperfect. For example, a white Turkish national with a strong accent 
would not be classed as ethnic (or ‘other’) whereas a person born and educated in 
Oxford but of Asian parentage would be classed as ‘other’. Other authors have used 
board member names as a surrogate to retain valuable observations (e.g., Bernile et al., 
2018). This also presents problems as names can reflect the spousal or parental 
heritage, rather than that of the board member. Therefore, I use the stated nationality 
of each director to denote whether they are different from the base case, this being of 
British nationality. 
4.4.2. MEASUREMENT OF CONSERVATISM 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Beaver and Ryan (2005) distinguish between 
conditional and unconditional conservatism. Beaver and Ryan (2005, p. 269) state: 
“Under unconditional conservatism, the book value of net assets is understated due to 
predetermined aspects of the accounting process. Under conditional conservatism, book value 
is written down under sufficiently adverse circumstances, but not up under favorable 
circumstances.” Examples of the former include accelerated depreciation and 
expensing research and development costs as incurred. Examples of the latter include 
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impairment recognition for long-lived assets and valuing inventory at the lower of 
cost or market. Unlike unconditional conservatism, conditional conservatism carries 
new information, which makes it an important concept in financial reporting (Ball, 
Kothari and Nikolaev, 2013a). 
I measure conditional conservatism by using Basu’s (1997) asymmetric 
timeliness coefficient, which captures the incremental timeliness of incorporating bad 
news over good news in earnings (i.e., asymmetric timeliness of earnings). Following 
prior research (e.g., Banker et al., 2016; Srinidhi et al., 2017; LaFond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008), I employ several models to capture the Basu coefficient. I 
specify these models below. 
4.4.3. EMPIRICAL MODELS 
Khan and Watts (2009) have extended Basu’s (1997) model by including size, 
leverage, and market-to-book ratio as drivers of conservatism. I extend their work by 
adding nationality diversity on the board and its audit committee as another potential 
determinant of conservatism. Therefore, I start by specifying a modified Basu model 
as follows: 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = (𝛽01 + 𝛽02𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽03𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽04𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽05𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 (𝛽11 + 𝛽12𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 (𝛽21 + 𝛽22𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽24𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽25𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡(𝛽31 + 𝛽32𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽34𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽35𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ ∑ 𝛿1𝑑 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑑
𝐷−1
𝑑=1






  (2) 
where: Xit is defined as one of the following: (i) EARNit = net income before 
extraordinary items divided by opening market value of equity (Khan and Watts, 
2009), (ii) ACCit = net income before extraordinary items − operating cash flows (CFO), 
scaled by lagged market value of equity (Collins et al., 2014), or (iii) ACCDEPit = net 
income before extraordinary items − CFO + depreciation expense, scaled by lagged 
market value of equity (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Banker et al., 
2016); RETit is the compound stock returns for the 12-month period ending at the 
fiscal-year end; DRit is a dummy indicator, for negative returns, that takes a value of 
one if RET is negative, and zero otherwise; NDit is nationality diversity, which is 
defined as one of the following: board nationality diversity (BDDDNit), audit 
committee nationality diversity (ACDDNit), or a dummy indicator for the presence of 
high nationality diversity levels on both the board and its audit committee (HIDDNit). 
HIDDNit is equal to one if both BDDDN and ACDDN in a given year are above their 
sample median for the same year, and zero otherwise; SIZEit is the natural logarithm 
of the market value of equity; LEVit is short-term plus long-term debt, scaled by the 
market value of equity; MTBit is the market value of equity divided by the book value 
of equity; d denotes a specific industry and D is the number of industries in my sample; 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑑 is a set of industry controls; t denotes a specific year, and T is the sample period; 
YEARt is a set of year controls; εit is an error term. 
In this model, it is expected that, due to the availability of public information 
about firms, returns lead earnings, that is, stock returns reflect information in a 
timelier way than earnings. Where accounting conservatism is present, bad news, 
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already reflected in stock prices, will be more quickly reflected in earnings, leading to 
a stronger association between earnings and stock prices in ‘bad news’ firms 
compared to ‘good news’ firms. In the original Basu’s (1997) model, conditional 
conservatism then manifest itself in a significantly positive slope coefficient on the 
interaction between ‘bad news’ and stock returns (DR*RET). This coefficient is 
therefore my measure of conditional conservatism. 
To test whether a specific variable (V) is a determinant of conditional 
conservatism, this variable should be interacted with DR, RET, and their interaction 
(DR*RET) in a Basu-type reverse regression of earnings on returns. If the estimation 
of the resultant regression model reveals a significant coefficient on the three-way 
interaction (DR*RET*V) then variable (V) is a determinant of conditional 
conservatism. 
Khan and Watts (2009) propose that maturity and better information 
environments (SIZE), debtholder demands for conservatism (LEV), and growth 
options (MTB) are key drivers of conservatism. In particular, the authors expect the 
coefficients on the interaction terms of SIZE, LEV, and MTB with DR*RET to be 
negative (β33), positive (β34), and positive (β35), respectively. 
I extend earlier work by examining a new potential source of variation in 
conservatism, which is nationality diversity on the board and its audit committee. My 
hypothesis predicts a positive association of nationality diversity (ND) with 
conditional conservatism. A positive coefficient is therefore expected on the three-way 
interaction: DR*RET*ND (β32). 
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Banker et al. (2016) point out that cost asymmetry in response to sales changes 
could bias conservatism estimates of the standard asymmetric timeliness models. This 
asymmetry exists because costs rise more in response to sales increases than they fall 
for sales decreases.  Following Banker et al. (2016), I apply the sticky cost adjustment 
to my modified Basu model, as follows: 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = (𝛽01 + 𝛽02𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽03𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽04𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽05𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 (𝛽11 + 𝛽12𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 (𝛽21 + 𝛽22𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽24𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽25𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡(𝛽31 + 𝛽32𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽34𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽35𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝛽41 + 𝛽42𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽43𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽44𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽45𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝛽51 + 𝛽52𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽53𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽54𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽55𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡(𝛽61 + 𝛽62𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽63𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽64𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽65𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ ∑ 𝛿1𝑑  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑑
𝐷−1
𝑑=1




  (3) 
where: ∆SALESit is the sales change in year t scaled by the lagged market value 
of equity; DSit is a dummy indicator, for a decrease in sales, that takes a value of one 
if ∆SALES is negative, and zero otherwise; ηi,t is an error term. 
To account for the industry- and year-specific variations in conservatism, I 
allow Basu coefficients to vary by industry and year. Specifically, I interact 
industry/year controls with the three fundamental terms in the Basu model: DR, RET, 
and the interaction between them (DR*RET), as follows: 
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𝑋𝑖𝑡 = (𝛽01 + 𝛽02𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽03𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽04𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽05𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 (𝛽11 + 𝛽12𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 (𝛽21 + 𝛽22𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽24𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽25𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡(𝛽31 + 𝛽32𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽34𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽35𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝛽41 + 𝛽42𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽43𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽44𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽45𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝛽51 + 𝛽52𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽53𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽54𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽55𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡(𝛽61 + 𝛽62𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽63𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽64𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽65𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑑(𝛿1𝑑 + 𝛿2𝑑𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑑𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡)
𝐷−1
𝑑=1




  (4) 
where: Υit is an error term. 
Given that my empirical model is a partial econometric model which includes 
a constant term to capture the effects of potential unobservable omitted variables, my 
OLS estimates will be unbiased only if the unobservable omitted variables are 
uncorrelated with one or more of my independent variables. OLS-based conservatism 
estimates are therefore biased if time-invariant firm-specific characteristics that relate 
to both earnings and returns are not controlled for (Ball et al., 2013b). To address this 
concern, I specify the below fixed-effects model. 
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𝑋𝑖𝑡 = (𝛽01 + 𝛽02𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽03𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽04𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽05𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 (𝛽11 + 𝛽12𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 (𝛽21 + 𝛽22𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽24𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽25𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡(𝛽31 + 𝛽32𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽34𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽35𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝛽41 + 𝛽42𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽43𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽44𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽45𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝛽51 + 𝛽52𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽53𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽54𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽55𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡(𝛽61 + 𝛽62𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽63𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽64𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽65𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡)
+ ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡(𝜆1𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑡𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆4𝑡𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡)
𝑇−1
𝑡=1




  (5) 
where: i denotes a specific firm, and I is the number of unique firms in the 
sample; FEi is a set of firm controls; αit is an error term. 
Lastly, I incorporate other board-level characteristics that are deemed 
important in explaining firm-level variations in conservatism, including the 
proportion of executive board members (BDEXD; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007), 
executives’ ownership (BDEXOWN; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008), and the 
proportion of female directors (BDFEM; Srinidhi et al., 2017). I also add an indicator 
for the presence of strong cultural faultlines on the board (STROFAU). Because 75% 
of audit committees in my sample have four or fewer members, subgroups within 
audit committees are unlikely. For this reason, I do not include an indicator of the 
presence of strong cultural faultlines on the audit committee. My extended model is 
therefore specified as follows: 
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𝑋𝑖𝑡 = (𝛽01 + 𝛽02𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽03𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽04𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽05𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽06𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽07𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽08𝐵𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽09𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐴𝑈𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 (𝛽11 + 𝛽12𝐴𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽16𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐵𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽19𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐴𝑈𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 (𝛽21 + 𝛽22𝐴𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽24𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽25𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽26𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽27𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽28𝐵𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽29𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐴𝑈𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡(𝛽31 + 𝛽32𝐴𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽34𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽35𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽36𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽37𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽38𝐵𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽39𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐴𝑈𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝛽41 + 𝛽42𝐴𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽43𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽44𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽45𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽46𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽47𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽48𝐵𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽49𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐴𝑈𝑖𝑡)
+ ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝛽51 + 𝛽52𝐴𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽53𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽54𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽55𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽56𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽57𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽58𝐵𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽59𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐴𝑈𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡(𝛽61 + 𝛽62𝐴𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽63𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽64𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽65𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽66𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽67𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽68𝐵𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽69𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐴𝑈𝑖𝑡)
+ ∑ 𝛿1𝑑 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑑
𝐷−1
𝑑=1




  (6) 
where: νit is an error term. A full definition of each variable is provided in Table 
1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
4.4.4. DATA AND SAMPLE 
My dataset comprises UK-domiciled non-financial firms that are listed on the 
London Stock Exchange over the period from 1999 to 2018. The dataset is obtained by 
202 
 
merging available board data from the BoardEx database with their respective 
financial data from the Worldscope database, excluding unlisted firms and those with 
missing industry classification benchmark (ICB) code. Because a firm’s annual report 
date on BoardEx database is reported at the beginning of the month in which its fiscal 
year ends, I require any difference in corporate annual reporting date between 
BoardEx data and Worldscope data to be less than or equal to one month. This 
involves correcting for Worldscope mid-January rule,55 then dropping firm-years with 
a reporting year that is more than seven days above or below 365. 
The resultant sample consists of 24,318 firm-year observations for 2,764 unique 
firms. Panel A of Table 2 shows that some observations are then excluded due to one 
of the following reasons: (1) belonging to the financial sector—ICB industry code = 
8000; (2) domiciled outside the UK; (3) missing age data for at least one board member; 
(4) missing nationality data for at least one board member; (5) having a board size of 
fewer than three directors; (6) having an audit committee size of fewer than three 
directors; (7) having a negative book value of equity; (8) having a share price of less 
than 1 pound;56 (9) missing returns for at least one month of the year; (10) missing data 
of some required variables. The final sample consists of 6,469 firm-years from 992 
unique firms. It includes 52,362 board director-years, with 23,723 audit committee 
 
55 This rule stipulates a cut-off date of 15 January of each year as the basis for classifying non-
US firms’ financial data into years on the Worldscope platform (Worldscope, 2013, p. 41). Accordingly, 
if a firm’s fiscal year ends before mid-January in year t, its financial data will be classified by 
Worldscope as belonging to year t-1. However, this firm’s board data will still be classified by BoardEx 
as belonging to year t. 
56 Exclusion Criteria (7) and (8) are employed following Khan and Watts (2009). 
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director-years, 98% of whom are non-executives. Panel B of Table 2 provides a 
breakdown of the final sample by industry and across years. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The next section details my analyses of this sample. 
4.5. ANALYSIS 
Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 3. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of 
outliers. Nationality diversity on the average (median) board has a value of 0.239 
(0.200), BDDDN. More than 50% of audit committees have no foreign board members. 
The median of audit committee nationality diversity (ACDDN) is therefore zero, but 
it has an average value of 0.235. Both variables (BDDDN and ACDDN) occupy a tidy 
range of variation from a minimum value of zero, indicating a homogeneous group, 
to a maximum value of one, indicating that each director comes from a different 
country. About one-third of sample firms have high levels of nationality diversity on 
both the board and its audit committee (HIDDN). Executive directors represent almost 
40% of the average board (BDEXD). The natural logarithm of mean equity ownership 
by executive board members (BDEXOWN) has an average (median) of 6.941 (7.118). 
Women comprise 9.5% of the average board (BDFEM). Boards with strong cultural 
faultlines (STROFAU) represent 11.4% of the sample. The average and median board 
has approximately eight members (BDSIZE), whereas average (median) audit 
committee size (ACSIZE) is 3.667 (3). 
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Turning to firm characteristics, average earnings (EARN), accruals (ACC), and 
accruals before depreciation (ACCBDEP) are 4%, −5.9%, and −0.3% of the opening 
market value of equity, respectively. Sample average (median) annual stock returns 
(RET) are 19.1% (13.5%). Slightly more than a third of sample firms suffer negative 
annual stock returns (DR). The natural logarithm of the market value of equity (SIZE) 
for the average firm is 13.027. Average (median) debt to equity ratios (LEV) for the 
sample are 0.29 (0.17) and firms have an average (median) market to book ratio (MTB) 
of 3.77 (2.42). The average (median) sample firm experiences annual sales growth 
(ΔSALES) equivalent to 10.3% (5.2%) of opening market value of equity, though 24.3% 
of firms suffer an annual decline in sales (DS). 
[Table 3 about here] 
In Table 4, I report descriptive statistics relating to nationality diversity on 
boards and audit committees over time. Despite some decreases in years 2004 and 
2010, the average proportion of foreign directors on the board (BDFDs) has an overall 
upward trend over my sample period, growing from 0.10 in 1999 to almost double 
(0.19) in 2018. Likewise, we can see a similar pattern for the average proportion of 
foreign directors on the audit committee (ACFDs). Turning to my measures of 
nationality diversity, we can see that the biggest increase (by 14.9%) in board 
nationality diversity (BDDDN) is in the year 2007, while the biggest increase (by 
16.3%) in BDFDs takes place in the year 2003. This difference is because my measure 
(BDDDN) accounts for dissimilarities in foreign directors’ nationalities, whereas the 
BDFDs regards foreign nationals as a homogeneous set of directors. By comparing the 
annual averages for audit committee nationality diversity (ACDDN) with those for 
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ACFDs, both have the biggest increase in the year 2003, but they are different in terms 
of the year of the biggest decline: 2010 (by 4.8%) and 2004 (by 5.2%), respectively. This 
provides further empirical support that my measure of nationality diversity as 
uniqueness is different from the conventional measure of the proportion of foreign 
directors. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Before moving on to conduct multivariate tests of my hypothesis, I report 
Pearson correlations in Table 5. Of note are the high correlations between my 
measures of nationality diversity on the board (BDDDN), the audit committee 
(ACDDN), and both of them (HIDDN): 0.80 (BDDDN and ACDDN), 0.77 (BDDDN and 
HIDDN), and 0.92 (ACDDN and HIDDN). This does not introduce a multicollinearity 
problem to my multivariate tests because each of these measures is included 
separately in my empirical models. None of the other correlations is high enough to 
introduce issues of multicollinearity in my main tests, which are reported below. 
[Table 5 about here] 
4.5.1. MAIN TESTS 
Table 6 reports the results of the first tests of my hypothesis, which predicts 
positive associations of board/audit committee nationality diversity with conditional 
conservatism. The results in this table are estimations of my modified Basu model, Eq. 
(2), using earnings (EARN) as the dependent variable. As described in Subsection 
4.4.3, my coefficient of interest is β32 (DR*RET*ND). If this coefficient is positive and 
significant, it will indicate that nationality diversity (ND) is strongly associated with 
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conservatism in the way predicted by my hypothesis. In Models (1)–(2) , (3)–(4), and 
(5)–(6), I define ND as board nationality diversity (BDDDN), audit committee 
nationality diversity (ACDDN), and a dummy indicator for the presence of high 
nationality diversity levels on both the board and its audit committee (HIDDN), 
respectively. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Model (1) shows OLS estimation results of the modified Basu model. I find a 
significant positive coefficient on the interaction term of interest: DR*RET*BDDDN, 
suggesting a positive association between board nationality diversity (BDDDN) and 
conservatism. Consistent with Khan and Watts (2009), coefficient estimates on the 
interactions of DR*RET with firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), and market-to-book 
ratio (MTB) have the expected signs, but only firm size (SIZE) is significant at the 1% 
level. 
In Models (3) and (5), I also find significant positive coefficients on the 
interaction terms of interest: DR*RET*ACDDN and DR*RET*HIDDN, respectively. By 
comparing these results with those reported in Model (1), we can see that audit 
committee nationality diversity (ACDDN) is more strongly associated with 
conservatism, in the sense of having a higher t-statistic, compared to board nationality 
diversity (BDDDN): coefficient = 0.148 and t-stat. = 2.38 versus coefficient = 0.160 and 
t-stat. = 2.06, respectively. The association is even stronger for firms with high 
nationality diversity levels on both the board and its audit committee (HIDDN), 
coefficient = 0.109 and t-stat. = 2.52. Coefficient estimates on control variables are 
generally in line with those reported in Model (1). 
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A potential interpretation of the above OLS results is that nationality diversity 
on the board and the audit committee encourage greater conservatism in financial 
reporting by enhancing board/audit committee independence and expanding their 
resource pool. A major concern with this interpretation is the potential endogenous 
nature of the relationships between board/audit committee nationality diversity and 
conservatism. In particular, the endogeneity problem occurs when foreign directors 
are not randomly distributed among firms, and their representation on boards and 
audit committees is indirectly related to conservative financial reporting. To mitigate 
this concern, I allow BDDDN, ACDDN, and HIDDN to be endogenous and implement 
instrumental variable tests using 2SLS regressions. 
I employ the average values of BDDDN, ACDDN and their interaction 
(BDDDN*ACDDN) for firms headquartered within the same postcode area as 
instrumental variables for BDDDN, ACDDN and HIDDN, respectively. These 
instruments are motivated by the role of a firm’s headquarters location in attracting 
foreign directors (Masulis et al., 2012 and Frijns et al., 2016). My instruments 
(LOCALBDs, LOCALACs, and LOCALBDACs)57 are thus likely to be correlated with the 
nationality diversity measures (BDDDN, ACDDN, and HIDDN), but unlikely to have 
a direct association with conservatism. 
Tests for the relevance of my instruments indicate that they are correlated with 
the endogenous regressors,58 and the correlations are not weak.59 The first stage results 
 
57 See Table 1 for a detailed definition of each instrument. 
58 In all 2SLS estimations, the p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap-LM statistic is 0.0000, rejecting 
the null hypothesis that first-stage models are under-identified. 
59 In all 2SLS estimations, first stage results reveal that the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic on 
the excluded instruments is greater than the threshold value of 10 (Staigler and Stock, 1997): 32.229, 
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(untabulated) show strong positive associations between the endogenous regressors 
and their respective instruments (the p-values are consistently equal to 0.000), 
confirming my expectations. 
Second stage results are reported in Models (2), (4), and (6). In Model (2), I find 
a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term of interest: 
DR*RET*INSTBDDDN, where INSTBDDDN refers to instrumented BDDDN (coeff. = 
0.362 and t-stat. = 1.97). In Models (4) and (6), the interaction terms of interest are 
DR*RET*INSTACDDN (where INSTACDDN refers to instrumented ACDDN) and 
DR*RET*INSTHIDDN (where INSTHIDDN refers to instrumented HIDDN), 
respectively. The former has a marginally significant coefficient (coeff. = 0.274 and t-
stat. = 1.95), whilst the latter has a significant coefficient (coeff. = 0.251 and t-stat. = 
2.12). The 2SLS results thus confirm that nationality diversity on the board and the 
audit committee impact accounting conservatism, and the impact is greater for firms 
with high diversity levels on both the board and the audit committee. Overall, both 
OLS and 2SLS results support my hypothesis and suggest that firms with greater 
nationality diversity on the board and its audit committee are significantly more 




29.492, and 22.029 for Models (2), (4), and (6), respectively. Also, the value of Cragg-Donald F-statistic 
is consistently greater than the Stock-Yogo critical value of 24.58 (Stock and Yogo, 2005): 171.262, 
145.416, and 96.980 for Models (2), (4), and (6), respectively. Both statistics indicate that my instruments 
are not weak. 
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4.5.2. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Collins et al. (2014) decompose the Basu asymmetric timeliness of earnings into 
accrual asymmetry and cash flow asymmetry. The authors then posit that cash flow 
asymmetry, which is unlikely to manifest conditional conservatism, could bias the 
Basu asymmetric timeliness of earnings. To adjust for this potential bias, operating 
cash flows (CFO) should be excluded from earnings. I implement this adjustment and 
report the results in Table 7, where the accrual component of earnings (ACC) is the 
dependent variable. In Models (1) to (3), I am interested in the interaction terms of 
DR*RET with board nationality diversity (BDDDN), audit committee nationality 
diversity (ACDDN), and the presence of high nationality diversity levels on the board 
and its audit committee (HIDDN), respectively. I find the coefficients on these terms 
to have bigger magnitude and stronger significance than those reported in Models (1), 
(3), and (5) of Table 6: coeff. = 0.188; t-stat. = 2.47, coeff. = 0.184; t-stat. = 3.02, and coeff. 
= 0.119; t-stat. = 2.68 versus coeff. = 0.160; t-stat. = 2.06, coeff. = 0.148; t-stat. = 2.38, and 
coeff. = 0.109; t-stat. = 2.52, respectively. The results after adjusting for cash flow 
asymmetry thus provide further support to my hypothesis. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Banker et al. (2016) propose another adjustment to account for the confounding 
effect of sticky costs on conditional conservatism. I incorporate this adjustment in Eq. 
(3), which is then estimated in Table 8 using two alternative definitions for the 
dependent variable: earnings (EARN) and the accrual component of earnings (ACC). 
In support of my hypothesis, the results on the interaction terms of interest are 
generally consistent with those reported without the sticky cost adjustment. 
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[Table 8 about here] 
Next, I execute further tests of my hypothesis after allowing the three 
fundamental terms in the Basu model (DR, RET, and DR*RET) to vary by industry 
and year, Eq. (4), to account for the industry- and year-specific variations in 
conservatism. Table 9 reports the results of these tests. The results are again consistent 
with those reported earlier, except for the interaction of DR*RET with board 
nationality diversity (BDDDN), which still has a positive, albeit insignificant, 
coefficient in Model (1). These results lend support to the idea that audit committee 
nationality diversity (ACDDN) is more important than board nationality diversity 
(BDDDN) in explaining variations in conservatism. 
[Table 9 about here] 
My subsequent set of tests pays regard to the potential influence of time-
invariant firm-specific characteristics, that relate to both earnings and returns, on OLS-
based conservatism estimates. In particular, the estimates will be biased if these 
characteristics are not controlled for (Ball et al., 2013b). To address this concern, I 
estimate a fixed-effects model, Eq. (5), that controls for these characteristics, thereby 
mitigating concerns about the problem of correlated-omitted-variables. Table 10 
reports the results, which are in line with those reported in Table 9. Together, the 
results in both tables are supportive of my hypothesis. 
[Table 10 about here] 
After that, I augment the modified Basu model with controls for other potential 
board-level determinants of conservatism, including the proportion of executive 
directors (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007), executives’ ownership (LaFond and 
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Roychowdhury, 2008), the proportion of female directors (Srinidhi et al., 2017), and 
the presence of strong cultural faultlines on the board. Table 11 presents the results of 
estimating this extended model, Eq. (6). I find positive and significant coefficients on 
the interaction terms of interest, except for the interaction of DR*RET with board 
nationality diversity (BDDDN), which has a marginally significant coefficient in 
Model (1). Coefficient estimates on control variables are generally consistent with 
expectations.60 
Finally, I re-estimate the models from Equations (2) to (6) after adjusting for 
depreciation, which is unlikely to reflect conditional conservatism (Givoly and Hayn, 
2000; Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Banker et al., 2016). The results across all model 
specifications are consistent with those obtained using the accrual component of 
earnings (ACC) as the dependent variable (see Appendix A). 
Overall, the results of the robustness tests strongly support my hypothesis: 
there is a stronger positive association between earnings and returns in bad news 
firms (i.e., greater reporting conservatism) where the board and its audit committee 
are more diverse with respect to the nationality of their members. 
[Table 11 about here] 
The next section summarises my study and its findings. 
 
 
60 When I re-estimate the models in Table 11 after dropping missing values for BDEXOWN (291 
observations), I obtain similar results (untabulated). 
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4.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
I examine nationality diversity on the board and its audit committee in relation 
to conservatism in financial reporting. I propose that nationality diversity enhances 
the effectiveness of boards and audit committees because: (i) directors from different 
foreign countries tend to have weak ties with each other and with domestic 
management, (ii) nationality diversity mitigates harmful groupthink, which is 
associated with excessively risky decisions being made by cohesive, often 
homogeneous, sets of people, and (iii) nationality diversity brings valuable expertise 
and insights relevant to a firm’s operations, especially for firms with complex and 
overseas operations. Effective boards and audit committees are then expected to 
demand greater conservatism in financial reporting to preserve their reputational 
capital, mitigate agency costs between shareholders and management, and reduce the 
cost of debt. 
To test my proposition, I employ a large sample of UK firms, where there is 
substantial heterogeneity in directors’ nationalities. My diversity measure accounts 
for the nationality composition of foreign directors to capture the level of diversity. I 
find that nationality diversity on both the board and the audit committee is positively 
associated with conditional conservatism, measured by Basu’s (1997) asymmetric 
timeliness coefficient. The results hold after mitigating sources of endogeneity, 
including self-selection bias and omitted-variable bias by using 2SLS and fixed-effects 
regressions. The results are also robust to several model specifications that mitigate 
possible sources of bias in the Basu model and to a battery of board-level, firm-level, 
industry, and year controls. 
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My findings suggest that foreign nationals who qualify for audit committee 
membership negatively impact its appetite for risk-taking in financial reporting. This 
effect is strengthened when nationality diversity on the audit committee is supported 
with a high level of nationality diversity on the board. These findings could be of 
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Table 1 – Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Panel A: Board Characteristics 
Variable Source Definitions 
Nationality diversity  
BDDDN BoardEx 
and FAME 
= 1 − [ ∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1) ÷  𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1  ], where: ni is the 
number of directors in the ith nationality on the board, 
and n is board size (Simpson, 1949; Rae and Taylor, 1970). 
ACDDN BoardEx 
and FAME 
= 1 − [ ∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1) ÷  𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1  ], where: ni is the 
number of directors in the ith nationality on the audit 
committee, and n is audit committee size (Simpson, 1949; 
Rae and Taylor, 1970). 
HIDDN BoardEx 
and FAME 
= A dummy indicator, for the presence of high nationality 
diversity levels on both the board and its audit committee, 
that equals one if both BDDDN and ACDDN in a given 
year are above their sample median for the same year, and 
zero otherwise. 
Instrumental variables  
LOCALBDs BoardEx 
and FAME 
= The average value of BDDDN for firms headquartered 
within the same postcode area. 
LOCALACs BoardEx 
and FAME 
= The average value of ACDDN for firms headquartered 
within the same postcode area. 
LOCALBDACs BoardEx 
and FAME 
= The average value of the interaction between BDDDN and 
ACDDN for firms headquartered within the same 
postcode area. 
Other board characteristics  
BDEXD BoardEx = The proportion of executive directors on the board. 
BDEXOWN BoardEx = The natural logarithm of one plus mean equity ownership 
by executive board members at year-end. Missing values 
(291 observations) are set to zero. 
BDFEM BoardEx = The proportion of female directors on the board. 
STROFAU BoardEx 
and FAME 
= A dummy indicator, for strong faultlines, that takes a 
value of one if the strength of board cultural faultlines has 
a value of at least 0.9, and zero otherwise.  The strength of 
board cultural faultlines (Cultural faultlines) is a proxy 
for the strength of cultural separation between cultural 
subgroups on the board.   Its computation involves 
attaching Hofstede’s four-dimensional scores to directors’ 
nationalities, then clustering directors into cultural 
subgroups by using a clustering algorithm developed by 
Meyer and Glenz (2013). The software used for executing 
the algorithm provides a summary value of the strength 
of the cultural separation. 
BDSIZE BoardEx = The number of directors on the board. 
ACSIZE BoardEx = The number of directors on the audit committee. 
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Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Variable Source Definitions 
Basu (1997)   
EARN Worldscope = Net income before extraordinary items scaled by the 
opening market value of equity. 
RET Datastream = Compound stock returns for 12 months ending at the 
fiscal-year end. 
DR Datastream = A dummy indicator, for negative returns, that takes a 
value of one if RET is negative, and zero otherwise. 
Khan and Watts (2009)  
SIZE Worldscope = The natural logarithm of the market value of equity. 
LEV Worldscope = Short-term plus long-term debt, scaled by the market 
value of equity. 
MTB Worldscope = The market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity. 
Banker et al. (2016)  
∆SALES Worldscope = Sales change scaled by the lagged market value of equity. 
DS Worldscope = A dummy indicator, for a decrease in sales, that takes a 
value of one if ∆SALES is negative, and zero otherwise. 
Accruals-based Models  
ACC Worldscope = Net income before extraordinary items minus cash flows 
from operations (CFO), scaled by the lagged market value 
of equity. It is referred to as the accrual component of 
earnings (Collins et al., 2014). 
ACCBDEP Worldscope = Net income before extraordinary items minus cash flows 
from operations (CFO) plus depreciation expense, scaled 
by the lagged market value of equity. It is referred to as 
accruals before depreciation (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; 
Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Banker et al., 2016). 
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Table 2 – Sample 





Initial sample 24,318 2,764 
Exclusion criteria   
(1) Belonging to the financial sector (6,195) (718) 
(2) Domiciled outside the UK (119) (12) 
(3) Missing age data for at least one board member (40) (3) 
(4) Missing nationality data for at least one board member (892) (50) 
(5) Having a board size of less than three directors (166) (9) 
(6) Having an audit committee size of less than three directors (5,888) (378) 
(7) Having a negative book value of equity (493) (36) 
(8) Having a share price of less than 1 pound (3,737) (502) 
(9) Missing returns for at least one month of the year (242) (52) 
(10) Missing data of some required variables (77) (12) 
Final sample 6,469 992 
 
Panel B: Sample by Industry and Year 
Year 
ICB Industry Code 
Total (0001) (1000) (2000) (3000) (4000) (5000) (6000) (7000) (9000) 
1999 7 11 69 26 12 38 3 7 15 188 
2000 8 13 91 30 20 57 3 7 24 253 
2001 9 13 103 41 24 72 7 9 24 302 
2002 8 13 98 42 22 86 2 8 16 295 
2003 14 16 102 45 27 85 3 9 23 324 
2004 20 21 122 53 27 102 7 10 32 394 
2005 23 22 129 47 27 99 6 11 35 399 
2006 25 24 140 46 27 85 6 13 31 397 
2007 28 26 134 45 29 90 9 11 29 401 
2008 19 18 102 37 24 70 7 11 18 306 
2009 18 13 94 32 23 68 5 11 24 288 
2010 19 22 100 38 19 67 4 10 24 303 
2011 18 30 100 36 16 58 7 9 23 297 
2012 18 30 104 38 16 59 7 9 27 308 
2013 22 26 113 38 20 75 7 8 30 339 
2014 13 25 125 42 23 75 8 9 33 353 
2015 12 21 117 44 27 77 9 10 30 347 
2016 8 26 117 46 25 83 9 9 37 360 
2017 10 25 113 49 25 85 6 8 38 359 
2018 5 17 80 37 16 64 5 7 25 256 
Total 304 412 2,153 812 449 1,495 120 186 538 6,469 
The ICB industry (codes) names are: (0001) Oil and gas; (1000) Basic materials; (2000) Industrials; (3000) 




Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Nationality diversity       
BDDDN 6469 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.417 1.000 0.265 
ACDDN 6469 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.323 
HIDDN 6469 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.475 
Other board characteristics       
BDEXD 6469 0.399 0.000 0.300 0.400 0.500 1.000 0.132 
BDEXOWN 6469 6.941 0.000 5.719 7.118 8.444 14.903 2.495 
BDFEM 6469 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.167 0.571 0.111 
STROFAU 6469 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.318 
BDSIZE 6469 8.094 3.000 6.000 8.000 9.000 23.000 2.318 
ACSIZE 6469 3.667 3.000 3.000 3.000 4.000 10.000 0.882 
Firm characteristics       
EARN 6469 0.040 -0.960 0.026 0.059 0.088 0.616 0.123 
ACC 6469 -0.059 -1.158 -0.083 -0.035 -0.005 0.467 0.131 
ACCBDEP 6466 -0.003 -0.867 -0.023 0.002 0.027 0.570 0.109 
RET 6469 0.191 -0.884 -0.107 0.135 0.394 5.679 0.510 
DR 6469 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.478 
SIZE 6469 13.027 7.740 11.687 12.955 14.266 18.324 1.928 
LEV 6469 0.290 0.000 0.031 0.167 0.376 6.669 0.441 
MTB 6469 3.773 0.318 1.459 2.420 4.083 98.526 5.189 
∆SALES 6469 0.103 -2.903 0.000 0.052 0.158 2.695 0.343 
DS 6469 0.243 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.429 
All variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 4 – Nationality Diversity Across Years 
Year 
 Board of Directors  Audit Committee 
 BDFDs  BDDDN  ACFDs  ACDDN 
1999  0.103  0.168  0.091  0.151 
2000  0.107  0.173  0.097  0.162 
2001  0.112  0.183  0.101  0.165 
2002  0.112  0.182  0.103  0.169 
2003  0.130  0.209  0.127  0.203 
2004  0.123  0.201  0.120  0.201 
2005  0.124  0.200  0.117  0.193 
2006  0.131  0.208  0.123  0.204 
2007  0.151  0.239  0.144  0.240 
2008  0.166  0.249  0.159  0.249 
2009  0.171  0.257  0.167  0.257 
2010  0.164  0.251  0.159  0.245 
2011  0.175  0.267  0.168  0.262 
2012  0.180  0.276  0.171  0.270 
2013  0.183  0.275  0.170  0.271 
2014  0.183  0.276  0.170  0.276 
2015  0.184  0.277  0.172  0.269 
2016  0.186  0.283  0.178  0.282 
2017  0.191  0.288  0.189  0.294 
2018  0.193  0.301  0.188  0.289 
Average  0.154  0.239  0.147  0.235 
BDFDs (ACFDs) is the proportion of foreign directors on the board (the audit committee). BDDDN 







Table 5 – Correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) BDDDN 1.00                   
(2) ACDDN 0.80 1.00                  
(3) HIDDN 0.77 0.92 1.00                 
(4) BDEXD -0.37 -0.29 -0.29 1.00                
(5) BDEXOWN 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 1.00               
(6) BDFEM 0.16 0.16 0.13 -0.32 0.05 1.00              
(7) STROFAU 0.30 0.21 0.24 -0.11 0.04 0.04 1.00             
(8) BDSIZE 0.34 0.24 0.25 -0.08 0.13 0.14 0.33 1.00            
(9) ACSIZE 0.25 0.22 0.28 -0.28 0.02 0.19 0.18 0.47 1.00           
(10) EARN -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 0.06 0.15 0.03 -0.02 0.10 0.05 1.00          
(11) ACC -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.07 0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.48 1.00         
(12) ACCBDEP -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.09 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.54 0.89 1.00        
(13) RET -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.21 -0.04 0.05 1.00       
(14) DR 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.12 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.23 -0.03 -0.09 -0.63 1.00      
(15) SIZE 0.40 0.29 0.29 -0.37 0.26 0.35 0.27 0.64 0.42 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.12 1.00     
(16) LEV -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.05 -0.12 -0.29 -0.15 -0.17 0.15 0.03 1.00    
(17) MTB 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.15 -0.10 0.14 -0.13 1.00   
(18) ∆SALES -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 0.12 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.15 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 1.00  
(19) DS 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.08 -0.11 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 0.11 -0.03 0.08 -0.05 -0.46 1.00 
The above table presents Pearson correlations between the main variables in my models. The variables are defined in Table 1. The number of observations is 
6,469, except for correlations involving ACCBDEP where the number of observations is 6,466.
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 Board of Directors  Audit Committee  Both 
 
 OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage)  OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage)  OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage) 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
Intercept   -0.060 *  -0.092 **  -0.037  -0.062 *  -0.035  -0.074 * 
   (-1.86)  (-2.33)  (-1.20)  (-1.69)  (-1.17)  (-1.91) 
BDDDN   -0.055 ***           
   (-4.00)           
INSTBDDDN     -0.112 ***         
     (-3.05)         
ACDDN       -0.019 *       
       (-1.94)       
INSTACDDN         -0.067 **     
         (-2.08)     
HIDDN           -0.012 *   
           (-1.83)   
INSTHIDDN             -0.065 ** 
             (-2.52) 
SIZE   0.009 ***  0.013 ***  0.006 ***  0.009 ***  0.006 ***  0.011 *** 
   (3.67)  (3.73)  (2.90)  (3.09)  (2.89)  (3.31) 
LEV   -0.025  -0.025  -0.025  -0.025  -0.025  -0.025 
   (-1.24)  (-1.22)  (-1.22)  (-1.21)  (-1.21)  (-1.19) 
MTB   -0.002 ***  -0.002 ***  -0.002 ***  -0.002 ***  -0.002 ***  -0.002 *** 
   (-3.53)  (-3.31)  (-3.45)  (-3.46)  (-3.40)  (-3.32) 
DR   0.046  0.040  0.039  0.039  0.034  0.043 
   (0.96)  (0.73)  (0.85)  (0.77)  (0.76)  (0.81) 
DR*BDDDN   0.030           
   (1.22)           
DR*INSTBDDDN     0.051         
     (0.98)         
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 Board of Directors  Audit Committee  Both 
 
 OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage)  OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage)  OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage) 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*ACDDN       0.018       
       (0.96)       
DR*INSTACDDN         0.042     
         (1.06)     
DR*HIDDN           0.009   
           (0.73)   
DR*INSTHIDDN             0.049 
             (1.54) 
DR*SIZE   -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.004  -0.006 
   (-1.34)  (-1.06)  (-1.25)  (-1.18)  (-1.14)  (-1.31) 
DR*LEV   0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
   (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
DR*MTB   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
   (1.05)  (1.17)  (0.97)  (1.02)  (0.98)  (1.11) 
RET   -0.050  -0.059  -0.067  -0.061  -0.066  -0.053 
   (-0.89)  (-0.80)  (-1.19)  (-0.86)  (-1.18)  (-0.73) 
RET*BDDDN   -0.008           
   (-0.29)           
RET*INSTBDDDN     -0.032         
     (-0.40)         
RET*ACDDN       -0.023       
       (-1.06)       
RET*INSTACDDN         -0.020     
         (-0.34)     
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 OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage)  OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage)  OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage) 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
RET*HIDDN           -0.017   
           (-1.07)   
RET*INSTHIDDN             -0.012 
             (-0.25) 
RET*SIZE   0.006  0.007  0.008 *  0.007  0.008 *  0.007 
   (1.36)  (1.08)  (1.75)  (1.15)  (1.75)  (1.00) 
RET*LEV   0.004  0.008  0.005  0.008  0.004  0.008 
   (0.16)  (0.29)  (0.18)  (0.29)  (0.16)  (0.29) 
RET*MTB   -0.002 **  -0.002 **  -0.002 **  -0.002 **  -0.002 **  -0.002 ** 
   (-2.41)  (-2.24)  (-2.29)  (-2.18)  (-2.26)  (-2.11) 
DR*RET   1.006 ***  0.946 ***  1.043 ***  0.983 ***  1.033 ***  0.947 *** 
   (6.52)  (5.75)  (6.90)  (6.38)  (6.88)  (6.08) 
DR*RET*BDDDN +  0.160 **           
   (2.06)           
DR*RET*INSTBDDDN +    0.362 **         
     (1.97)         
DR*RET*ACDDN +      0.148 **       
       (2.38)       
DR*RET*INSTACDDN +        0.274 *     
         (1.95)     
DR*RET*HIDDN +          0.109 **   
           (2.52)   
DR*RET*INSTHIDDN +            0.251 ** 
             (2.12) 
DR*RET*SIZE −  -0.077 ***  -0.077 ***  -0.079 ***  -0.078 ***  -0.079 ***  -0.077 *** 
   (-6.19)  (-5.17)  (-6.54)  (-5.86)  (-6.53)  (-5.67) 
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 OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage)  OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage)  OLS  
2SLS 
(2nd Stage) 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*RET*LEV +  0.019  0.019  0.017  0.015  0.017  0.015 
   (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.44)  (0.41)  (0.43)  (0.38) 
DR*RET*MTB +  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.005 
   (1.12)  (1.42)  (0.98)  (1.08)  (1.03)  (1.24) 
Industry controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   6469  6469  6469  6469  6469  6469 
Adjusted R2   0.230  0.210  0.224  0.208  0.225  0.189 
The above table investigates nationality diversity on the board of directors (BD) and its audit committee (AC) in relation to financial reporting conservatism. 
Nationality Diversity is measured using the dissimilarity of director nationalities (BDDDN/ACDDN) =  1 − [ ∑ 𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)  ÷  𝑛 (𝑛 − 1)
𝐾
𝑖=1  ], where ni is the 
number of directors in the ith nationality on the BD/AC and n is BD/AC size. In addition, I proxy for the presence of high nationality diversity levels on both 
the board and its audit committee using an indicator (HIDDN) that equals one if both BDDDN and ACDDN in a given year are above their sample median for 
the same year, and zero otherwise. Conservatism is captured by the Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings. The dependent variable (EARN) is net 
income before extraordinary items, scaled by opening market value of equity. INSTBDDDN, INSTACDDN, and INSTHIDDN refer to instrumented BDDDN, 
ACDDN, and HIDDN, respectively. Other variables are defined in Table 1. Models (1) and (2) examine the relationship between board nationality diversity 
(BDDDN) and conservatism using OLS and 2SLS, respectively. Similarly, Models (3) and (4) investigate the relationship between audit committee nationality 
diversity (ACDDN) and conservatism using OLS and 2SLS, respectively. Lastly, Models (5) and (6) examine the relationship between the presence of high 
nationality diversity levels on both the board and its audit committee (HIDDN) and conservatism using OLS and 2SLS, respectively. Below coefficient estimates 
are robust t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009).  ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. Coefficients of industry and year controls are suppressed for brevity.
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Committee  Both 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Intercept   -0.097 ***  -0.093 ***  -0.093 *** 
   (-3.41)  (-3.26)  (-3.31) 
BDDDN   -0.030 **     
   (-2.13)     
ACDDN     -0.023 **   
     (-2.17)   
HIDDN       -0.018 ** 
       (-2.40) 
SIZE   0.007 ***  0.007 ***  0.007 *** 
   (3.32)  (3.09)  (3.20) 
LEV   -0.079 ***  -0.079 ***  -0.079 *** 
   (-3.00)  (-3.00)  (-2.99) 
MTB   -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
   (-1.25)  (-1.50)  (-1.48) 
DR   0.114 ***  0.119 ***  0.116 *** 
   (2.83)  (3.00)  (2.91) 
DR*BDDDN   0.027     
   (1.43)     
DR*ACDDN     0.046 ***   
     (2.88)   
DR*HIDDN       0.027 ** 
       (2.39) 
DR*SIZE   -0.011 ***  -0.011 ***  -0.011 *** 
   (-3.23)  (-3.53)  (-3.40) 
DR*LEV   0.008  0.009  0.008 
   (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.24) 
DR*MTB   0.003 **  0.003 ***  0.003 *** 
   (2.58)  (2.66)  (2.64) 
RET   0.036  0.052  0.054 
   (0.59)  (0.82)  (0.87) 
RET*BDDDN   -0.048     
   (-1.64)     
RET*ACDDN     -0.017   
     (-0.74)   
RET*HIDDN       -0.012 
       (-0.73) 
RET*SIZE   -0.005  -0.007  -0.007 
   (-0.92)  (-1.24)  (-1.29) 
RET*LEV   -0.073  -0.073  -0.074 
   (-1.45)  (-1.46)  (-1.46) 
RET*MTB   0.001 **  0.002 ***  0.002 *** 
   (2.28)  (2.70)  (2.70) 
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Committee  Both 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
DR*RET   0.393 ***  0.385 ***  0.373 ** 
   (2.70)  (2.61)  (2.52) 
DR*RET*BDDDN +  0.188 **     
   (2.47)     
DR*RET*ACDDN +    0.184 ***   
     (3.02)   
DR*RET*HIDDN +      0.119 *** 
       (2.68) 
DR*RET*SIZE −  -0.030 ***  -0.030 **  -0.028 ** 
   (-2.60)  (-2.49)  (-2.38) 
DR*RET*LEV +  0.070  0.069  0.069 
   (1.12)  (1.14)  (1.12) 
DR*RET*MTB +  0.004  0.004  0.004 
   (1.07)  (0.97)  (0.99) 
Industry controls   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   6469  6469  6469 
Adjusted R2   0.162  0.160  0.161 
The above table is a re-estimation of the OLS models in Table 6 using the accrual component of earnings 
(ACC) as the dependent variable. ACC is defined as net income before extraordinary items minus CFO, 
scaled by the lagged market value of equity. Models (1) to (3) examines the impacts on conservatism of 
board nationality diversity (BDDDN), audit committee nationality diversity (ACDDN), and the 
presence of high nationality diversity levels on the board and its audit committee (HIDDN), 
respectively. Other variables are defined in Table 1. Below coefficient estimates are robust t-statistics 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustered at the firm level 
(Petersen, 2009).  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
Coefficients of industry/year controls are suppressed for brevity.
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
Intercept   -0.045  -0.045  -0.023  -0.042  -0.020  -0.044 
   (-1.32)  (-1.42)  (-0.70)  (-1.35)  (-0.64)  (-1.42) 
BDDDN   -0.047 ***  -0.024         
   (-3.16)  (-1.59)         
ACDDN       -0.011  -0.015     
       (-1.02)  (-1.33)     
HIDDN           -0.006  -0.013 * 
           (-0.80)  (-1.72) 
SIZE   0.007 ***  0.003  0.005 **  0.003  0.004 *  0.003 
   (2.77)  (1.48)  (1.99)  (1.32)  (1.94)  (1.44) 
LEV   -0.003  -0.054 ***  -0.004  -0.056 ***  -0.004  -0.055 *** 
   (-0.23)  (-2.69)  (-0.27)  (-2.71)  (-0.27)  (-2.70) 
MTB   -0.001 **  -0.001  -0.001 **  -0.001  -0.001 **  -0.001 
   (-2.38)  (-0.95)  (-2.40)  (-1.15)  (-2.34)  (-1.11) 
DR   0.057  0.121 ***  0.050  0.123 ***  0.047  0.120 *** 
   (1.17)  (2.97)  (1.09)  (3.09)  (1.02)  (3.01) 
DR*BDDDN   0.035  0.037 *         
   (1.40)  (1.90)         
DR*ACDDN       0.021  0.045 ***     
       (1.08)  (2.97)     
DR*HIDDN           0.011  0.027 ** 
           (0.89)  (2.44) 
DR*SIZE   -0.006  -0.011 ***  -0.005  -0.011 ***  -0.005  -0.011 *** 
   (-1.51)  (-3.36)  (-1.45)  (-3.62)  (-1.36)  (-3.51) 
DR*LEV   -0.000  0.004  0.001  0.006  -0.000  0.005 
   (-0.02)  (0.15)  (0.04)  (0.23)  (-0.00)  (0.20) 
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*MTB   0.001  0.003 ***  0.001  0.003 ***  0.001  0.003 *** 
   (0.73)  (2.64)  (0.71)  (2.75)  (0.73)  (2.72) 
RET   -0.066  0.048  -0.079  0.060  -0.076  0.063 
   (-1.18)  (0.76)  (-1.39)  (0.93)  (-1.34)  (1.00) 
RET*BDDDN   0.000  -0.025         
   (0.00)  (-0.83)         
RET*ACDDN       -0.026  -0.024     
       (-1.19)  (-1.07)     
RET*HIDDN           -0.017  -0.015 
           (-1.07)  (-0.94) 
RET*SIZE   0.007  -0.005  0.008 *  -0.007  0.008 *  -0.007 
   (1.56)  (-1.01)  (1.84)  (-1.24)  (1.79)  (-1.33) 
RET*LEV   0.023  -0.060  0.024  -0.059  0.023  -0.060 
   (0.91)  (-1.30)  (0.92)  (-1.26)  (0.88)  (-1.27) 
RET*MTB   -0.001 **  0.001 **  -0.001 **  0.002 ***  -0.001 **  0.002 *** 
   (-2.50)  (2.08)  (-2.22)  (2.61)  (-2.21)  (2.61) 
DR*RET   1.011 ***  0.398 ***  1.047 ***  0.388 ***  1.035 ***  0.376 *** 
   (6.51)  (2.81)  (6.88)  (2.72)  (6.86)  (2.62) 
DR*RET*BDDDN +  0.149 **  0.173 **         
   (1.96)  (2.39)         
DR*RET*ACDDN +      0.156 **  0.202 ***     
       (2.49)  (3.36)     
DR*RET*HIDDN +          0.115 ***  0.129 *** 
           (2.64)  (2.97) 
DR*RET*SIZE −  -0.077 ***  -0.032 ***  -0.080 ***  -0.031 ***  -0.079 ***  -0.030 *** 
   (-6.17)  (-2.80)  (-6.52)  (-2.73)  (-6.50)  (-2.59) 
DR*RET*LEV +  0.008  0.069  0.006  0.067  0.005  0.067 
   (0.20)  (1.16)  (0.15)  (1.13)  (0.14)  (1.12) 
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 Board of Directors  Audit Committee  Both 
  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*RET*MTB +  0.003  0.005  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.005 
   (0.94)  (1.32)  (0.81)  (1.21)  (0.86)  (1.22) 
DS   -0.081 **  -0.107 ***  -0.078 **  -0.101 ***  -0.080 **  -0.101 *** 
   (-2.04)  (-3.38)  (-2.04)  (-3.46)  (-2.08)  (-3.45) 
DS*BDDDN   -0.012  0.017         
   (-0.63)  (0.91)         
DS*ACDDN       -0.015  -0.000     
       (-1.04)  (-0.02)     
DS*HIDDN           -0.010  0.004 
           (-1.05)  (0.39) 
DS*SIZE   0.006 *  0.006 **  0.006 *  0.006 ***  0.006 **  0.006 *** 
   (1.85)  (2.44)  (1.96)  (2.77)  (2.01)  (2.74) 
DS*LEV   -0.012  -0.010  -0.013  -0.013  -0.012  -0.012 
   (-1.00)  (-0.63)  (-1.02)  (-0.78)  (-0.99)  (-0.77) 
DS*MTB   -0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.001 
   (-0.12)  (1.30)  (-0.29)  (0.90)  (-0.38)  (0.83) 
∆SALES   0.017  -0.126  0.007  -0.123  -0.001  -0.122 
   (0.21)  (-1.44)  (0.09)  (-1.40)  (-0.01)  (-1.38) 
∆SALES*BDDDN   0.004  -0.061         
   (0.08)  (-1.12)         
∆SALES*ACDDN       0.002  -0.030     
       (0.05)  (-0.74)     
∆SALES*HIDDN           -0.008  -0.019 
           (-0.30)  (-0.68) 
∆SALES*SIZE   0.002  0.009  0.003  0.008  0.004  0.008 
   (0.30)  (1.27)  (0.48)  (1.20)  (0.61)  (1.17) 
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 Board of Directors  Audit Committee  Both 
  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
∆SALES*LEV   -0.018  -0.013  -0.019  -0.012  -0.017  -0.014 
   (-0.77)  (-0.39)  (-0.75)  (-0.34)  (-0.68)  (-0.38) 
∆SALES*MTB   -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 *  -0.003  -0.003 *  -0.003 
   (-1.61)  (-0.85)  (-1.74)  (-0.98)  (-1.70)  (-0.99) 
DS*∆SALES   -0.069  -0.152  -0.087  -0.153  -0.074  -0.155 
   (-0.34)  (-0.82)  (-0.43)  (-0.81)  (-0.37)  (-0.82) 
DS*∆SALES*BDDDN   0.200 *  0.308 ***         
   (1.86)  (2.80)         
DS*∆SALES*ACDDN       0.065  0.025     
       (0.81)  (0.28)     
DS*∆SALES*HIDDN           0.055  0.021 
           (1.09)  (0.35) 
DS*∆SALES*SIZE   -0.003  0.013  0.001  0.019  -0.000  0.019 
   (-0.20)  (0.81)  (0.07)  (1.20)  (-0.01)  (1.19) 
DS*∆SALES*LEV   0.143 ***  0.098 **  0.131 ***  0.077 *  0.131 ***  0.079 * 
   (4.58)  (2.27)  (4.11)  (1.70)  (4.09)  (1.74) 
DS*∆SALES*MTB   0.013 *  0.003  0.011  0.001  0.011  0.001 
   (1.85)  (0.38)  (1.48)  (0.10)  (1.50)  (0.11) 
Industry controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   6469  6469  6469  6469  6469  6469 
Adjusted R2   0.267  0.195  0.258  0.190  0.259  0.190 
In the above table, all models are OLS estimations of Eq. (3). Model 1 (Model 2) investigates the impact of board nationality diversity, BDDDN, on conservatism 
using EARN (ACC) as the dependent variable. I re-estimate the first two models in Models 3 and 4 and Models 5 and 6 after replacing BDDDN with audit 
committee nationality diversity (ACDDN) and an indicator for the presence of high nationality diversity levels on the board and its audit committee (HIDDN), 
respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1. Below coefficient estimates are robust t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White, 1980) and clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009).  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. Coefficients 
of industry and year controls are suppressed for brevity.
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
Intercept   -0.018  -0.034  -0.003  -0.038  0.000  -0.038 
   (-0.48)  (-1.02)  (-0.09)  (-1.14)  (0.01)  (-1.15) 
BDDDN   -0.042 ***  -0.016         
   (-3.00)  (-1.18)         
ACDDN       -0.006  -0.011     
       (-0.58)  (-1.02)     
HIDDN           -0.003  -0.011 
           (-0.38)  (-1.49) 
SIZE   0.008 ***  0.003  0.005 **  0.003  0.005 **  0.003 
   (2.95)  (1.39)  (2.18)  (1.28)  (2.12)  (1.40) 
LEV   -0.003  -0.056 ***  -0.006  -0.059 ***  -0.006  -0.059 *** 
   (-0.19)  (-2.63)  (-0.35)  (-2.69)  (-0.34)  (-2.66) 
MTB   -0.001 ***  -0.000  -0.001 ***  -0.000  -0.001 ***  -0.000 
   (-2.71)  (-0.45)  (-2.61)  (-0.51)  (-2.60)  (-0.51) 
DR   0.093 *  0.139 ***  0.092 *  0.146 ***  0.088 *  0.143 *** 
   (1.80)  (3.04)  (1.86)  (3.25)  (1.77)  (3.17) 
DR*BDDDN   0.027  0.025         
   (1.13)  (1.29)         
DR*ACDDN       0.013  0.041 **     
       (0.68)  (2.56)     
DR*HIDDN           0.007  0.024 ** 
           (0.58)  (2.13) 
DR*SIZE   -0.007 *  -0.012 ***  -0.007 *  -0.013 ***  -0.006 *  -0.012 *** 
   (-1.85)  (-3.53)  (-1.81)  (-3.90)  (-1.75)  (-3.79) 
DR*LEV   0.000  0.000  0.003  0.004  0.002  0.003 
   (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*MTB   0.001  0.002 **  0.001  0.002 **  0.001  0.002 ** 
   (0.87)  (2.28)  (0.84)  (2.36)  (0.88)  (2.36) 
RET   -0.078  0.078  -0.075  0.099  -0.075  0.100 
   (-1.23)  (1.19)  (-1.16)  (1.49)  (-1.16)  (1.52) 
RET*BDDDN   -0.016  -0.050 **         
   (-0.67)  (-2.02)         
RET*ACDDN       -0.039 *  -0.037 *     
       (-1.86)  (-1.82)     
RET*HIDDN           -0.026 *  -0.024 * 
           (-1.80)  (-1.73) 
RET*SIZE   0.002  -0.007  0.003  -0.008 *  0.003  -0.009 * 
   (0.45)  (-1.35)  (0.63)  (-1.67)  (0.59)  (-1.75) 
RET*LEV   0.013  -0.049  0.016  -0.047  0.015  -0.048 
   (0.47)  (-1.03)  (0.57)  (-0.96)  (0.53)  (-0.98) 
RET*MTB   -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001 
   (-0.87)  (1.25)  (-0.84)  (1.46)  (-0.78)  (1.54) 
DR*RET   1.080 ***  0.562 ***  1.114 ***  0.551 ***  1.099 ***  0.535 *** 
   (6.30)  (3.47)  (6.62)  (3.37)  (6.56)  (3.25) 
DR*RET*BDDDN +  0.106  0.160 **         
   (1.40)  (2.18)         
DR*RET*ACDDN +      0.133 **  0.206 ***     
       (2.16)  (3.27)     
DR*RET*HIDDN +          0.105 **  0.132 *** 
           (2.44)  (2.94) 
DR*RET*SIZE −  -0.073 ***  -0.035 ***  -0.076 ***  -0.035 ***  -0.076 ***  -0.033 *** 
   (-5.82)  (-3.02)  (-6.14)  (-3.03)  (-6.16)  (-2.91) 
DR*RET*LEV +  0.025  0.045  0.021  0.042  0.022  0.043 
   (0.62)  (0.74)  (0.53)  (0.70)  (0.53)  (0.71) 
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*RET*MTB +  0.002  0.005  0.002  0.005  0.002  0.005 
   (0.65)  (1.62)  (0.57)  (1.61)  (0.63)  (1.60) 
DS   -0.089 **  -0.109 ***  -0.083 **  -0.103 ***  -0.085 **  -0.103 *** 
   (-2.26)  (-3.40)  (-2.18)  (-3.47)  (-2.22)  (-3.45) 
DS*BDDDN   -0.011  0.015         
   (-0.60)  (0.84)         
DS*ACDDN       -0.012  0.000     
       (-0.83)  (0.01)     
DS*HIDDN           -0.009  0.004 
           (-0.96)  (0.44) 
DS*SIZE   0.006 **  0.006 **  0.006 **  0.006 ***  0.006 **  0.006 *** 
   (2.07)  (2.47)  (2.10)  (2.79)  (2.16)  (2.74) 
DS*LEV   -0.005  -0.007  -0.006  -0.009  -0.005  -0.009 
   (-0.42)  (-0.46)  (-0.46)  (-0.60)  (-0.43)  (-0.60) 
DS*MTB   -0.000  0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.000 
   (-0.46)  (1.05)  (-0.67)  (0.68)  (-0.74)  (0.62) 
∆SALES   -0.008  -0.141  -0.019  -0.137  -0.028  -0.135 
   (-0.10)  (-1.59)  (-0.26)  (-1.55)  (-0.38)  (-1.52) 
∆SALES*BDDDN   0.004  -0.062         
   (0.08)  (-1.17)         
∆SALES*ACDDN       0.000  -0.031     
       (0.01)  (-0.76)     
∆SALES*HIDDN           -0.010  -0.018 
           (-0.41)  (-0.65) 
∆SALES*SIZE   0.004  0.010  0.005  0.010  0.006  0.009 
   (0.58)  (1.44)  (0.81)  (1.37)  (0.96)  (1.33) 
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
∆SALES*LEV   -0.013  -0.014  -0.014  -0.012  -0.012  -0.014 
   (-0.55)  (-0.41)  (-0.54)  (-0.35)  (-0.46)  (-0.40) 
∆SALES*MTB   -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 *  -0.003  -0.003 *  -0.003 
   (-1.53)  (-0.82)  (-1.71)  (-0.99)  (-1.67)  (-1.02) 
DS*∆SALES   -0.123  -0.164  -0.133  -0.158  -0.119  -0.161 
   (-0.62)  (-0.87)  (-0.65)  (-0.83)  (-0.58)  (-0.84) 
DS*∆SALES*BDDDN   0.253 **  0.326 ***         
   (2.47)  (2.91)         
DS*∆SALES*ACDDN       0.077  0.035     
       (0.95)  (0.39)     
DS*∆SALES*HIDDN           0.064  0.027 
           (1.26)  (0.44) 
DS*∆SALES*SIZE   0.001  0.013  0.006  0.019  0.004  0.019 
   (0.06)  (0.83)  (0.36)  (1.18)  (0.26)  (1.17) 
DS*∆SALES*LEV   0.141 ***  0.103 **  0.127 ***  0.081 *  0.125 ***  0.083 * 
   (4.50)  (2.42)  (3.94)  (1.82)  (3.90)  (1.87) 
DS*∆SALES*MTB   0.012 *  0.003  0.010  0.001  0.010  0.001 
   (1.68)  (0.36)  (1.26)  (0.09)  (1.28)  (0.11) 
Industry controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Interactions of industry 
/year controls with DR, 
RET, and DR*RET   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   6469  6469  6469  6469  6469  6469 
Adjusted R2   0.297  0.206  0.287  0.200  0.289  0.201 
The above table is a re-estimation of the models in Table 8 after adding interactions of industry and year controls with the fundamental terms in the Basu model: 
DR, RET, and DR*RET. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.  ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. Coefficients involving industry or year controls are suppressed for brevity.
243 
 




 Board of Directors  Audit Committee  Both 
  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
Intercept   -0.014  -0.349 ***  -0.018  -0.359 ***  -0.021  -0.362 *** 
   (-0.22)  (-4.68)  (-0.29)  (-4.85)  (-0.32)  (-4.89) 
BDDDN   -0.010  0.002         
   (-0.69)  (0.14)         
ACDDN       0.017  0.002     
       (1.54)  (0.18)     
HIDDN           0.011  -0.002 
           (1.56)  (-0.23) 
SIZE   0.008  0.029 ***  0.007  0.030 ***  0.008  0.030 *** 
   (1.51)  (5.08)  (1.49)  (5.23)  (1.55)  (5.31) 
LEV   -0.046 **  -0.086 ***  -0.048 **  -0.089 ***  -0.048 **  -0.089 *** 
   (-2.01)  (-3.60)  (-2.09)  (-3.63)  (-2.07)  (-3.62) 
MTB   -0.001 **  -0.001  -0.001 **  -0.001  -0.001 **  -0.001 
   (-2.10)  (-1.01)  (-2.13)  (-1.06)  (-2.13)  (-1.04) 
DR   0.043  0.135 ***  0.042  0.137 ***  0.041  0.136 *** 
   (0.98)  (3.06)  (0.99)  (3.18)  (0.98)  (3.16) 
DR*BDDDN   0.003  0.025         
   (0.17)  (1.33)         
DR*ACDDN       -0.007  0.026 *     
       (-0.42)  (1.75)     
DR*HIDDN           -0.005  0.015 
           (-0.42)  (1.43) 
DR*SIZE   -0.004  -0.010 ***  -0.004  -0.010 ***  -0.004  -0.010 *** 
   (-1.29)  (-3.08)  (-1.27)  (-3.29)  (-1.26)  (-3.23) 
DR*LEV   0.019  0.025  0.021  0.028  0.020  0.027 
   (0.85)  (0.99)  (0.93)  (1.05)  (0.88)  (1.02) 
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*MTB   0.002 *  0.002 **  0.002 *  0.002 **  0.002 *  0.002 ** 
   (1.78)  (2.17)  (1.87)  (2.19)  (1.89)  (2.19) 
RET   0.016  -0.023  0.024  -0.001  0.028  0.004 
   (0.32)  (-0.39)  (0.47)  (-0.02)  (0.55)  (0.07) 
RET*BDDDN   -0.038  -0.035         
   (-1.56)  (-1.21)         
RET*ACDDN       -0.054 ***  -0.031     
       (-2.67)  (-1.47)     
RET*HIDDN           -0.031 **  -0.014 
           (-2.19)  (-0.97) 
RET*SIZE   0.000  0.000  0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.002 
   (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.13)  (-0.30)  (-0.01)  (-0.45) 
RET*LEV   0.035  -0.023  0.038  -0.021  0.037  -0.022 
   (1.33)  (-0.51)  (1.43)  (-0.45)  (1.36)  (-0.47) 
RET*MTB   -0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.001 
   (-0.86)  (1.16)  (-0.58)  (1.50)  (-0.56)  (1.50) 
DR*RET   0.166  0.503 ***  0.153  0.466 ***  0.142  0.447 *** 
   (0.96)  (3.19)  (0.90)  (2.95)  (0.83)  (2.82) 
DR*RET*BDDDN +  0.092  0.187 **         
   (1.12)  (2.31)         
DR*RET*ACDDN +      0.127 **  0.200 ***     
       (2.01)  (3.37)     
DR*RET*HIDDN +          0.089 **  0.114 *** 
           (2.03)  (2.69) 
DR*RET*SIZE −  -0.019  -0.034 ***  -0.019  -0.032 ***  -0.018  -0.030 *** 
   (-1.41)  (-3.04)  (-1.49)  (-2.90)  (-1.44)  (-2.74) 
DR*RET*LEV +  0.002  0.029  -0.001  0.025  -0.000  0.026 
   (0.06)  (0.50)  (-0.03)  (0.44)  (-0.01)  (0.44) 
245 
 




 Board of Directors  Audit Committee  Both 
  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*RET*MTB +  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.007 
   (1.20)  (1.59)  (1.22)  (1.56)  (1.24)  (1.55) 
DS   -0.067 *  -0.101 ***  -0.062 *  -0.098 ***  -0.063 *  -0.099 *** 
   (-1.92)  (-3.22)  (-1.83)  (-3.31)  (-1.85)  (-3.34) 
DS*BDDDN   -0.013  0.018         
   (-0.71)  (1.01)         
DS*ACDDN       -0.011  0.007     
       (-0.81)  (0.51)     
DS*HIDDN           -0.007  0.006 
           (-0.73)  (0.65) 
DS*SIZE   0.005  0.007 ***  0.004 *  0.007 ***  0.004 *  0.007 *** 
   (1.61)  (2.67)  (1.65)  (3.04)  (1.66)  (3.06) 
DS*LEV   -0.003  -0.016  -0.003  -0.017  -0.003  -0.017 
   (-0.20)  (-1.14)  (-0.25)  (-1.25)  (-0.22)  (-1.24) 
DS*MTB   0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.57)  (0.46)  (0.27)  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.19) 
∆SALES   0.019  -0.081  0.006  -0.088  -0.002  -0.089 
   (0.23)  (-0.91)  (0.08)  (-1.01)  (-0.02)  (-1.01) 
∆SALES*BDDDN   -0.003  -0.040         
   (-0.05)  (-0.68)         
∆SALES*ACDDN       -0.009  -0.026     
       (-0.25)  (-0.60)     
∆SALES*HIDDN           -0.016  -0.019 
           (-0.65)  (-0.65) 
∆SALES*SIZE   0.001  0.005  0.002  0.006  0.003  0.006 
   (0.16)  (0.76)  (0.33)  (0.84)  (0.46)  (0.85) 
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
∆SALES*LEV   -0.017  -0.032  -0.017  -0.029  -0.015  -0.030 
   (-0.62)  (-0.95)  (-0.62)  (-0.82)  (-0.54)  (-0.87) 
∆SALES*MTB   -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003 
   (-0.87)  (-0.84)  (-0.96)  (-0.91)  (-0.93)  (-0.91) 
DS*∆SALES   -0.082  -0.213  -0.095  -0.200  -0.085  -0.199 
   (-0.39)  (-1.08)  (-0.43)  (-0.97)  (-0.38)  (-0.96) 
DS*∆SALES*BDDDN   0.245 **  0.259 **         
   (2.29)  (2.29)         
DS*∆SALES*ACDDN       0.097  0.051     
       (1.14)  (0.57)     
DS*∆SALES*HIDDN           0.082  0.042 
           (1.53)  (0.70) 
DS*∆SALES*SIZE   -0.001  0.020  0.004  0.024  0.003  0.023 
   (-0.06)  (1.22)  (0.23)  (1.41)  (0.15)  (1.37) 
DS*∆SALES*LEV   0.137 ***  0.110 **  0.124 ***  0.092 *  0.121 ***  0.094 * 
   (3.53)  (2.08)  (3.21)  (1.68)  (3.20)  (1.76) 
DS*∆SALES*MTB   0.011  -0.001  0.008  -0.003  0.008  -0.003 
   (1.50)  (-0.19)  (1.06)  (-0.44)  (1.08)  (-0.43) 
Firm fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Interactions of year 
controls with DR, RET, 
and DR*RET   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   6469  6469  6469  6469  6469  6469 
Adjusted R2   0.181  0.208  0.176  0.206  0.177  0.205 
In the above table, I run the models from Table 8 after replacing industry controls with firm-specific fixed effects. The models still include year controls and 
their interactions with DR, RET, and DR*RET. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm 
level.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. Coefficients involving firm/year controls are suppressed for brevity.
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
Intercept   -0.103 **  -0.076 *  -0.094 **  -0.076 *  -0.093 **  -0.075 * 
   (-2.42)  (-1.91)  (-2.24)  (-1.92)  (-2.21)  (-1.90) 
BDDDN   -0.036 **  -0.016         
   (-2.41)  (-1.11)         
ACDDN       -0.005  -0.011     
       (-0.49)  (-0.93)     
HIDDN           -0.001  -0.009 
           (-0.15)  (-1.15) 
SIZE   0.007 ***  0.004  0.006 **  0.004  0.006 **  0.004 
   (2.80)  (1.46)  (2.26)  (1.42)  (2.24)  (1.45) 
LEV   0.002  -0.052 **  0.003  -0.054 **  0.002  -0.054 ** 
   (0.15)  (-2.47)  (0.16)  (-2.52)  (0.15)  (-2.52) 
MTB   -0.001 **  -0.000  -0.001 **  -0.000  -0.001 **  -0.000 
   (-2.27)  (-0.54)  (-2.38)  (-0.64)  (-2.33)  (-0.60) 
BDEXD   0.067 **  0.011  0.075 ***  0.012  0.075 ***  0.009 
   (2.26)  (0.37)  (2.61)  (0.37)  (2.60)  (0.29) 
BDEXOWN   0.003 **  0.002  0.003 **  0.002  0.003 **  0.002 
   (2.05)  (1.09)  (2.32)  (1.10)  (2.30)  (1.07) 
BDFEM   0.003  -0.017  0.003  -0.017  0.002  -0.018 
   (0.08)  (-0.52)  (0.09)  (-0.54)  (0.05)  (-0.56) 
STROFAU   0.007  -0.019 *  0.003  -0.021 **  0.002  -0.021 ** 
   (0.69)  (-1.83)  (0.25)  (-2.11)  (0.17)  (-2.10) 
DR   0.072  0.125 **  0.069  0.124 **  0.068  0.123 ** 
   (1.18)  (2.54)  (1.11)  (2.54)  (1.12)  (2.50) 
DR*BDDDN   0.027  0.038 *         
   (1.11)  (1.96)         
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*ACDDN       0.014  0.045 ***     
       (0.77)  (2.84)     
DR*HIDDN           0.006  0.027 ** 
           (0.51)  (2.39) 
DR*SIZE   -0.004  -0.012 ***  -0.003  -0.013 ***  -0.003  -0.012 *** 
   (-0.97)  (-3.49)  (-0.88)  (-3.67)  (-0.85)  (-3.61) 
DR*LEV   -0.003  0.010  -0.002  0.012  -0.003  0.011 
   (-0.17)  (0.37)  (-0.11)  (0.44)  (-0.15)  (0.41) 
DR*MTB   0.001  0.002 **  0.001  0.002 **  0.001  0.002 ** 
   (0.85)  (2.29)  (0.88)  (2.37)  (0.88)  (2.34) 
DR*BDEXD   -0.037  0.005  -0.036  0.011  -0.038  0.009 
   (-0.88)  (0.12)  (-0.84)  (0.25)  (-0.89)  (0.20) 
DR*BDEXOWN   -0.003  0.001  -0.003 *  0.001  -0.003 *  0.001 
   (-1.58)  (0.33)  (-1.69)  (0.32)  (-1.68)  (0.33) 
DR*BDFEM   -0.024  0.044  -0.027  0.045  -0.024  0.048 
   (-0.55)  (1.03)  (-0.60)  (1.05)  (-0.53)  (1.13) 
DR*STROFAU   -0.008  0.004  -0.005  0.004  -0.004  0.004 
   (-0.58)  (0.25)  (-0.33)  (0.28)  (-0.29)  (0.25) 
RET   0.009  0.013  0.000  0.015  0.004  0.017 
   (0.15)  (0.19)  (0.01)  (0.21)  (0.06)  (0.24) 
RET*BDDDN   -0.021  -0.020         
   (-0.71)  (-0.65)         
RET*ACDDN       -0.039 *  -0.018     
       (-1.86)  (-0.78)     
RET*HIDDN           -0.027 *  -0.012 
           (-1.66)  (-0.74) 
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
RET*SIZE   0.009 **  -0.004  0.010 **  -0.005  0.010 **  -0.005 
   (2.08)  (-0.74)  (2.32)  (-0.90)  (2.27)  (-0.95) 
RET*LEV   0.011  -0.053  0.012  -0.052  0.011  -0.053 
   (0.41)  (-1.12)  (0.44)  (-1.10)  (0.41)  (-1.11) 
RET*MTB   -0.002 ***  0.001  -0.002 ***  0.001  -0.002 ***  0.001 
   (-3.08)  (1.27)  (-2.84)  (1.60)  (-2.84)  (1.59) 
RET*BDEXD   -0.124 **  0.080  -0.119 **  0.094 *  -0.117 **  0.095 * 
   (-2.43)  (1.53)  (-2.49)  (1.73)  (-2.44)  (1.78) 
RET*BDEXOWN   -0.005 ***  -0.002  -0.005 ***  -0.002  -0.006 ***  -0.003 
   (-2.61)  (-0.75)  (-3.03)  (-0.83)  (-3.00)  (-0.85) 
RET*BDFEM   -0.055  -0.057  -0.054  -0.049  -0.051  -0.047 
   (-0.62)  (-0.81)  (-0.62)  (-0.70)  (-0.58)  (-0.66) 
RET*STROFAU   -0.036  0.022  -0.034  0.021  -0.032  0.022 
   (-1.43)  (0.94)  (-1.43)  (0.95)  (-1.35)  (1.00) 
DR*RET   0.973 ***  0.432 **  0.992 ***  0.419 **  0.978 ***  0.411 ** 
   (4.96)  (2.50)  (5.12)  (2.39)  (5.08)  (2.33) 
DR*RET*BDDDN +  0.136 *  0.168 **         
   (1.81)  (2.23)         
DR*RET*ACDDN +      0.144 **  0.195 ***     
       (2.33)  (3.10)     
DR*RET*HIDDN +          0.107 **  0.129 *** 
           (2.48)  (2.80) 
DR*RET*SIZE −  -0.066 ***  -0.032 ***  -0.068 ***  -0.031 ***  -0.067 ***  -0.031 ** 
   (-5.10)  (-2.73)  (-5.28)  (-2.61)  (-5.24)  (-2.53) 
DR*RET*LEV +  0.022  0.067  0.021  0.066  0.020  0.066 
   (0.54)  (1.10)  (0.53)  (1.09)  (0.51)  (1.08) 
DR*RET*MTB +  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.006  0.005  0.006 
   (1.47)  (1.52)  (1.37)  (1.46)  (1.40)  (1.48) 
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*RET*BDEXD −  -0.053  -0.086  -0.048  -0.084  -0.041  -0.086 
   (-0.36)  (-0.52)  (-0.31)  (-0.49)  (-0.27)  (-0.50) 
DR*RET*BDEXOWN −  -0.013 **  -0.002  -0.012 **  -0.002  -0.012 *  -0.002 
   (-2.03)  (-0.21)  (-1.98)  (-0.20)  (-1.96)  (-0.21) 
DR*RET*BDFEM +  -0.103  0.212  -0.133  0.184  -0.125  0.192 
   (-0.57)  (1.25)  (-0.72)  (1.11)  (-0.68)  (1.16) 
DR*RET*STROFAU −  0.016  -0.039  0.022  -0.039  0.016  -0.043 
   (0.26)  (-0.65)  (0.36)  (-0.64)  (0.26)  (-0.70) 
DS   -0.072  -0.102 **  -0.068  -0.094 **  -0.068  -0.095 ** 
   (-1.49)  (-2.49)  (-1.40)  (-2.36)  (-1.39)  (-2.37) 
DS*BDDDN   -0.011  0.014         
   (-0.58)  (0.71)         
DS*ACDDN       -0.009  -0.000     
       (-0.63)  (-0.02)     
DS*HIDDN           -0.006  0.003 
           (-0.62)  (0.35) 
DS*SIZE   0.005 *  0.006 **  0.005 *  0.006 **  0.005 *  0.006 ** 
   (1.70)  (2.09)  (1.74)  (2.19)  (1.74)  (2.16) 
DS*LEV   -0.011  -0.015  -0.011  -0.016  -0.011  -0.016 
   (-0.94)  (-0.91)  (-0.95)  (-1.00)  (-0.92)  (-0.99) 
DS*MTB   0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.001 
   (0.19)  (1.54)  (-0.00)  (1.14)  (-0.06)  (1.08) 
DS*BDEXD   -0.003  0.010  -0.004  0.008  -0.005  0.009 
   (-0.07)  (0.24)  (-0.09)  (0.19)  (-0.13)  (0.22) 
DS*BDEXOWN   -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
   (-0.11)  (-0.43)  (-0.31)  (-0.47)  (-0.26)  (-0.45) 
DS*BDFEM   -0.002  0.029  0.004  0.040  0.003  0.040 
   (-0.05)  (0.79)  (0.10)  (1.10)  (0.09)  (1.09) 
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DS*STROFAU   -0.004  0.006  -0.003  0.012  -0.002  0.011 
   (-0.33)  (0.52)  (-0.23)  (1.02)  (-0.18)  (0.96) 
∆SALES   0.020  -0.201 *  0.018  -0.191 *  0.015  -0.192 * 
   (0.19)  (-1.86)  (0.18)  (-1.78)  (0.14)  (-1.79) 
∆SALES*BDDDN   0.037  -0.086 *         
   (0.69)  (-1.77)         
∆SALES*ACDDN       0.027  -0.049     
       (0.88)  (-1.35)     
∆SALES*HIDDN           0.010  -0.036 
           (0.44)  (-1.36) 
∆SALES*SIZE   -0.002  0.009  -0.001  0.007  -0.000  0.008 
   (-0.24)  (1.12)  (-0.13)  (0.97)  (-0.04)  (1.00) 
∆SALES*LEV   -0.011  -0.028  -0.013  -0.025  -0.012  -0.026 
   (-0.43)  (-0.90)  (-0.51)  (-0.74)  (-0.46)  (-0.79) 
∆SALES*MTB   -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
   (-1.11)  (-0.82)  (-1.26)  (-0.95)  (-1.23)  (-0.93) 
∆SALES*BDEXD   0.007  0.126  -0.004  0.118  -0.007  0.116 
   (0.09)  (1.24)  (-0.04)  (1.14)  (-0.08)  (1.13) 
∆SALES*BDEXOWN   0.004  0.002  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.003 
   (1.21)  (0.43)  (1.19)  (0.56)  (1.16)  (0.55) 
∆SALES*BDFEM   0.053  0.082  0.056  0.081  0.058  0.079 
   (0.61)  (0.79)  (0.64)  (0.79)  (0.66)  (0.76) 
∆SALES*STROFAU   -0.059  0.109 ***  -0.059  0.105 ***  -0.054  0.111 *** 
   (-1.31)  (3.64)  (-1.34)  (3.26)  (-1.21)  (3.44) 
DS*∆SALES   0.027  0.020  0.001  0.016  0.011  0.017 
   (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.08) 
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  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC  EARN  ACC 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DS*∆SALES*BDDDN   0.147  0.318 ***         
   (1.42)  (2.84)         
DS*∆SALES*ACDDN       0.052  0.038     
       (0.73)  (0.48)     
DS*∆SALES*HIDDN           0.041  0.032 
           (0.88)  (0.59) 
DS*∆SALES*SIZE   0.003  0.011  0.010  0.018  0.008  0.017 
   (0.22)  (0.61)  (0.62)  (1.03)  (0.52)  (1.01) 
DS*∆SALES*LEV   0.136 ***  0.112 ***  0.131 ***  0.092 **  0.130 ***  0.094 ** 
   (4.21)  (2.83)  (4.01)  (2.19)  (3.99)  (2.24) 
DS*∆SALES*MTB   0.011  0.003  0.009  0.000  0.009  0.000 
   (1.63)  (0.36)  (1.28)  (0.06)  (1.31)  (0.06) 
DS*∆SALES*BDEXD   -0.119  -0.205  -0.128  -0.201  -0.125  -0.200 
   (-0.53)  (-0.95)  (-0.56)  (-0.96)  (-0.55)  (-0.96) 
DS*∆SALES*BDEXOWN   -0.021 ***  -0.009  -0.025 ***  -0.012  -0.024 ***  -0.012 
   (-2.59)  (-0.82)  (-2.96)  (-1.22)  (-2.86)  (-1.22) 
DS*∆SALES*BDFEM   -0.014  -0.122  0.044  -0.028  0.049  -0.028 
   (-0.06)  (-0.55)  (0.17)  (-0.13)  (0.19)  (-0.13) 
DS*∆SALES*STROFAU   0.093  -0.065  0.107  0.000  0.098  -0.007 
   (1.07)  (-0.72)  (1.33)  (0.00)  (1.22)  (-0.08) 
Industry controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   6469  6469  6469  6469  6469  6469 
Adjusted R2   0.283  0.204  0.278  0.200  0.278  0.200 
The above table incorporates controls for the proportion of executive directors (BDEXD), executives’ ownership (BDEXOWN), the proportion of female directors 
(BDFEM), and an indicator for the presence of strong cultural faultlines on the board (STROFAU). All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. Coefficients 




Table A1 – Adjusting for Depreciation 
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  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
Intercept   -0.001  0.029  0.001  0.030  -0.001  0.027 
   (-0.03)  (1.01)  (0.05)  (1.08)  (-0.05)  (0.98) 
BDDDN   -0.015  -0.015         
   (-1.39)  (-1.25)         
ACDDN       -0.012  -0.009     
       (-1.41)  (-1.02)     
HIDDN           -0.011 *  -0.010 * 
           (-1.93)  (-1.68) 
SIZE   0.002  -0.000  0.002  -0.001  0.002  -0.000 
   (1.04)  (-0.18)  (0.95)  (-0.28)  (1.12)  (-0.09) 
LEV   -0.007  0.016  -0.007  0.015  -0.006  0.015 
   (-0.33)  (1.01)  (-0.34)  (0.91)  (-0.33)  (0.93) 
MTB   -0.001 ***  -0.001 **  -0.001 ***  -0.001 ***  -0.001 ***  -0.001 *** 
   (-3.72)  (-2.58)  (-3.93)  (-2.81)  (-3.92)  (-2.78) 
DR   0.095 **  0.102 ***  0.100 ***  0.106 ***  0.097 ***  0.104 *** 
   (2.57)  (2.70)  (2.76)  (2.89)  (2.68)  (2.82) 
DR*BDDDN   0.024  0.030 *         
   (1.43)  (1.80)         
DR*ACDDN       0.037 ***  0.038 ***     
       (2.75)  (2.91)     
DR*HIDDN           0.020 **  0.020 ** 
           (2.08)  (2.16) 
DR*SIZE   -0.009 ***  -0.009 ***  -0.009 ***  -0.010 ***  -0.009 ***  -0.009 *** 
   (-2.88)  (-3.01)  (-3.20)  (-3.35)  (-3.07)  (-3.22) 
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  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*LEV   -0.003  -0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.003  -0.002 
   (-0.11)  (-0.17)  (-0.08)  (-0.04)  (-0.11)  (-0.08) 
DR*MTB   0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 *** 
   (2.81)  (2.69)  (2.87)  (2.79)  (2.85)  (2.77) 
RET   0.052  0.052  0.065  0.065  0.070  0.071 
   (0.96)  (0.94)  (1.18)  (1.18)  (1.30)  (1.31) 
RET*BDDDN   -0.041 *  -0.027         
   (-1.91)  (-1.18)         
RET*ACDDN       -0.017  -0.021     
       (-0.93)  (-1.25)     
RET*HIDDN           -0.008  -0.010 
           (-0.64)  (-0.87) 
RET*SIZE   -0.004  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006 
   (-0.83)  (-0.80)  (-1.16)  (-1.13)  (-1.30)  (-1.29) 
RET*LEV   -0.042  -0.027  -0.042  -0.026  -0.043  -0.027 
   (-1.39)  (-0.98)  (-1.40)  (-0.92)  (-1.42)  (-0.95) 
RET*MTB   0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
   (1.07)  (0.94)  (1.52)  (1.56)  (1.53)  (1.58) 
DR*RET   0.406 ***  0.421 ***  0.396 ***  0.409 ***  0.382 ***  0.394 *** 
   (3.10)  (3.25)  (3.02)  (3.16)  (2.89)  (3.03) 
DR*RET*BDDDN +  0.193 ***  0.181 ***         
   (3.05)  (2.88)         
DR*RET*ACDDN +      0.174 ***  0.187 ***     
       (3.44)  (3.69)     
DR*RET*HIDDN +          0.099 ***  0.107 *** 
           (2.69)  (2.91) 
DR*RET*SIZE −  -0.033 ***  -0.034 ***  -0.031 ***  -0.033 ***  -0.030 ***  -0.031 *** 
   (-3.10)  (-3.30)  (-2.97)  (-3.20)  (-2.77)  (-2.99) 
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  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*RET*LEV +  0.094 **  0.088 **  0.094 **  0.087 **  0.093 **  0.087 ** 
   (2.33)  (2.13)  (2.34)  (2.10)  (2.31)  (2.09) 
DR*RET*MTB +  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.004 
   (1.07)  (1.18)  (0.95)  (1.05)  (0.96)  (1.06) 
DS     -0.082 ***    -0.079 ***    -0.079 *** 
     (-2.82)    (-2.86)    (-2.87) 
DS*BDDDN     0.018         
     (1.09)         
DS*ACDDN         0.002     
         (0.20)     
DS*HIDDN             0.005 
             (0.63) 
DS*SIZE     0.005 **    0.005 **    0.005 ** 
     (2.23)    (2.57)    (2.54) 
DS*LEV     -0.021 **    -0.024 **    -0.024 ** 
     (-2.00)    (-2.19)    (-2.18) 
DS*MTB     0.001    0.001    0.001 
     (1.06)    (0.70)    (0.65) 
∆SALES     -0.074    -0.079    -0.076 
     (-1.01)    (-1.10)    (-1.05) 
∆SALES*BDDDN     -0.003         
     (-0.08)         
∆SALES*ACDDN         0.002     
         (0.06)     
∆SALES*HIDDN             0.005 
             (0.21) 
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  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
∆SALES*SIZE     0.006    0.006    0.006 
     (1.04)    (1.16)    (1.11) 
∆SALES*LEV     -0.011    -0.011    -0.012 
     (-0.44)    (-0.42)    (-0.47) 
∆SALES*MTB     -0.002    -0.002    -0.002 
     (-0.86)    (-0.97)    (-0.97) 
DS*∆SALES     -0.169    -0.176    -0.182 
     (-1.09)    (-1.11)    (-1.14) 
DS*∆SALES*BDDDN     0.236 ***         
     (2.59)         
DS*∆SALES*ACDDN         0.018     
         (0.25)     
DS*∆SALES*HIDDN             0.016 
             (0.33) 
DS*∆SALES*SIZE     0.010    0.016    0.016 
     (0.78)    (1.22)    (1.22) 
DS*∆SALES*LEV     0.099 ***    0.082 **    0.084 ** 
     (3.06)    (2.38)    (2.45) 
DS*∆SALES*MTB     0.004    0.003    0.003 
     (0.81)    (0.41)    (0.44) 
Industry controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   6466  6466  6466  6466  6466  6466 
Adjusted R2   0.084  0.115  0.083  0.109  0.083  0.109 
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  OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
Intercept   0.051 *  -0.110 *  0.047  -0.120 **  0.046  -0.123 ** 
   (1.68)  (-1.94)  (1.59)  (-2.12)  (1.58)  (-2.17) 
BDDDN   -0.011  0.002         
   (-0.98)  (0.15)         
ACDDN       -0.007  -0.003     
       (-0.81)  (-0.32)     
HIDDN           -0.009  -0.006 
           (-1.54)  (-0.86) 
SIZE   -0.000  0.012 ***  -0.001  0.013 ***  -0.000  0.014 *** 
   (-0.23)  (2.84)  (-0.34)  (3.03)  (-0.17)  (3.12) 
LEV   0.017  -0.027  0.014  -0.030  0.015  -0.030 
   (0.98)  (-1.41)  (0.82)  (-1.51)  (0.85)  (-1.51) 
MTB   -0.001 **  -0.001 **  -0.001 **  -0.001 **  -0.001 **  -0.001 ** 
   (-2.22)  (-2.13)  (-2.31)  (-2.18)  (-2.33)  (-2.15) 
DR   0.134 ***  0.133 ***  0.141 ***  0.137 ***  0.138 ***  0.136 *** 
   (3.30)  (3.23)  (3.58)  (3.39)  (3.49)  (3.37) 
DR*BDDDN   0.020  0.023         
   (1.16)  (1.39)         
DR*ACDDN       0.033 **  0.029 **     
       (2.48)  (2.12)     
DR*HIDDN           0.017 *  0.017 * 
           (1.80)  (1.75) 
DR*SIZE   -0.010 ***  -0.009 ***  -0.011 ***  -0.010 ***  -0.011 ***  -0.009 *** 
   (-3.34)  (-3.05)  (-3.77)  (-3.32)  (-3.64)  (-3.25) 
DR*LEV   -0.011  0.008  -0.008  0.010  -0.009  0.009 
   (-0.51)  (0.39)  (-0.36)  (0.51)  (-0.38)  (0.45) 
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  OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*MTB   0.002 **  0.002 *  0.002 ***  0.002 *  0.002 ***  0.002 * 
   (2.53)  (1.69)  (2.60)  (1.71)  (2.61)  (1.71) 
RET   0.051  0.002  0.071  0.020  0.073  0.027 
   (0.88)  (0.04)  (1.22)  (0.40)  (1.26)  (0.55) 
RET*BDDDN   -0.043 **  -0.026         
   (-2.14)  (-1.16)         
RET*ACDDN       -0.031 *  -0.026     
       (-1.86)  (-1.52)     
RET*HIDDN           -0.017  -0.009 
           (-1.50)  (-0.78) 
RET*SIZE   -0.005  -0.000  -0.006  -0.001  -0.007  -0.002 
   (-1.10)  (-0.04)  (-1.45)  (-0.37)  (-1.58)  (-0.60) 
RET*LEV   -0.022  -0.003  -0.020  -0.000  -0.022  -0.002 
   (-0.73)  (-0.10)  (-0.66)  (-0.01)  (-0.69)  (-0.06) 
RET*MTB   0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000 
   (0.69)  (0.36)  (0.89)  (0.68)  (0.97)  (0.66) 
DR*RET   0.613 ***  0.561 ***  0.602 ***  0.530 ***  0.585 ***  0.507 *** 
   (4.08)  (3.62)  (4.00)  (3.43)  (3.86)  (3.27) 
DR*RET*BDDDN +  0.144 **  0.176 **         
   (2.32)  (2.38)         
DR*RET*ACDDN +      0.174 ***  0.199 ***     
       (3.46)  (3.69)     
DR*RET*HIDDN +          0.098 ***  0.111 *** 
           (2.75)  (2.98) 
DR*RET*SIZE −  -0.038 ***  -0.037 ***  -0.038 ***  -0.036 ***  -0.036 ***  -0.034 *** 
   (-3.60)  (-3.34)  (-3.60)  (-3.29)  (-3.41)  (-3.11) 
DR*RET*LEV +  0.070  0.053  0.068  0.050  0.069  0.050 
   (1.64)  (1.21)  (1.59)  (1.12)  (1.60)  (1.12) 
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  OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
DR*RET*MTB +  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004 
   (1.32)  (0.97)  (1.29)  (0.95)  (1.27)  (0.96) 
DS   -0.087 ***  -0.095 ***  -0.083 ***  -0.091 ***  -0.083 ***  -0.092 *** 
   (-2.96)  (-3.13)  (-2.97)  (-3.10)  (-2.95)  (-3.15) 
DS*BDDDN   0.018  0.016         
   (1.09)  (0.93)         
DS*ACDDN       0.003  0.006     
       (0.24)  (0.45)     
DS*HIDDN           0.006  0.005 
           (0.66)  (0.62) 
DS*SIZE   0.005 **  0.006 ***  0.006 ***  0.006 ***  0.006 ***  0.006 *** 
   (2.35)  (2.61)  (2.66)  (2.84)  (2.61)  (2.89) 
DS*LEV   -0.018 *  -0.005  -0.020 *  -0.006  -0.020 *  -0.006 
   (-1.72)  (-0.46)  (-1.90)  (-0.60)  (-1.90)  (-0.57) 
DS*MTB   0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.92)  (0.58)  (0.57)  (0.30)  (0.53)  (0.29) 
∆SALES   -0.089  -0.077  -0.093  -0.088  -0.090  -0.091 
   (-1.21)  (-0.98)  (-1.31)  (-1.15)  (-1.26)  (-1.19) 
∆SALES*BDDDN   -0.002  -0.012         
   (-0.05)  (-0.25)         
∆SALES*ACDDN       0.002  -0.008     
       (0.07)  (-0.25)     
∆SALES*HIDDN           0.006  -0.010 
           (0.25)  (-0.45) 
∆SALES*SIZE   0.007  0.006  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.007 
   (1.24)  (0.94)  (1.38)  (1.11)  (1.32)  (1.18) 
∆SALES*LEV   -0.011  -0.026  -0.011  -0.024  -0.012  -0.024 
   (-0.45)  (-0.94)  (-0.42)  (-0.81)  (-0.47)  (-0.81) 
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  OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
∆SALES*MTB   -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
   (-0.86)  (-0.77)  (-1.01)  (-0.81)  (-1.04)  (-0.80) 
DS*∆SALES   -0.183  -0.193  -0.182  -0.181  -0.187  -0.177 
   (-1.17)  (-1.09)  (-1.13)  (-0.95)  (-1.16)  (-0.93) 
DS*∆SALES*BDDDN   0.261 ***  0.243 **         
   (2.78)  (2.50)         
DS*∆SALES*ACDDN       0.029  0.047     
       (0.40)  (0.57)     
DS*∆SALES*HIDDN           0.023  0.043 
           (0.45)  (0.78) 
DS*∆SALES*SIZE   0.011  0.015  0.016  0.018  0.016  0.018 
   (0.81)  (1.01)  (1.21)  (1.21)  (1.21)  (1.16) 
DS*∆SALES*LEV   0.104 ***  0.126 ***  0.086 **  0.109 ***  0.088 ***  0.109 *** 
   (3.27)  (3.43)  (2.54)  (2.79)  (2.62)  (2.84) 
DS*∆SALES*MTB   0.005  0.000  0.003  -0.002  0.003  -0.002 
   (0.83)  (0.07)  (0.44)  (-0.27)  (0.48)  (-0.26) 
Firm fixed effects   No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry controls   Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Interactions of year 
controls with DR, RET, 
and DR*RET   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Interactions of industry 
controls with DR, RET, 
and DR*RET   Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
n   6466  6466  6466  6466  6466  6466 
Adjusted R2   0.125  0.121  0.118  0.118  0.119  0.117 
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Committee  Both 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Intercept   -0.001  0.000  0.001 
   (-0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
BDDDN   -0.007     
   (-0.57)     
ACDDN     -0.004   
     (-0.43)   
HIDDN       -0.005 
       (-0.94) 
SIZE   -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
   (-0.02)  (-0.01)  (0.07) 
LEV   0.019  0.017  0.017 
   (1.11)  (1.01)  (1.01) 
MTB   -0.001 **  -0.001 **  -0.001 ** 
   (-2.03)  (-2.20)  (-2.16) 
BDEXD   0.019  0.016  0.013 
   (0.75)  (0.62)  (0.51) 
BDEXOWN   0.001  0.001  0.001 
   (0.96)  (1.03)  (0.99) 
BDFEM   -0.010  -0.012  -0.012 
   (-0.35)  (-0.43)  (-0.44) 
STROFAU   -0.017 *  -0.019 **  -0.018 ** 
   (-1.91)  (-2.11)  (-2.09) 
DR   0.117 ***  0.117 ***  0.117 *** 
   (2.66)  (2.65)  (2.66) 
DR*BDDDN   0.027     
   (1.59)     
DR*ACDDN     0.036 ***   
     (2.65)   
DR*HIDDN       0.018 * 
       (1.92) 
DR*SIZE   -0.010 ***  -0.010 ***  -0.010 *** 
   (-3.05)  (-3.28)  (-3.22) 
DR*LEV   -0.001  0.002  0.001 
   (-0.03)  (0.09)  (0.05) 
DR*MTB   0.002 **  0.002 **  0.002 ** 
   (2.36)  (2.46)  (2.43) 
DR*BDEXD   -0.013  -0.004  -0.007 
   (-0.35)  (-0.10)  (-0.20) 
DR*BDEXOWN   -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
   (-0.14)  (-0.17)  (-0.16) 
DR*BDFEM   0.030  0.029  0.032 
   (0.79)  (0.76)  (0.83) 
DR*STROFAU   0.006  0.006  0.007 
   (0.43)  (0.44)  (0.50) 
RET   0.054  0.055  0.058 
   (0.88)  (0.91)  (0.96) 
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Committee  Both 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
RET*BDDDN   -0.032     
   (-1.38)     
RET*ACDDN     -0.024   
     (-1.36)   
RET*HIDDN       -0.014 
       (-1.14) 
RET*SIZE   -0.002  -0.003  -0.004 
   (-0.54)  (-0.79)  (-0.90) 
RET*LEV   -0.027  -0.025  -0.026 
   (-0.89)  (-0.84)  (-0.86) 
RET*MTB   0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.23)  (0.64)  (0.64) 
RET*BDEXD   0.032  0.051  0.054 
   (0.73)  (1.13)  (1.21) 
RET*BDEXOWN   -0.004 *  -0.004 *  -0.004 * 
   (-1.78)  (-1.95)  (-1.94) 
RET*BDFEM   -0.004  0.004  0.006 
   (-0.06)  (0.06)  (0.10) 
RET*STROFAU   0.024  0.023  0.024 
   (1.15)  (1.14)  (1.17) 
DR*RET   0.441 ***  0.431 ***  0.427 *** 
   (2.77)  (2.69)  (2.65) 
DR*RET*BDDDN +  0.182 ***     
   (2.86)     
DR*RET*ACDDN +    0.186 ***   
     (3.63)   
DR*RET*HIDDN +      0.109 *** 
       (2.92) 
DR*RET*SIZE −  -0.035 ***  -0.034 ***  -0.033 *** 
   (-3.17)  (-3.02)  (-2.89) 
DR*RET*LEV +  0.090 **  0.089 **  0.088 ** 
   (2.09)  (2.08)  (2.05) 
DR*RET*MTB +  0.005  0.005  0.005 
   (1.38)  (1.29)  (1.29) 
DR*RET*BDEXD −  -0.067  -0.072  -0.083 
   (-0.52)  (-0.55)  (-0.63) 
DR*RET*BDEXOWN −  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
DR*RET*BDFEM +  0.102  0.072  0.078 
   (0.68)  (0.47)  (0.51) 
DR*RET*STROFAU −  -0.030  -0.027  -0.026 
   (-0.56)  (-0.49)  (-0.48) 
DS   -0.069 *  -0.064 *  -0.065 * 
   (-1.82)  (-1.69)  (-1.72) 
DS*BDDDN   0.015     
   (0.87)     
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Committee  Both 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
DS*ACDDN     0.003   
     (0.20)   
DS*HIDDN       0.005 
       (0.63) 
DS*SIZE   0.005 **  0.006 **  0.005 ** 
   (2.13)  (2.28)  (2.26) 
DS*LEV   -0.025 **  -0.027 **  -0.026 ** 
   (-2.24)  (-2.36)  (-2.34) 
DS*MTB   0.001  0.001  0.001 
   (1.39)  (1.00)  (0.97) 
DS*BDEXD   -0.011  -0.014  -0.013 
   (-0.31)  (-0.39)  (-0.35) 
DS*BDEXOWN   -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
   (-0.90)  (-1.01)  (-0.99) 
DS*BDFEM   0.007  0.018  0.017 
   (0.23)  (0.57)  (0.55) 
DS*STROFAU   -0.001  0.003  0.002 
   (-0.13)  (0.28)  (0.16) 
∆SALES   -0.143 *  -0.140 *  -0.140 * 
   (-1.70)  (-1.68)  (-1.67) 
∆SALES*BDDDN   -0.023     
   (-0.62)     
∆SALES*ACDDN     -0.016   
     (-0.61)   
∆SALES*HIDDN       -0.010 
       (-0.51) 
∆SALES*SIZE   0.006  0.006  0.006 
   (0.99)  (1.03)  (1.03) 
∆SALES*LEV   -0.023  -0.021  -0.022 
   (-0.87)  (-0.78)  (-0.82) 
∆SALES*MTB   -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
   (-0.77)  (-0.89)  (-0.89) 
∆SALES*BDEXD   0.109  0.099  0.099 
   (1.45)  (1.32)  (1.31) 
∆SALES*BDEXOWN   0.002  0.003  0.003 
   (0.54)  (0.58)  (0.58) 
∆SALES*BDFEM   0.036  0.038  0.036 
   (0.41)  (0.44)  (0.41) 
∆SALES*STROFAU   0.091 ***  0.091 ***  0.093 *** 
   (2.93)  (2.95)  (2.98) 
DS*∆SALES   0.059  0.049  0.047 
   (0.31)  (0.26)  (0.25) 
DS*∆SALES*BDDDN   0.250 ***     
   (2.60)     
DS*∆SALES*ACDDN     0.041   
     (0.60)   
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Committee  Both 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
DS*∆SALES*HIDDN       0.032 
       (0.70) 
DS*∆SALES*SIZE   0.006  0.013  0.013 
   (0.45)  (0.96)  (0.95) 
DS*∆SALES*LEV   0.109 ***  0.093 ***  0.095 *** 
   (3.33)  (2.73)  (2.79) 
DS*∆SALES*MTB   0.005  0.003  0.003 
   (0.91)  (0.48)  (0.50) 
DS*∆SALES*BDEXD   -0.273  -0.276  -0.277 
   (-1.48)  (-1.51)  (-1.50) 
DS*∆SALES*BDEXOWN   -0.011  -0.014  -0.014 
   (-1.14)  (-1.59)  (-1.59) 
DS*∆SALES*BDFEM   -0.057  0.026  0.028 
   (-0.30)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
DS*∆SALES*STROFAU   -0.085  -0.036  -0.043 
   (-0.97)  (-0.45)  (-0.54) 
Industry controls   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year controls   Yes  Yes  Yes 
n   6466  6466  6466 
Adjusted R2   0.122  0.117  0.117 
The above table re-estimates Equations (1) to (5) after using accruals before depreciation (ACCBDEP) 
as the dependent variable. ACCBDEP is the accrual component of earnings (ACC) plus depreciation 
expense, scaled by the lagged market value of equity. Other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.  ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. Coefficients involving firm/industry/year 




5.1. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW 
Drawing on various theories, conscious and subconscious differences in 
mentality and behaviour have been attributed to diversity among board members 
(Chen et al., 2017; Lai et al., 2017; Van Peteghem et al., 2018; Riordan and Wayne, 2008). 
Understanding the upside and the downside of diversity is then a key to board 
effectiveness. Less clear is how available empirical proxies map onto different 
theoretical constructs of diversity. The first essay of this thesis contributes to filling 
this gap. In particular, it distinguishes between three constructs of diversity: case-
based asymmetry, balanced diversity, and unique diversity. It then presents three sets 
of criteria to assess how well available empirical proxies map onto these constructs. 
The assessment reveals that these constructs are best captured by using the proportion 
of case directors, proportional balance (excluding null categories/ combinations), and 
dissimilarity proportion, respectively. 
The second essay examines the demand side and the outcome side of diversity, 
after accounting for the nationality composition of non-domestic (foreign) directors. 
This composition can play a vital role in shaping board dynamics as it determines 
three elements of diversity: (i) the level of board nationality diversity, (ii) the strength 
of cultural subgrouping along faultlines, and (iii) the possible presence of 
marginalized foreign minorities. These elements have not yet been directly 
investigated in the literature on the antecedents and consequences of board nationality 
diversity. To fill this gap, this essay begins by distinguishing the first element, which 
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is deemed helpful to the operation of corporate boards, and the other two elements, 
which are mechanisms through which board cultural separation may reduce the value 
of diversity to shareholders. Each of these elements is then measured separately. 
Using a large UK sample, the empirical findings indicate that the level of board 
nationality diversity is driven by the magnitude of foreign activities (measured by the 
proportion of foreign sales), rather than the number of geographical regions in which 
a firm operates. The findings also suggest that higher diversity is associated with 
higher firm value, after addressing potential endogeneity by implementing an 
instrumental variable approach using 2SLS regressions. In addition, no statistically 
significant role is found for the presence of strong board cultural faultlines or 
marginalized foreign directors in moderating the relationship between board 
nationality diversity and firm value. Yet, this relationship is mitigated by levels of 
operational complexity, suggesting that board nationality diversity contributes to firm 
value only under certain circumstances. 
The final essay investigates the nationality compositions of the board and its 
audit committee in relation to conditional conservatism. This area has not been 
investigated in accounting and governance research to date. This essay fills this gap. 
It draws on the theories of groupthink and resource dependence to propose that 
nationality-diverse boards and audit committees are more likely to demand higher 
conservatism in financial reporting compared to their homogeneous (all-domestic) 
counterparts. Employing a sample of UK firms with at least three audit committee 
members, I find that higher nationality diversity on the board and the audit committee 
is associated with greater conservatism. The association is stronger for firms with high 
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diversity on both the board and its audit committee. The results hold after addressing 
potential endogeneity by using 2SLS and fixed effects regressions. The findings 
suggest that foreign nationals who qualify for audit committee membership 
negatively impact its appetite for risk-taking in financial reporting. This effect is 
strengthened when nationality diversity on the audit committee is supported with a 
high level of nationality diversity on the board. 
5.2. IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has a set of implications for academic research on board diversity. 
First, it suggests that both the positive and the negative aspects of board diversity 
should be accounted for simultaneously. Second, it reviews a set of theoretical and 
empirical constructs of diversity that could be applied to diversity within other 
workgroups (e.g., top management teams and audit teams).  Third, it cautions against 
the use of empirical proxies that do not map onto the theoretical construct under 
investigation. Fourth, it introduces geographical proximity between firms’ 
headquarters as a potential driver for similar corporate governance practices. 
The thesis also has some practical implications. First, it directs companies’ 
attention to unique boards as diverse boards with potentially no faultlines nor 
marginalized members. This could help companies in the design of their optimal 
board diversity structures. Second, the thesis shows that board nationality diversity 
creates value for shareholders only when firms are complex.  This could help investors 
in developing a better understanding of the shareholder-value implications of board 
nationality diversity. Third, it identifies a new source of variation in conditional 
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conservatism. This suggests that regulators could advocate higher levels of nationality 
diversity on corporate boards to achieve greater conservatism in financial reporting, 
thereby facilitating efficient contracting between market participants (including 
shareholders, debtholders, and managers).  
This study could therefore be of interest to academics, companies, investors, 
and regulators. 
5.3. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As with all studies, this study has limitations. First, the empirical tests 
emphasise two main constructs of board diversity: uniqueness and separation. Other 
constructs of diversity, such as disparity, are not tested empirically in this thesis. Also, 
the comparisons between available empirical proxies for each diversity construct are 
mainly theoretical, except for those between our proxy for board nationality diversity 
as uniqueness and prior measures of board nationality diversity. Future research may 
explore these points further. Second, while the results survive a battery of robustness 
checks to mitigate sources of endogeneity (including self-selection bias and omitted-
variable bias), endogeneity concerns cannot be completely ruled out. Third, boards 
with strong faultlines are not common in my samples. A possible reason for this is that 
most firms with nationality-diverse boards are actively avoiding the creation of such 
strong faultlines on their boards to get the most out of diversity. Fourth, the empirical 
tests have been conducted employing UK samples. While the results should be 
reasonably generalisable to many other countries, future research might consider the 
use of other samples. 
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5.4. FINAL REMARKS 
This study is a further step toward a better understanding of the theoretical and 
empirical constructs of board diversity. It introduces new theoretical and empirical 
constructs to board diversity research in accounting and finance, opening the door for 
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